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ESSENTIALISM AND QUANTIFIED MODAL LOGIC:
QUINS'S ARGUMENT AND KRIPKE'S
SEMANTICS

Abstract

Quine's argument that quantified
modal logic (QML) is com-

mitted to essentialisn is considered.

It is concluded that although

essentialism seems to be the basis for a
natural account of certain
0f the formulas of

Qj'!L,

Quine has not shown that essentialism is

an inevitable commitment of QML.

Parsons seems to have shown that Kripke's
semantics for QML
allows one to avoid essentialism.

^ast within

It is argued, however, that at

the framework of the system S5 any interpreted
theory

which is anti-essentialist makes no indispensable
use of quantifying

m.

The expressive resources of QML are reducible
to those of un-

quantified modal logic with respect to the models for such
theories.
This result is at least a partial vindication of
Quine's original

claims that the semantics for QML requires essentialism.
It is shown that a claim made by von Wright about the lack

of need for quantiiying in can be vindicated by a proof very similar
to that given to show that anti-essentialism makes quantifying in

dispensable.

In fact, von Wright's Principle of Predication appears

to be consistent with certain limited forms of essentialism, yet
it still leads to the eliminability of quantifying in.

Since at least some connection between quantified S5 and

v

essentialism can be demonstrated, those who
find importance in the
metaphysics associated with QML should be
ready to support essentialism
The metaphysical doctrines associated
with QML are distinguished

trom other doctrines which, despite
similarities of title, are not

linked with the standard interpretations
of QML.

It is argued that

once the appropriate form of essentialism
is distinguished in this

way, it should be recognized that the
resources for its defense are

scarce

vi
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SECTION

I

QUINE'S ARGUMENT

CHAPTER

1

QUINE'S ARGUMENT

i

In

inree Grades of Modal Involvement"^ Quine distinguishes

three different degrees to which we may allow our logic, or
semantics,
to embrace the notion of necessity 2
.

The first two grades employ the

notion of necessity only to distinguish an elite class of true closed
sentences.

For example, we might single out all logical truths as

necessary.

A statement would be said to be necessary if and only if

it were a logical truth.

More typically, necessity is explicated

in terms of analyticity.

The important thing is that necessity

applies only to sentences or formulas which are closed.

In the first

grade, necessity is predicated of statements or closed formulas.
the second, necessity operators

In

attach to statements or closed for-

mulas to form new more complex formulas.

The first grade involves

meta-linguistic claims applying the predicate ’is necessary

1

to sentences.

The second incorporates necessity into the object language (in the modal

operator

)

Some examples should make clear just what is involved.

Consider
(l)

’Every man is either married or not married’ is necessary.

The logical truth of ’Every man is either married or not married’

2

3

warrants the use of the semantical predicate
'is necessary' in this
case.

Necessity is predicated of the statement 'Every
man is either

married or not married.

1

One who is comfortable with analyticity might
want to go a

step further, attributing necessity to all
analytic statements.

He

still involves himself to only the first degree
when he employs
(2)

'All bachelors are unmarried' is necessary

as another way of saying that

lytic.

'All bachelors are unmarried'

is ana-

The attribution of necessity is precisely as clear as
the

attribution of analyticity because it is merely a stylistic variant
of
it

Nothing importantly different is introduced when necessity
is embodied in a statement operator (an operator on closed sentences

or formulas).
(l')

Thus, using

for necessity,

n(every man is either married or not married)

is not importantly different from (l).
r

oA~

1

The truth conditions of

can be given in the obvious way, based upon the notion of logical

truth or analyticity.
truth (is analytic).

r

nA

is true if and only if A is a logical

Such statement operators are the core of modal

logic, distinguishing it from the explicitly semantical discourse
that characterizes the first grade of involvement.

But if the two

grades are treated in the way discussed so far, they are merely

stylistic variants.

There is no important philosophical difference

between them.
A long tradition connects the semantical predicate 'is

necessary' and the statement operator
ity) with logical truth and analyticity.

Langford explain

(

C.

and

'<)'

for possibil-

Lewis and

I.

C.

H.

as follows:

'<}'

Self-consistency or possibility: <>p. This may be read
P is self-consistent" or "p is possible" or "It is possible
that p be true.”
^p is equivalent to "It is false
that p implies its own negation"
„

...

...

This suggests that

is to be interpreted as

signifying logical

truth, but their examples suggest the broader notion of
analyticity as
the proper explicatum.

July

h oh

and

For example, they pick 'Today is Monday,

tjuly 5^h is

not Tuesday' as inconsistent propositions,

and they entertain the idea that 'All men are mortal' is necessarily
,

true

k

Quine deplores the introduction of any context whose truth-

conditions are given in terms of the notion of analyticity.

5

attacks on the analytic-synthetic distinction are well known.

His
c

But in "Three Grades of Modal Involvement," in "Reference and Modality"

and in other places

Q
,

Quine argues that there is a metaphysical dif-

ficulty with the third grade of modal involvement which goes beyond
any difficulties with the first two grades.

The alleged difficulty

is Aristotelian essentialism.

The third grade of modal involvement occurs when modal

operators are allowed to appear before open formulas, and quantifiers

binding the free variables are applied to the longer open formulas
created by such applications of modal operators.

In other words,

quantifiers to the left of a modal operator are allowed to bind

variables to the right of it.

5

we use a modal operator before an
open sentence or formula

it

we can not explain its applicability in
terms of the necessity or

analyticity of the sentence or formula that
follows it.
sentences can be necessarily true or analytic.
i

Only closed

An operator on open

ormulas is importantly different from a semantical
predicate.
D ( it x is a bachelor, then x is not
married)

(o)

can not be construed as
ii

(^+)

x is a bachelor, then x is not married'

is necessary

(logically true; analytic).
The open sentence 'if x is a bachelor, then x is unmarried'
can not

be true, and so of course it can not be necessarily true,
logically

true or analytic.
We can put unis point another way.

The third grade of modal

involvement allows quantification into open sentences like

(

3

)

to

make
(3')

But (3'

(3x)o(if x is a bachelor, then x is unmarried).

can not be explained as

(V)

9

(3x)['if x is a bachelor, then x is unmarried' is

necessary]
(U') is incoherent.
'x'

appears in

(it)

an open sentence.
to quantify in
(5

The

'x'

in

1

)

(it')

(3x)

Quantifiers bind free variables, but the letter
as a part of a complex expression referring to
It is not used as a variable in

makes no sense.

(it’)

‘(it).

So the attempt

is like

(xylophones sound nice).

'xylophones'

is a part of a noun.

It is not a variable

6

-which is bound by the quantifier.

ii

But if the use of the modal operator
before open formulas

can not be explained in terms of the semantical
predicate 'is ne-

cessary', how is this use to be understood?

Quine says that in such

cases necessity no longer "resides in the way in
which we say things."

Now it resides in "the things we talk about." 10

How can we make sense

of such necessity?

Quine argues that we can make sense of such locutions only
if we adopt Aristotelian essentialism.

According to this doctrine

objects have a more intimate association with some of their properties

than with others.
(6)

We can say that sentences of the form

BxnFx

are true whenever there is something which has the property of being
F necessarily or essentially, or whenever there is something with

the property of being necessarily (essentially) F.

But Quine claims

that since essentialism is a repugnant doctrine, the explanation of

sentences like (6) in terms of it must be rejected.

There is, if

Quine is right, no unobjectionable way to make sense of the third
grade of modal involvement.
Quine believes that by associating essentialism with QML he
can discredit QML

.

Like Lewis, Carnap and others, Quine would re-

ject essentialism as an incoherent doctrine.

He concludes that if

quantifying in must be explained in terms of essentialism, then
quantifying in can receive no adequate explanation.

7

As Quine points out:

1 1

Essentialism is abruptly at variance with
the idea, favored
by Carnap, newis and others, of explaining
necessity by
analyticity
'

.

Their program was to use

to mark logical or linguistic neces-

sities, the truths that are made true just
by the way in which we

use words

12

Accepting essentialism is directly contrary to
at least one
goal of tnis approach.

eschewed

m

It was thought that metaphysics could
be

favor of logic and linguistics by giving a
linguistic

account of necessity.

A metaphysical doctrine like essentialism,

the view that some properties are more closely linked
to the being

of an object than are others, was to be regarded as
meaningless
(or, at best, plainly unacceptable because of a lack
of acceptable

foundation).

Only some logical or linguistic counterpart of the view

could be seriously considered.

iii

Quine believes himself to have associated essentialism and

QML in a strong way.

He has given an argument intended to show that

any normal quantified modal system must involve essentialism.

1^

He

says that a system is essentialist if some properties of a thing
are singled out for special status.

place open sentences
(11)
is true,

(

3x)

'

Fx

'

and

'

Gx'

Thus if there

a.re

two one

such that

(aFx.Gx.~QGx)

then the interpreted system is essentialist.

ll+

Quine

then demonstrates that all normal modal systems will involve this sort

8

of essentialism.

p

Let

'

'

stand for any closed formula which is true

hut not necessarily true.
(12)

will be true.

(3x)

(a(x=x)

Ev^rj/

Then
.

(p.x=x) .~o(p.x=x)

ohing satisfies the open formula following
the

quantifiers, so in non-empty domains, something does.

And (12)

is an instance of the essentialist schema
(ll).

As we shall see, 15 Quine's criterion of
essentialist commitment
(ll) is inadequate, since a semantics can be
given which makes some

formulas of the -orm of (ll) true but which relies upon an
unprob-

lematic, solely logical account of the satisfaction of open
modal
formulas

.

Thus this argument fails to show that

a.ll

must embrace a problematically metaphysical doctrine.

modal systems
A part of

this dissertation will be concerned with the development of a more

suitable characterization of essentialism.

dissertation will explore the relationship

The major portion of the
of.

-essentialism, so

characterized, to QML.
This sketch of Quine's polemic against QML has, in outline
at least, followed the exposition in "The Three Grades of Modal In-

volvement.”

We will turn now to a more detailed discussion of other

papers in which Quine discusses the problems of combining quantifiers

with modal operators

1^

iv
It has been over thirty years since Quine first pointed out

9

referential peculiarities that occur when
non-truth-functional statement operators occur in a formal language.

In "Whitehead and the Rise

of Modern Logic" he formulated a principle
of truth-functionality

adhered to in Frincicia Mathematica 1

^

one statement is capable of containing
other statements truthfunc oionally only i e
in such a way that the truth value
(truuh or ialsehood) of the whole remains when
a true part
is replaced by any other truth, or
a false part is replaced
by any other falsehood.
;

.

.

,

He then noted that in all departures from
this principle of

which he had knowledge, a "sacrifice" was made with
regard to "the
admiss ability of a certain cmmmon-sense mode of inference:

inference

by inter-changing terms that designate the same object." 18

In a

footnote,
Langford.

19

he cites, as an example, the use of '9' by Lewis and

20

-ney employ this sentence operator in such a way that

0 (number of planets in solar system<7
is true but

0

(

9 <7

)

is false, although both

'9'

and 'number of planets in solar system'

designate the same object.
In several later writings,

21

Quine returns to a consideration

of how co-designative terms behave in modal contexts.

He connects

the "common-sense mode of inference" discussed above with some more

general observations about designation and quantification, and he
concludes that any attempt to explain existential generalization of

statements beginning with modal operators conflicts with the program
of explicating modal-

operators ('o' and

'<>')

or modal terms

10

(

necessarily', 'possibly') solely in terms
of the notion of analy

ticity (or logical truth).

Thus he says that 22

referential opacity afflicts the so-called
modal contexts
Necessarily
and 'Possibly
at least when they
are given one sense of strict necessity
and possibility as
Lewis's modal logic.
'

-

m

he general idea of strict modalities is based
on the putative
notion of. analyticity as follows: a statement
of the form
Necessarily
is true if and only if the component
statement which 'necessarily' governs is analytic.
.

.

.

'

.

.

Quine attempts to show that there is conflict
between the

attempt to freely combine quantifiers with modal
operators when they
are explained in this way.

Accepting such an explanation, one will

say that
(1)

(9 >7)

is true, but that
(2)

n(the number of planets>7)

is false, since
(

3

)

9>7

is analytic, but
(4)

The number of planets>7

is not.

As we have seen, this conflicts with the principle that co-

referential singular terms are interchangable

,

salva veritate

.

But

conflict with this principle will not, by itself, occasion discomfort
for the modal logician.

The modal logician needs to worry only if

this principle is an indispensable part of his logical system
i.e., an indispensable aspect of the interpretation of formally

11

stated theories
Quine attempts to create worries for the modal
logician by

connecting the principle of interchangeability of
co-referential
singular terms with the fundamental semantics of
quantifiers.^

In

ordinary first-order quant if icational logic, the following
principle
holds
(8)

If a denotes u, then u satisfies

..x..?

m

r

...a...

is true,

if and only if

and u fails to satisfy

'...a...'

if and only if
r
.

..x...

is false.

An equivalent version of (8) takes explicit account of co— referential

terms
(8')

If a and

both denote u, then u satisfies

3

if and only if

...a...'

and u fails to satisfy
and

r
.

.. 3

On the basis of this

,

r

f

and

.

..

3 ..?

r
.

..x..?

are both true

if and only if

'...x...'

r
.

..a..?

..^ are both false.

we can make explicit the restrictions on uses

of EG.
(9)

(

3x)

(

.

.

.

x.

.

.

)

singular term3, if

truth-value of

r

follows from
3

.

..a..?

only if for every

denotes what a denotes, then the

'...3..^

is the same as that of

from

r
.

..a..?

if and only if

thing that a denotes satisfies

r

...a..?
r

.

..a.. 9

.

~i

r

This is justified on the basis of (8') since

r

(3x)

(

.

.

.x.

.

.

follows

is true if and only if the
n

...x...

.

Thus in the first-order

logic there is a link between the proper use of existential generaliza-

tion and the inter-changeability of co-referential terms.

12

In English we can find contexts
which do not allow existential

generalization.

For example, we can not quantify into
quotational

contexts
(

3x)

x'

(
'

has five letters)

is not inferrable from

'nine' has five letters.

Also
(

3x) (John believes that x is a spy)

is not inferrable from

John believes that the tallest spy is a spy.

Substitution of co-referential terms is not truth-preserving in
eitner case

a symptom of the referential peculiarity of such sentences.

lhus Quine connects existential generalization with the apparatus

of reference, saying that the principle embodied in existential

generalization is "simply the logical content of the idea that a
given occurence is referential." 2b
•

'

(

3x)

(

.

.

.

x.

.

.

can be inferred from

The general principle is that
r
.

..a.. 7

occurs in purely referential position in

r
.

if and only if ’x'

..x..?

.

One indi-

cation that’x’is not in purely referential position in

r
.

..x..7

that there are two co-referential terms, a and 3, such that

and

r
.

..3--7

1

r

is

...a...'

7

differ in truth value.

This connection between reference and existential generaliza-

tion can be given the following defense.

Failure of substitutivity

salva veritate of co-referential terms in a context shows that something
other than reference is involved in determining the truth-value of

13

substitution instances of that context.
other than reference can matter.

But with variables, nothing

Each object either satisfies or

fails to satisfy an open sentence.

It is only in terms of bare

satisfaction that we evaluate open sentences.

The singular terms

that refer to an object make no difference in considering
whether
that object satisfies an open formula.
the same reference

So, if singular terms with

force different truth-values in a particular

context, then something other than reference makes a difference in

evaluating ohat context

.

To form an open sentence by replacing

a singular term oy a variable in such a context is not permissible,

since in that context more than reference must be evaluated; but

there is nothing more to the context to evaluate when a variable
occurs there.
Put another way, we are arguing that the semantics for quan-

tifiers is given in terms of the satisfaction of open formulas.

An

open formula is satisfied (or not) by an object, irrespective of

what means are available for referring to that object.
and

3

are co-referential, and

r

“1

But if a

r-

is true but

...a...

1

... 3 ...

is

not, then the way they refer, not merely their referent, is relevant

m

r

that context.

Determining whether an object satisfies

...x...

is problematic in such cases because the context has such referential

peculiarities.

But evaluation of the open formula in terms of objects
r

is what a proper evaluation of

(

~i
,

3x

)

(

.

.

.

x.

.

.

would require.

The

semantics for quantifiers requires that existential generalization
be used only on "purely referential" occurences of singular terms.

As we observed above, co-referential terms
can not, in general

be interchanged in modal contexts, if modality is
explicated in
terms of analvticity (or some similar notion).

'd 9>7'

is true

but 'Dthe number of planets>7’ is false, according to the
traditional

interpretation of

But those who wish to quantify into modal

contexts must hold that it is coherent to speak of objects satis-

fying

Dx >7

even though the truth of

other than what the referent of a is.

rna>7~

1

depends upon things

The link between inter-

changeability of co-referential terms and satisfaction is broken.

v
In this section we will explore some ways in which one can

restrict singular terms or their referents in an attempt to formulate
a modal system in which the quantifiers function in an ordinary

way, so that the semantics will guarantee that existential generaliza

tion is a sound inferential' procedure.

The problem is to reconcile

the account of necessity as analyticity with the ordinary semantics
for the quantifiers.

For a time, Quine thought that one could save QML by restricting the domain over which quantifiers ranged to intensional entities.

Following a suggestion of Church,

^

he held that by paying the onto-

logical price of such a restriction we could save

QML,

from the

referential problems outlined above.
The problems involving co-referential terms can be avoided
if, for any singular terms a and 3? if a and 3 are co-referential,

than '"Fa

1

and

r

_1

aF3

have the same truth-value.

Substitution into

15

modal contexts is then warranted.
then so is

r

1

aa=3'

(since

r

na=oT'

In particular, if ra =p

1

is true,

is).

If a and b are inters ional entities
then they themselves are

necessarily co-referential if co-referential at
all.

So it was

thought that restriction to such entities would
satisfy the demands

of QML.
But, as Quine later saw, this expedient is, byt
quate.

itself, inade-

No matter what the objects of our domain are,
they can

always be contingently specified.

Let us suppose that our quanti-

fiers range over intensional objects (individual concepts). 27
Let

stand for an arbitrary sentence which is true but not analytic.

1

'

Define a function f in the following way:
x if p.

f(x) =

j

0 if
1 if

^
^

and x^O.
and x=0.

Since 'a=a' is analytic
(T)

is true.
(8)

D (a=a)

So,

f(a)=a

since p is true.

By substituting in (7), which is what is supposed

to be allowed by our restriction to intensional objects,
(9)

But

'

o(f(a)=a).

f(a)=a* is not analytic, so
(10

~a(f (a)=a)

l6

Thus any language which allows the
free use of function
23
symbols
forming singular terms can not allow
inter-substitu-

m

tivity oi expressions denoting identicals
and at the same time have
r

it that

nq1

is true if and only if
q is analytic.

Restriction to intensional entities is not an
adequate remedy.
We need to restrict the singular terms in
such a way that if a and
3

are singular terms, then if

truth-value as

r

aF3^

r

a=f

is true, then

r

cFcT

has the same

But that restriction works, if at all, even

.

29
if no restriction is placed on the range of the
variables.
T
.\

terms.
if

r

should tnen explain the method of restricting the singular

e

We pick our singular terms so that for any terms
a and 3,
n

a=3

is true, then

A fortiori

,

if

r

a=3~

1

'

aFcT

has the same truth value as

is true, so is

W=3"

r

!

nF3~

.

T
.

Any two co-referential

terms are necessarily co-referential.
on

But Quine has given an argument

that we can use

to show that if definite descriptions are among the singular terms
of language and if any two co— referential terms are necessarily

co-referential, then modal distinctions break down.

formula p is true if and only if

r

l

njT

is true,

Any closed

under these conditions.

A consequence of the requirement on singular terms is the

following
(1)

If (ox) Fx = (ax) Gx, then d(ox) Fx = (ax) Gx.

It follows from (l) that
(2)

If (ax) Fx = (ax) Gx, then a(w)

(Fw if and only if Gw).

The following is in turn a consequence of (2).
(3)

If (3x)((w)(Fw if and only if w=x) and (w)( Gw if and

IT

only if w-x))

s

then a(w)(Fw if and only if Gw ). 31

Any modal system with descriptions
among its primitive singular terms
must, it seems, satisfy this condition,
if quantifiers and modal
operator

are to be xreely combined.

s

But) let
u=v.

'

p
'

3_

stand for any true sentence and suppose that

Then
(w)((p and w=v) if and only if w=u)

(^)

(

5

(w)(w=v if and only if w=u)

)

(6)

(ax)

(

(w)((p

and w— v

)

if and only if w=x) and (w)(w=v

if and only if w=x))
(10)

By (3), d(w)((p and w=v) if and only if w=v)

(T)

m((p and v=v) if and only if v=v)

(8)

3-2
(

nv=v

9

ap
Thus from the assumption ohat p is true we have deduced that it is

necessary.
r

p=DP

Since the converse also holds, we can conclude that

is a theorem, thus vitiating modal distinctions.

Quine seems to believe that this argument applies to all

QML systems

.

We actually have only an argument that shows that cer-

tain assumptions about descriptions lead to a breakdown of modal

distinctions.

But if we formulate our quantified modal system without

making the assumption that descriptions are a part of its primitive
vocabulary, we may be able to avoid this disastrous consequence.
If descriptions are always eliminated contextually, for example,

perhaps we can have a viable QML.

3b
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What we should try to formulate, then,
is a quantified modal

system which does not have descriptions'35
among its primitive singula
terms and which is such that if
same truth-value as

r

aF$

r

7

a=|3

is true then r aFa'1

has the

for any primitive singular terms a and

,

Quine claims that what is needed to give
such a semantics
for QML is essentialism.

If

r

aFa

is read as saying that the object

that a denotes is necessarily, or essentially,
F, then if ra=3~’ is

true then

?3

will have the same truth-value as

is now of things, not of words; the uses
of

in terms of linguistic or logical rules. 37

prized category

o±

'Fa'

.

Necessity

can not be

explained

Rather than marking a

expressions, the modal operator now indicates

a special intimacy between the subject and what is
predicated of
it

.

The claim that there is such a

special intimacy" between some

objects and some of their properties is the metaphysical doctrine

of essentialism.

Essentialism can serve as a basis for severing the tie

between

'o'

and analytic, ity.

The essentialist semantics for

provides us with a way to make existential generalization possible.

Variables and singular terms within its scope can have purely referential occurence; since sentences in which

'a'

occurs are evaluated

in terms of whether the properties predicated in the sentence

governed by

'o'

are essential.

The properties of the object denoted

by a (in particular, whether it is necessarily or essentially
what count in evaluating

r

oFa

— not

the formal properties of

are

F)
r

1

Fa"

.

19

One might respond at this point
that even if ve hold that

essentialism can provide a semantical basis
for QML, we are not forced
to give such a metaphysical semantics.
r

fulfilling our condition that
adequate semantics for QML.

There may be other ways of

a=3^( Fc^aF3)~'

For example, we could restrict our sin-

gular terms so that for any two terms a and
r

only if

o=3'

is analytic.

be made valid by any

r

is true if and

o=f?

3,

Since we have removed descriptions and

functions from our basic singular terms, and
since two different

proper names or constants a and
P

•

a-3

is analytic,

38

3

are presumably never such that

this suggestion amounts to a proposal to make

sure that no two constants of the language refer
to the same object.
Such a proposal can be implemented.
’1',

For example, let 'O',

'2', etc. be our only singular terms.

unless a=3
is analytic

,

and if a=3 then rQa=|?

Then

is true since

r

_5

a=3

is false

ra=3~

!

(i.e.,

r

a=(?

)

Since no two terms are co-referential, inter-substitu-

.

tivity principles are vacuously true. We can stipulate that
is true if and only if

r

FcT

is analytic.

¥e will say that

r

r

aFa’

:

1

oFx'

is satisfied by n if and only if the singular term a denoting n
is such that

satisfy
v

r

r

Fa

ox>7‘.

is analytic.
9

Thus if '‘9>7

will not satisfy

9 numbers the planets''

r ax

is not analytic.

/

is analytic, 9

numbers the planets"

will

1

,

since

An account of satisfaction

based on analyticity can be given in this way.
More simply, we could satisfy our semantical requirements
on singular terms by abolishing singular terms, using only variables

and quantifiers as our referential apparatus.

We could then stipulate

20

that for any closed formula A,

r

aA1 is true whenever A is analytic.

Several explanations of the satisfaction of
(in one free variable) seem plausible.

r

1

One that seems particularly

promising is to allow that something satisfies
j-

if

.

when A is open

aA~

r

nA

l

if and only

~i

,

(x)A

is analytic

(where A is a formula with 'x' as its sole

free variable).
As we shall see later, these suggestions can serve as the

basis for a semantics for QML.

But they do so only by making the

uses of the resources of QML trivial in certain ways
we shall ignore such possibilities

,

For now

.

concentrating on traditional

explanations of what it is for an open formula

r

to be satisfied.

aA?

vi

We would do well now to see what more can be said to support
the contention that the semantics for QML requires essentialism.
As we have already seen, in a language with singular terms and or-

dinary quantificational rules (in particular the rule of existential

generalization), it must be that any two co-referential terms a and
r

3

only if
3

is true and such that

are such that aa=3’
r

aF3

is true.

r

ciFof

is true if and

But it is not true in general that if a and

are co-referential then

r

cx=f is analytic or that Fa is analytic

if and only if F 3 is analytic.

h0

Thus it seems that if quan-

tifiers and singular terms are combined, then the use of

can

not be explained in a natural way solely in terms of tha analyticity

of what follows it.

As we have already mentioned, essentialism pro-

vides a natural basis for understanding uses of

'o'

in QML.

21

But since Quine favors banishing
singular terms from the

primitive vocabulary of formal languages

1,1

it is important to his

argument that it be possible to show that
essentialism is involved
even if singular terms are eliminated.

formulas like 'Fx'

1

The satisfaction of open

receives a natural explanation in terms
of

essentialism whether or not there are singular
terms.
r

that something satisfies

necessarily

F.

D Fx"

We can say

if and only if it is essentially
or

It must, in other words, bear a
special relation-

ship to that particular one of its properties.

But so far we have

found no argument that shows that systems without
singular terms must
rely upon essentialism.
Quine has argued extensively , although somewhat
cryptically,
that even though most of his examples showing that
QML involves

essentialism exploit singular terms, the presence of singular
terms
is not crucial to the failure of attempts to explain
uses of

QML in terms of analyticity.

Thus he says that**

in

2

this expository reversion to our old singular terms is avoidable as may now be illustrated by re-arguing the meaninglessness of
qx ) x is necessarily greater than 7)
(30)
in another way.
Whatever is greater than 7 is a number, and
any given number greater than 7 can be uniquely determined by
any of various conditions, some of which have 'x>7' as a
necessary conseuqence, some of which do not.
One and the same
number x_ is uniquely determined by the condition:
,

(

(

(

32

)

x.

=

+ ^
+
21

^ y~x

and by the condition
There are exactly x. planets,
(33)
but (32) has ’x>7' as a necessary consequence while (33)
does not.
Necessary greaterness than 7 makes no sense as
applied to a number x; necessity attaches only to the connection between 'x^ and the particular method (32), as opposed
to (33), of specifying x_1

22

What can we make of this argument?

The use of the notion of

necessary consequence suggests that what
Quine means to say is that
although
(A)

o(x =

fx

+

'V'1c

+

Vx

t

-\Tx

x > T

is always satisfied
(B)

is not

(NP}px>7

(where 'NPx' means

'x

numbers the planets’).

since there might have been only

5

planets, it is possible that

numbers the planets but is not greater than
Thus

In particular,
5

7.

,

0(NP5.~(5>7)),
i.e.

,

~a(NP5z>(5>7)).
So far this poses no problem for the modal logician.
tact,

The

that there is a logical relation between the antecedent and con-

sequent of (A) but there is no such relationship between the antecedent and consequent of (B) is not, by itself, any difficulty.

But

in a passage shortly after this one, Quine makes a remark that

suggests where he sees the problem.
But the important point to observe is that granted an understanding of the modalities (through uncritical acceptance,
for the sake of argument of the -underlying notion of anulyticity), and given an understanding of quantification ordinarily so called, we do not come out automatically with any
meaning for quantified medal sentences such as (30)
((3x.)(x_ is necessarily greater than 7)).
,

The point seems to be that although we can understand (A) and
(B)

in such a way that

(A)

is always satisfied but

(B)

isn’t (because

23

there is a logical relation
between the antecedent and
consequent
of (A) "but not of (B))
n w^
n not
on the v
basis of that, understand
'

(30).

That we can deduce

’

™

’x>7' from one open formula
specifying

the number 9 does not warrant
our claiming that 9 satisfies 'Ux>7

'

,

Since we can not deduce 'x>7' from
some other ways of specifying
9.
To say that 9 satisfies 'ox>7'
would be to favor one way of specifying that number over others.

But that is essentialism.

Thus the

remark that analyticity (or, in this
case, the related notion of
analytic consequence) is not an adequate
basis for determining

whether 9 satisfies 'mx>7'.

™

s

argument leaves something to be desired.

It is simply

an argument that an understanding of (A)
and (B) provides no obvious

way of understanding

(

30 )

It is not adequate to show that
analyti-

city can not be used to give an understanding
of (30).
On the other hand, Quine's conclusion that
even if we under-

stand analyticity and quantification "we do not come
out automatically

with any meaning for quantified modal sentences such
as (30)" is not
without merit.

As we have seen, an explanation of

in terms of analy-

ticity which was adequate for the first two grades of modal
involvement is not extendable in any obvious way to the third grade.

We also

saw that the inferential principle EG (which applies, of course,

only in languages with constants) runs into difficulties in modal
logic.

But tnat principle seems to be a very natural outgrowth of the

ordinary semantics for quantifiers and constants.

Quine's attempts

to find such problems in languages without constants are not

completely convincing, but in
considering languages with constants
We Sa" Str0ng reaSOns t0 ex
P laln
uses of
in ways that did
not rely on the notion of analyticity.

In giving an essentialist

semantics for such formulas we have
to develop an account of satisfaction which can also be used in
giving a semantics for languages

without constants.

Essentialist semantics for QML is at
least a

natural outgrowth of consideration of
some of the ptoblems we have
discussed.

Essentialism in so far as it is comprehensible
at all, will
provide an adequate basis for a semantics
for QML.
can be given by allowing that u satisfies
is essentially F.

A facile semantics

if and only if u

This completely removes consideration of
analyti-

city from the evaluation of such formulas.

Essentialism is thus suggested as a natural basis
for interpreting the formulas of modal systems which allow
quantifiers to

bind variables "across” modal operators.

An adequate understanding

of essentialism would provide an adequate
understanding of quantifying
in.

But we have tound

no.

absolutely convincing argument in Quine's

writings that legitimately concludes that essentialism is
a semantical
requirement of QML.
Quine's argument is not, of course, an argument in support
of essentialism.

His argument is meant to show that we can make no

sense of quantifying into modal formulas

— i.e.,

that the account

of satisfaction that we must give for such formulas is ultimately

inadequate.

By showing that the account of satisfaction relies

25

upon essentialism, he believes
that he has discredited QML.

Since

QML makes sense only if essentialism
does, QML does not make sense.
Thus, Quine argues, if we assume
that essentialism is false
or incoherent, we will be forced
to admit that QML has no acceptable

semantics.

But

if we do not propose to quantify
across the necessity operator
6 USS ° x that
°P erat or ceases to have any clear advantage
over merely quoting a sentence and
saying that it is analytic.
_

Thus modal logic without quantifiers
is useless; modal logic with

quantifiers is unacceptable.^
Quine gives us two grounds for rejecting
a formal system;

that it is useless or that it is philosophically
unacceptable.

Quine

argues that QML should be rejected because
its semantics is based
upon an unacceptable metaphysical doctrine.

We shall later see

that a semantics can be given which does not
implement essentialism.
But we shall also see that restriction to such
a semantics raises

serious questions of the usefulness of QML.

We will conclude that,

for at least some purposes, the rejection of essentialism
maices

QML worthless.

vii

There is another traditional philosophical terminology which
we can use to restate Quine's point in a quite succinct way.

By

talking of modalities de dicto and de re and of objects possessing
properties
•

-

,

we can make the conflict between quantifying in and the
•

analyticity interpretation of necessity quite clear.
.

'hi

Necessity de dicto is the necessity that resides in words.

*+7
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When ’ ln

h

feCOnd srads 0:

'

involvement ,

was used to mark

the analytic! ty of what
followed, modal logic was used
in connection

with necessity de dicto

.

De re necessity, on the other
hand, is necessity used in

conjunction with a claim that some
object necessarily has a certain
property
An object satisfies an open
sentence if and only if it

possesses the property the open sentence
expresses.

Tims

an account of the satisfaction of
formulas of the form

to give

W
,

,

one

must say what it is for something to
have the property of being

necessarily

F.

Such a de re necessity applies
independently of how

a thing is designated.

Quine echoes the traditional terminology

when he says that when quantifying in
occurs, necessity is no longer
"of words" but is now "of things."

me

conflict that Quine points out, then, is simply
a re-

flection of the fact that when quantifiers are
freely combined with

modal operators

we no longer know whether the modal operators

,

indicate de dicto or de re necessity.

We graft QML onto unquantified

modal logic, and typically when this is done no new
account of
necessity before closed formulas is given, so presumably
some uses

must still be
of

DFx

de_

dicto

.

But to give an account of the satisfaction

we must, it seems, give an account of a new use of

connection with

de_ re_

modality.

A thing satisfies

only if it has the property of being necessarily

T

in

oFx' if and

F.

The principle problem is that formulas with quantifying in

are linked in important ways to
formulas which lack quantifying in.

From

r

1

we expect to infer r 3xoFx\

oFa~

But if

marks de dicto

necessity in the former formula and
de re necessity in the latter,
then there is reason to question
whether such a logic can make this

inference work: particularly if de dicto
necessity is explicated
as analyticity.

Thas we find the need to give a new
account of
(

3x ) nFx

infecting

our old account of

tell us something about ’Fa
a

du.no

1

r

1

nFa“

.

Does

W

in

1
,

when tru

or something about the object that

The former is what

de_

dicto reading would have.

existential generalization seems to require the

de_

But

re reading.

Quine's remarks can be seen as merely an
attempt to show that
if quantiiying in is to be allowed, then we
must recognize that

the account of

in terms of analyticity is inadequate for
the

cases in which

occurs before open formulas, and, furthermore,

ohat this account of

seems to be compromised even in cases in

which it appears before closed formulas containing constants.
inferential ties of
'a'

oFa

to

(3x)nFx

make the

de_

The

dicto reading of

questionable even for formulas lacking quantifiers.
But when de dicto reading is called into question, we must

search for a new account of necessity.

As we have already seen,

an essentialist account seems to be the only plausible candidate.

Sentences in which necessity occurs de

re_

have traditionally been

tied to essentialist claims, and no other account suggests itself
so strongly.

discussion of the do re-de _dicto
distinction may make
Quine's argument more accessible.
But continued use of this
term ieulogy would, in some ways,
impede our efforts to evaluate
Quine' s
views with respect to formally
interpreted versions of QML.
For
TtiiS

this reason we will use this
terminology only occasionally, when

accessibility seems particularly elusive
without it.
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Quine’s polemic against QML is based
primarily upon a con-

sideration of examples of the behavior
of singular terms and the
inference rule existential generalization.

While this may provide

a good means for focusing upon
the semantical issues that Quine

wishes to discuss, it is misleading in
two respects.
First of all, Quine should not rely
upon consideration
of inferences involving singular terms.

If the problem of essential

ism is to have any force for Quine (or for
anyone else) it must
also show up when one considers languages
from which singular terms
have been eliminated.

Essentialism must be a part of the account

of the satisfaction of open formulas lacking
constants

,

if it

is to be a commitment of QML.

recognizes onis and has attempted to argue that the

consideration of examples with singular terms does not affect the
conclusion linking essentialism with QML.
'/i

,

But as we saw in section

his arguments ^nat the semantics for QML (without singular terms

requires essentialism are not adequate.
Quine's discussion of QML and essentialism in terms of the

29

inference rule existential generalization
is also misleading in

another way.

It suggests that modes of
inference involving modal

operators are the source of essentialist
commitments.

But the notion

of the metaphysical commitment of
a mode of inference is quite
unclear.

Quine should he calling our attention
to the commitments

involved in giving a semantics for QML
theories.

(Of course, the

inferences one is allowed to make are a
good indication of the
semantics that we wish to give.
Quine has made it clear that his principle
interest in formal

languages is as languages for theories^ 8

;

so it is reasonable to

view his remarks on EG as attempts to call our
attention to problems

which appear when QML is used as the language of
a theory.

In ad-

dition, Quine makes it clear that he regards QML's
commitment to

essentialism as a metaphysical commitment.

It is not merely a

feature of inference forms of the same formal structure
as inferences involving possibility and necessity.

But a metaphysical

commitment is above all a commitment of a theory.
Thus in chapters 3-8 we shall consider the interpretations
of QML theories and the nature of their connection (if any) with

essentialism, and we shall concentrate primarily upon constantfree versions of QML.
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Except, cf. discussion of Hintikka's systems.
-

*n

^ferring steps

en i-

(9) and ( 10 ) it is assumed that if
d 1 5 then Dp and if'n(p<>q) then rap'.
These hold

marks analyticity or logical truth.
3 I*

Cf.

chapter
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m

Or function symbols, since a similar argument
works
that case.
3o

Certain descriptions and functions could be allowed,
som. - ^ s trictions were placed to rule out the
troublesome ones.
We will consider the more general practice of ruling
out all of them.
i^f

33

UntroU^ ^ esome descriptions
could be acl

comodated'^to^our^rg^ents

planations trivialize

.

QmT in certain^ays!
'
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Carnap, Meaning and Necessity
(Chicago, 19 U 7
1956) 196
"i
l08ic wlthout ^antification is
of
interest o^lv
1S
" ider SyStem ineludl hg quantification.
If such a wider
d
svs?f
System
found to be impossible, logicians
would
Z
OUld
°
probably abandon
modal logic entirely."
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Quine attributes the unacceptabilitv
of QML to its inooherence.
He would say that essentialism is
ultimately incoherent
so QML must be semantically
incoherent. As we shall later see
contemporary semantics gives some sense
to essentialism and QML at
sam ® time.
But eve n if ve suppose that essentialism
is coherent,
!
+h ere
still, remains to Quine the argument
that QML is unacceptable
e cause essentialism is false, if
he can establish that QML is
committed to essentialism.
46

Cf

.

Part II and Parsons, op

cit.

47

Qume himsel: would have certain reservations about such
ogv.
Our point is not to argue for its acceptability,
but
ra her to employ it as a helpful way to restate
some of our
ermmo

previous

discussion.
48
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2

SOME REACTIONS

m

this chapter we will briefly
examine some ways of handling

QML Xhat might be thou ht to
avoid the problems that Quine
S
has
brought to light.
In each case the problem
that Quine stresses,
the fact that an essentialist
semantics must be given, remains,

even though no formal paradoxes are
apparent in the modal systems

suggested.

Arthur

F.

Smullyan and Frederic

B.

Fitch have followed a

suggestion made by Church, arguing that QML
can be made acceptable

by banishing troublesome singular terms
from the primitive vocabulary of the language.

1

By eliminating descriptions in favor
of

their Russellian expansions, they hope to
remove all appearances
of paradox from QML.

O

Following this line,^

one will require disambiguation of

the statements appearing in the arguments that
Quine uses to dis-

credit QML.
(1)

For example, the argument
Q 9>7

(2)

The number of planets = 9.

(3)

oThe number of planets > 7.

has several renderings in a system which uses contextual definitions

3h

35

p^iorib

•

(2*)

U)

.

13

(3x)(Px. (y

(j) has at least three

(3*)

**)

(

(

D ( 3x

3 * **

(

(

)

)

3x )

symbolized as above, but
(

)

Py=y=x

)

x=9

.

(

Px

.

(

.

(

)

becomes

renderings

Px (y) (Py=y= x .x>7)

3x ) Px

2

)

(

.

(

)

(

y

) (

Py =y=x

y ) Px=y=x
(

depending upon what one

)

.

x>7
x >7

) .

)

tai.es to be the scope of
the description.

WS Can simP lif y our discussion
a bit by ignoring the exis-

tence claims made by the desciptions
and using logical rules to
derive some consequences of
(2) and (3 ) which can serve as an
adequate basis for our discussion.
(

2

(

3

'

)

’

)

(3’’)
3

'

(x) (P xh x = 9

o(x

)

(x)n(Px=3x> 7

)

Px=x3x>7

)

'
'

(

(3

)

)

)

Px=>x> 7

(

x

) (

) (

We then have

and (3'') both seem to assert a necessary
connection

between numbering the planets and being greater
than 7

Everyone

.

denies that any such connection exists, so
we should regard both
(3

)

and (3'') as false.

(l)

and (2') are both true, so QML would

be in trouble if either (3') or (3") followed
from (l) and (2').
But no one , including Quine, has suggested that
either does follow,
so there is no problem.

(3'"), on the other hand, does follow from
So th

-

modal logician must say that

apparently no problem in accepting

(3*

(

3

T

1

)

’
’

is

true.

(l)

if

and

(

2 ’).

But there is

as true, since

(

3

’

1

)

36

asserts no necessary connection between
numbering the planets and
being greater than 7
.

This gambit is

,

to an extent, successful.

an apparent paradox in QML can be
resolved.

It shows that

There is no formal

contradiction that can be derived within the
system, nor are we

forced to assert any necessary connections
that are undesirable.
(We need not say thao being identical
with 9 and numbering the planet:

are necessarily connected.)

All we need to do is to recognize that

the scope of descriptions makes a difference
when modal operators
are used, and that one must make an important
decision about where

to place modal operators when he is translating
a sentence into his

formal system."’
But as a response to Quine's total offensive
against QML,

this move is by itself inadequate.

What Quine ultimately relies

upon is not a charge of formal inconsistency, but rather
a charge
of semantical incoherence.

This charge remains to be met because

the modal logician who uses this method for rescue must

his claim thao (3'

)

is true.

justify

Giving truth conditions for

requires him to say what it is for an object to satisfy
A fortiori he must say when an object satisfies 'ax>7'.

'

(3'

'
'

(Pxnox>7)
As we have

already argued, to explain what it is for objects to satisfy formulas
of that form is, prime facie

,

to explain essentialism.

'ax> 7

'

is apparently satisfied by anything that is necessarily or essentially

greater than

7-

While some natural non-essentialist interpretation

may be available, essentialism is what suggests itself most urgently
as the explanation of the satisfaction conditions of such formulas.

37

To have QML one must explain
what it is for formulas

to be satisfied by an object.

W

Smullyan and Fitch would have
answered

Quine if they had given a
non-essentialist account of the satisfacsncn for^uiab.

They ao not do so, so Quine's
challenge to pro-

vide a non-essentialist semantics
for QML is not met by their
responses.

We haVe exPTained the ways in
which one might argue that

essentialism arises in systems in which
the basic singular terms
are restricted so that for any
two such singular terms a and
3 if
r

a=3

is true, then

W

has the same truth-value as

W

.

One

must give an account of what it is
for an object to satisfy an open

formula

f

°Fx1

;

and that is most naturally done by saying
that an

object satisfies

W

if and only if it satisfies Fx and
it bears

some special relation to the property
that Fx expresses.

(We saw

that if Fa is analytic if and only if F3
is, whenever r a=3~ is true,

then we can give an account of satisfaction
of
analyticity.

But this is a very special case.

r

1

nFx

in terms of

Indeed, a language

with two co-referential terms would normally fail
to fulfill this
condition

.

Jaako Hintikka has supported the other means of avoiding
the conflicts that arise between the explanation of

in terms

of analyticity and the use of quantifiers to bind variables
"across'
a modal operator.

We can view this maneuver as a restriction on

the use of EG, thus altering quantif icational rules.

"
1

If Quine's

38

arguments about tv*u
v

an,^
etna

,

•

essentialism are
me rm^r'an-icorrect, tnen the seman-i

tlcal approach that Hintikka
takes must (a) have certain
inadequacies, (b) amount to a
substitutional interpretation
of quantification, so that Quine's
arguments have no bearing, 8
or (c) be committed
to essentialism.

Dagfinn FjJllesdal has argued
for (a) and
has disputed his arguments 10

(b ),

9

and Hintikka

Without entering that dispute,
we can

.

argue for Quine's contention
that QML is committed to
essentialism
if Hintikka's semantical
method is employed, by arguing
11
for (c ).
Hintikka's approach is to introduce
an altered version of
the rule of existential
generalization (or rather its semantical
counterpart).
(3x)

(

.

,X.

.

.

r

From a sentence
.

It

...a..?

we can not always infer

is only lf a meets a ce
rtui n condition that

such inferences are allowed.
As we saw earlier, existential
generalization is allowable

if it is restricted to applying
to singular terms such that if any
two of them a and B, are such that

W

is true, then (restricting

consideration for the moment to the case of
a single '') ‘‘Fa
has the same truth-value as
r

then aa= 3"

1

is true

W

(since raa=cT

We can also see that if

if

r

is true then

r

A fortiori

.

,

1

'

a=3

1

is true,

is true).
~

r

na=3

7

oFa

1

has the

"

same truth-value as
a and

r

a?3 1

in the following way.

If

0 must refer to the same object, no matter what

possible situation).
a denotes satisfies

If we read
r

*

r

na=3"

T
,

then

(in every

as saying that the thing that

~

ap'x

7

no matter what, then we can conclude that

if

no

r

ma= 81

Mater

is true, then

what.

W

has the same truth-value
as

is true), then so is
FB (hence,

ams

^

So if Fa is true no matter
what (i.e., if

W

,

''Fa'’

is true also).

Hintikka's condition on EG can
he justified by a version of
argument. What is required before
EG can be allowed is that

there be some object that the
generalized term must refer to no
matter what. The term must pick
put the same individual in every

possible situation.

Thus, if

W

is true, and there is some
par-

ticular object u that a picks out
in every possible situation,
then rD?a 1 tells is that particular
object ,u, must satisfy Fx no

matter what.

The requirement that there be some
particular object

for a to refer to is just the
requirement that

according to Hintikka,

r

(3x)ox=a"1 be true,

Thus we can formulate a restricted
version

of EG.
r
is true and r (3x)ax=a"1 is true,
then
(3x)...x..

Ix

is true.
12
There are several possible sources of
trouble here,
but

all we must argue, for our purposes, is
that Hintikka's method
is best looked upon as an explicit
implementation of essentialism.
r
1
we must explain what it is for a sentence
like
(3x)nx=a"

to be true.

It is true if a bears a special relation
to some object

? r ma

this seems to be the claim that some ways of designa-

^-

ting such an object "better reveal its essence" than
others.

object satisfies
none other than

r

a.

ax=a 1

,

i.e., it is essentially (necessarily)

The

Ho

To see that Hintikka's proposal
amounts to an implementation

of essentialism we need to consider what
sorts of terms are allowed
and what sorts are ruled out by his
condition.

Hintikka's condition is meant to rule
out existential gen-

eralization on sentences like ’Necessarily
the tallest spy is a
Spy

°r

i<eces sarily the

'

number of planets numbers the planets’.

We could say that these were true,
but still hold that the person

who is the tallest spy might never have
entered the field of es-

pionage (becoming, perhaps, a basketball player),
and that the

number

(

9

which does number the planets might not have
done so

)

(if, for example. Mars or some other planet
had never formed).

Thus,

even if we were to grant the truth of these
sentences, we should
not therebj

conclude that there is something that is necessarily

a spy or something that necessarily numbers the
planets.

Hintikka
inference.
3

version of EG seems to rule out just this kind of

s

Let a be the singular term 'the tallest spy’ and let

be the singular term ’the number of planets'.

We could allow

"

that

r

aSa

1

and

(3x)ciSx
r

and

(3x)ox=a

and

f

oP 3

'

are true without being forced to allow that

(3x)aPx

are true, if we adopt Hintikka's rules.

r

1

(3x)nx=3

are not true, because someone else might

have been the tallest spy and some other number might have numbered
the planets, so the illegitimate inference is not allowed by the

EG rule we formulated based on Hintikka's restriction.
On the other hand, from
r

I

(3x)ax>T~

,

since

r

(3x)ax=9'

1

a9>7

it seems that we can infer

is, apparently, true

(since

'

9

'

hi

designates the

saume

thing in every possible situation).

In thus distinguishing among
the ways of denoting an object,

singling out some but not others
of the properties it alone
has
as crucial to it, we implement
essentialism. We accept that the
object which has the property of
numbering the planets and the
property of being 9 has the latter
property, but not the former,

necessarily or essentially.
is essential to it alone.)
r

(3x)mx=9'

is true but

r

(In addition, the latter property

We accept this when we say that

Ox) D x=f

is false.

If anything, the es-

sentialism stands out more here than
in the other cases we have
discussed.

r

(3x)Px=y will be true whenever
Y is associated with an

essential property of some object, i.e.,
whenever some object is

essentially identical to y.

The general problem of an account of

the satisfaction of formulas like

'W

is merely pushed back to

the slightly more specific problem of
accounting for the satisfaction of

mx=y

.

But the latter problem suggests an essentialist

solution at least as much as the former. 13

Perhaps a non-essential-

1
ist account could be given, but Hintikka gives
none. ^

His examples

clearly suggest an association of singular terms with
properties,
r
and an association of singular terms
y such that (3x)ox=y*7 with

essential properties.
We will take another look at singular terms and the way they
are connected with essentialism in a later chapter. 1 ^

For now all

we need to notice is that removing the paradoxes from QML hy altering
its inference rules does not automatically remove the problem of

essentialism.

The range of singular terms Hintikka
allows makes

it seem likely that

'he

(.ruth

conditions for

r

l

(r3x)nx=a~

involve

"1

essentialism.

10

iii

At this point it should he noted that
although Quine takes

the apparent essentialism of QML to he a
commitment which condemns
it, he does not argue against essentialism.

It is taken for granted

that essentialism is a doctrine to be eschewed.

That essentialism

is unacceptable is a given premise of
Quine's argument against QML.

We have already suggested why Quine might
have argued in
IT
this way.
The prevailing philosophical trend when Quine
first

argued that essentialism was involved in QML was distinctly
antimetaphysical.

Modal logicians like Carnap would certainly have thought

that commitment to a doctrine with the metaphysical
"obscurities"
of essentialism was sufficient to undermine QML.

Nevertheless some people have construed Quine's discussions
of QML as arguments against essentialism.
-i

Thus we find Richard Cartwright
ler.

O

accusing Quine of "a how-

Cartwright asks how, if we adopt the doctrine that necessity

is a property of bearers of truth-value, it can "have any conse-

quences at all with respect to essentialism?

To suppose it somehow

implies the meaningless of essentialism is to confound at the outset

modalities de re with modalities de dicto." IQ
But this demonstrates confusion about what it is that Quine

is arguing.

Quine argues that an understanding
of de dieto modali-

ties does not provide us with
any understanding of de
re modalities
To understand de re modalities
we must understand
essentialism.
Quine and Cartwright are in
agreement that linguistic
necessities
are not adequate to provide
an understanding of the
de re modalities which ngure in the
foundation of essentialism.
0.

course , Quine and Cartwright
disagree about whether essen-

tialism is meaningless.

But Quine does not infer that
essentialism

meaningless irom che fact that an
understanding of de dicto
modalities is Inadequate to provide
an understanding of de re
modalities.

Quine assumes from the outset that
essentialism is meaningless.
In an often quoted passage
about mathematical cyclists 20

Quine attempts to "evoke the appropriate
sense of bewilderment"
about essentialism by asking us whether
such a creature is essen-

tially rational or essentially two-legged.

Predictably, Cartwright

searches for but fails to find an argument
against essentialism
in this passage.

But it is clear that none was intended.

An es-

sentialxst may have difficulty deciding the issue,
hut he will not
find the question bewildering.

It is only if one assumes that all

necessity is explicable in terms of linguistic
relations that one
will he bewildered.

(As is often the case, we find that a close

analysis of Quine's arguments show them to be arguments
against
a position held by Carnap.)

One might take Quine to task for not arguing for the
important

premise that essentialism is unacceptable. 21

however that he does so argue.

One should not suppose
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SECTION II

ESSENTIALISM IN
QUANTIFIED MODAL LOGIC

CHAPTER

3

KRIPKE'S SEMANTICS AND
PARSONS'S RESPONSE TO QUINE
In Part

I

ve saw how Quine's argument
attempts to show that

essentialism is required in interpreting
QML; and we hare concurred,
at least in so far as to agree
that essentialism is a natural,
if not unique, basis for the
interpretation of open modal formulas.
In Part II we will explore
the most well-known of the
interpretations
for QML, Saul Kripke’s. 1 Kripke
does precisely what we have
suggested
the modal logician should do in
interpreting QML. He explicitly

divorces necessity ('') from analyticity,
and he eliminates sin-

gular terms from his modal systems. 2

We will attempt to see if,

in allowing quantifying in and
breaking the tie of necessity to

analyticity, one must accept essentialism
in order to give a semantics
for QMl.

Our question is whether the kind of
semantics

Kripke

gives is best seen as a way of implementing
essentialism, or whether

such a semantics can be used in showing
that the interpretation
of a QML theory need not involve essentialism.

i

Kripke allows free intermingling of quantifiers and
modal

operators and a uniform semantics is given which handles
formulas with
and formulas without quantifying in.

hQ

He uses the Leibnizian notion of

h9
a set of possible
worlds

(K)

,
’

which serve as a
« w
tasis .for giving

truth-conditions for iormulas
formulae with modal
™ ^
operators.
An object u
Of the domain satisfies r
aTx at world „ if
and on ly lf u satls _
f-ies Fx
ever, world possible
with respect to H. 3
If we say that
every world is possible
with respect to every
other and we consider
a closed formula. A,
Kripke's truth conditions
reduce to the familiar
Leibnizian definition of necessary
truth: A is necessarily
true if
and only if A is true in
every possible world, and
A is possible if
and only if it is true in
some possible world.
But it is

m

Of the formula

W

the case

with one free variable that
interests us most,

because, as we saw in chapter
1, it is the account of the
satisfaction of such formulas that
seems to require essentialism.
And Knpke's account does
suggest essentialism in the way
that we would expect.

To say that an object satisfies

r

is

nFx''

to say that it is F in every
possible world (i.e., in every
possible
situation), which amounts to the
claim that it couldn't fail to
be
F,

i.e., that it is essentially F.

(We will return to the defini-

tion of essentialism in the next
section, and we will discuss it
very fully in chapter 4
.

There are just a few things about
Kripke's semantics that

we should note before we go on to
consider Terence Parsons's evaluation of the essentialist commitments
of QML so interpreted.

First,

we should emphasize that Kripke's semantics
makes no attempt to
explain uses of

in terms of analyticity.

It is the evaluation

of formulas at the various possible worlds that
determines the

applicability of

Of course, one might argue (contra Kripke)
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that it is only analytic
formula, that are true
in every possible
WOrld; then
OOUl4 be tied to analyticity
after all.
3ut to argue in this
way would be to overlook
precisely

the point that we
emphasised in chapter

1.
Even if one accounts
for uses of 'o' before
closed formulas in terms
of analyticity,

^

still will nave to give
an account of its uses
before open formulas,
mis Kripke-s semantics does.
And Kripke's semantics
handles certain formulas in such a
way that there is no evident
explanation of
the uses of 'o' i n terms
of analyticity.
For example, if
(1)

'O'

is a monadic predicate,

then

(x) (y) ( x=ym( oGxsoGy
)

IS universally valid
on Kripke's semantics.

way to explicate the uses of
or any similar notion.

'o'

in

(!)

There is no evident

in terms of analyticlty

Yet the validity of
(1) i s to be expected

because, as we saw in chapter
1,
(2)

(x) (y) ( x=yr)( Fxsiy

)

should be a valid schema, for any
one place open formula

Fx>

The

notion of a possible world used in
giving QML its intended inter-

pretation is explicitly metaphysical,
and no explanation in terms
of analyticity is to be expected.^
We should also contrast Kripke’s
sort of semantics with some

otner mtensional systems, in order to
emphasize some features of

Kripke's interpretation for QML.

For example, Kripke's semantics

makes no restrictions on the members of the
domain

Cl\)

.

cular, tne domain need not have any intensional
objects.

In partiIn that
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respect it con rests with
Alonzo Church's intensional
6
logic
which requires senses as
arguments in modal contexts.
Kripke

'

5; :L
'

also treats variables in
a standard

way.

Different appearances of the
safe variable bound by
a single
quantifier
a f0rMla are evaluated
»ith respect to the sane
range
of objects
There is no intension-extension
"ambiguity" as in
Rudolf Carnap's systems in
Meaning and Necessity 7

“

The quantifiers of Kripke

QML also range over the
same

's

domain of objects whether or
not they reach into modal
contexts.
Thus Kripke's system differs
from Hintikka's, which has
the socalled "restricted range" feature

8
.

Finally, we should emphasize
that quantification in Kripke's

systems is objectual, not
substitutional. Open formulas are
evaluated
by determining what satisfies
them-not by determining the truth-

values their substitution instances
have.^
In all of these respects,
Kripke's system reflects the "stan-

dard” semantics for quantifiers,
simply extended to modal contexts.
It is really only to such
standard semantics for quantifiers that

Quine's argument is intended to apply 10
.

So our choice to evaluate

QML's commitment to essentialism with
respect to Kripke's semantics
is not a choice made arbitrarily,
nor is it a choice based merely

on the

i

act that Kripke's semantics is the most
well-known and

widely accepted.
We should also mention that in discussing
Kripke's semantics

we are not simply discussing the set-theoretic
"pure" semantics
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as given in "Semantical
Considerations on Modal

Logic"

We are

concernea with the intended
interpretation of QML in terms
of possible
worlds and possible individuals.
What Kripke does formally
is to
say that we can interpret
QML in terms of certain
objects and sets
related in certain wavs.
These could be bean bags
and sets of marbles.
But it is only the
interpretation in terms of possible
worlds
that gives the modal
operators their intended meaning,
and it is
that interpretation with which
we are concerned when we
evaluate
the alleged commitment to
essentialism of QML's theories.
Kripke
hints at the nature of this
interpretation when he says that,
11
e.g.y
"Intuitively we look at matters
thus:
K is the set of all 'possible
worlds'; G is the 'real world'
"
v
Kripke
s own views on
the nature of necessity are
made more explicit in "Identity
and
'

Necessity

and "Naming and

*

,

•

Necessity."' 2

,

1'

Thus our discussion of

the metaphysical issues surrounding
modal logic relies also on those
o
two papers. 1
Terence Parsons has evaluated the
claim that QML involves

essentialism with specific attention to
the sort of semantics that
Kripke gives.
,

Hit,

.

conclusion is negative.

can he given for QML.

Anti-essentialist models

it

To understand Parsons's answer to
the question of whether

QML is committed to essentialism we need
an appropriate definition
of essentialism.

As Parsons points out, the schema that
Quine

offers as a characterization of essentialism
is not adequate to

characterize any troublesome sort of doctrine.
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(

1

(

)

(1), Qu±ne

3x ) ( aFx Gx ~aFx
.

,

^cnema, is supposed to
capture the fact that the
essentialist favors some
properties of an object over
others.
!„ this
case F is the favored,
necessary property.
-

But, as Parsons argues,
consistent with (1), ve
might "favor"
only properties like being
bald or not bald (to use
Parsons's example).
If only such "tautological"
properties are necessary of
objects, perfectly precise,
uncontroversial truth conditions
can
be given for 'o' which
render some instances Qf
(l)

^

simply stipulate that
r<X)A"

13 a t he0rem ° f
r

tors,

IbxW

_

non-empty domain if

In particular, of A lacks
modal opera-

i

(3x)oA‘

_
is true in a non-empty
domain if r (x)A '

of quant if 1 cat ior.al logic.

“

is true in a

^

is a theorem

No dubious metaphysical
view is presupposed

thS faCt th3t Some lns tances
of (l) are true, because
the truth

conditions for those instances of
(l) can be given without
resorting
to any controversial explicata.
Quine should not object simply

because some instances of (l) are
true, since Quine's objection
QilL

is that it requires the truth
of a

vieu.

There is nothing mysterious about
the truth of those instances

of (l) in which
that

mysterious metaphysical

(x)A

V

is replaced by some formula A
which is such

is a theorem of quantificational
15
logic.

A more important essentialist commitment
occurs if the truth
of
r

/

(3x)nA
\

n

X A

•

can not be explained in terms of the
provability of

Parsons gives a characterization which is
more satisfactory.

He says that a model is essentialist
if it makes any closed formulas
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of the following form
true
(2)

A
S

-del

°“

Of

(

is

3x)o?x. (3x)~aJ%;

essentials

^

° bJeCtS tUt

essentials

1
.

if some formulas are
necessarily true of

° f 0therS

'

We

no* explain away this
sort

W

in the way we explained
away Quine's example,
since

the second clause of
(2) guarantees that
or analytic truth.

is not a logical

points out, criterion
(2) also needs improvement.
We shall discuss Parsons's
improvement on (2), and some
further
refinements of the definition
of essentials in chapter
For
now, (2) will be an adequate
basis for discussing
Parsons's results.
A slightly stronger form of
essentials is captured by the
schema

U

(3)

(

3x)aFx. (3x) (Fx.~dFx)

.

^

If instances of (3) are true,
then it is not merely the case
that

objects differ

m

their essential properties, there
is also no sharp

distinction of properties into essential
and non-essential properties.

Some properties are essential
to some thing but not to others.

Typical models are essentialist according
to Parsons's definition.

Some examples of instances of
(2) that essentialists have

traditionally upheld are the claims that
Aristotle is necessarily
(essentially) a man and that Lassie is
not necessarily a man, and
tha. nine is nec
not.

-

:

oily greater than seven although this
apple is

Most recent work in modal logic has, at the
very least, assumed

this much essentialism.
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It even seems that
the stronger form of
essentialism will
be incorporated into
most models

(i.e.
’

?x,

^

'(

3x ) oFx

.

(

3x ) ( Fx ~a?x }?
.

w
,-n
Vl11

that seven is necessarily
odd.

‘r®

4

for at least one open
Ior
sentence

m s*

voxld).

For suppose

Then there is something
(seven)

that is necessarily odd
or red, and there is
something (this apple)
that is odd or red, but it
is not necessarily
odd or red.
To implement anti-essentialism
in QML we must adopt
the denial
(2).
(To deny (2) is also to
deny (3), s l nC e (3) entails
(2).)
Thus the anti-essentialist
must hold that if anything
is necessarily
F, then everything is
necessarily F.

All instances of the
following

schema must he true in every
world:
(*0

(3x) aFxm>( x ) oFx

.

Th^re are basically two sorts
of properties that have
traditionally been treated in ways
incompatible with anti-essentialism.

Categorial properties-those corresponding
to the broadest sorts
of "natural” classifications of
things-are generally said to belong

necessarily to the things to which they
belong; but such properties
(e.g., natural kind properties)
would not classify things at all

if they belonged to everything.

Thus it has traditionally been

claimed that Aristotle is necessarily
a man, although not everything
is.

Certain derivative necessary properties,
that of being rational,

for example, are treated similarly.
,

certain properties which are contingently
true or false

of the objects of certain broad categories
are often held to be

necessarily lacking in objects of other categories.

Although this

apple is not necessarily
non-red, the number
seven is held to be
necessarily non-red. QML
provides a formal system
for representing
such claims.

At the core of Parsons's
contention
n that
+.
rnat QMT isG not
committed

to essentially is a
proof that we can construct
Kripke type models

^

VhiCh
fSlSe

-

ttiS

eSSentialis t sentences
(instances of

“OUntS

(

2)

)

necessarily

t0 ShOWl "S that ve can
imple m ent anti-essen-

tialism in QML, making (k)
true in every possible
world.
The prineiple examples Parsons
gives are called 'maximal
models'. He concludes from the existence
of such models that QML
is not committed
to essentialism, at least
in one important way in
which it might
be thought to be so committed,
(As Parsons points out,
QML allows
the formulation of essentialism,
so it seems to be committed
at

least to its coherence.

Maximal models implement only the
broadest, most strictly
logical sort of necessity.

In a maximal model, for each
object

and each primitive predicate,
there is some possible world in
which
that object belongs to the extension
of that predicate.
If being
a number and being a billiard
ball are both among the primitive

properties, then everything in the domain
is possibly a number and

possibly a billiard ball, since no
strictly formal considerations
rule out such possibilities.

A maximal model makes both of the

sentences 'Kripke could have been a billiard
ball’ and 'Kripke

coiua nave been the number
nine' true.
But maximal models axe
not the only
anti-essentialist models
that Parsons discusses.
Maximal models provide a
convenient basis
proof that there are models
which make no formulas
of the form
Of (a) true, but there
are other models in which
is necessarily
(2 )
false
By restricting a maximal
model to just those
worlds in which
a particular set of closed,
non-modal formulas are true,
we produce another anti-essentialist
model which melees at least
a partial
accomodation to some common
intuitions about what is
necessary. 19
In such a model it can
be true that nine is
necessarily greater
than seven without its being
true that everything is
necessarily

greater than seven, because we
can restrict our models
to those
worlds in which
(3x)(3y)(x is nine.y is seven.
x>7)

(5)

is true.
(6)

Such a restriction validates
a (3x)(3y)(x is nine.y is
seven. x>y)

Without making any essentialist
sentences true in any world.

On

the other hand, such a restriction
does not validate
(T)

(3x)(3yj(x is nine.y is seven. nx>y)

or
(8)

(

3x ) ( 3y ) o (

is nine.y is seven.x>y).

Both (7) and (8) entail essentialist
sentences.
We can add analogues of arithmetical
truths in this way.
We can also analytic truths, restricting
the set of worlds to those
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an

in which

analytic sentences are
assigned truth.

«e can capture the
view that, for example,

-d

things are colored.

|

I n this way

is necessary

^

Any waning relations
expressible by

formas

in which no nodal
operators occur governing
open sentences can be

made necessarily true in
this way.
Similar maneuvers allow us
to make concessions
to the alleged
necessary connections of
certain properties with
the broad categorial
properties as mentioned above.
We can construct
anti-essentialist
models in which 'All men are
necessarily rational' and
'All numbers
are necessarily non-red'
are true.
That is, we can add

°(x)(x is a man 3 x is rational)
and

o(x)(x is a number

x is non-red)

to our stock of necessary
truths without destroying the
anti-

essentialist character of our models.
Since we are considering languages
without constants, ve
can also add an analogue of
'Aristotle is necessarily human',
viz.
n (x) (x is Aristotle

m>

x is human ).^^

But there are some noticeable
peculiarities of anti-essen-

tialist models.

If the anti-essentialist schema
is true in every

world, then
(

9

)

(

3x aA= x nA
)

(

)

is true in every possible world with
a non-empty domain (if A

has at most one free variable).

There is no important distinction

between uni/_rjhl and existential quantifiers
when they reach across
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m ° dal 0Perat0rS
Vlu3d lat °

'

^

t 0 Classes

S " Ch

'"'

>

one-place open formulas
are dl _

the necessary ones
(necessarily true of

everything) and the
non-necessary ones (not
necessarily true of
anything).
In so dividing up the
formulas
nul.as
«n+anti-essentialist models
eeem to be caking
only the distinctions allowed
in Quine's first
two grades of nodal
involvement, avoiding the
complications introed by the third grade
of modal involvement.
In chapter 5 we
will generalize this
point, showing that there
is a sense in which
anti-essentialism is won for QML
only by a retreat from
the third
grade of modal involvement.
,

This point stands out in
a particularly striking
way when
we consider only maximal
models. For such models
each non-modal
formula that is necessarily
satisfied by a sequence of
objects is
such that its .universal
closure is provable in
quantification theory.
Quantification theory seems to
make the important distinctions
that are to be made for
such models.

These considerations suggest
that the full resources of

QMI,

are dispensable if only
anti-essentialist interpretations of
QML
languages are considered. To make
this more precise and to demonstrate it in its full generality,
i.e., for all formulas, including

those with modal operators occuring
within the scope of other modal
operators, and for all anti-essentialist
models, not merely maximal models and those based on them,
we must first examine the deft-

nition of essentialism. more carefully.
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CHAPTER

1;

THE DEFINITION OP ESSENTIALISM

In discussing Parsons's
definition of anti-essentialism
in

chapter 3, we considered only
one-place open formulas.

If only
one-place open formulas mattered, the
schema we haye for anti-

essentialism
(l)

(3x) Fx=>(x)nFx

would not run into any serious
difficulties (at least in languages
free of constants).

However, following Parsons, we should
gene-

ralize our definition to consider formulas
with more than one free

variable (formulas expressing relations
among objects).
There are several reasons for generalizing
the definition
so that it applies to formulas with
multiple quantifiers.

The defi-

nition of an ant i-es sent ialist model should
rule out the possibility
of there being certain objects that are
essentially related to each

other in ways in which others are not, as well
as the possibility
that individuals might have different essential
properties

.

Also,

the formal discussion of essentialist models requires
a fully general

account of the satisfaction of modal formulas, and a fully
general

definition of essentialism expedites the proofs involved there.
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61+

in&lly

—

fully cgnoy'rjl
^
al rjpf
o
definition
is readily extendable
to languages with constants
(That extension win he
done in chapter 6.)
We can not extend the
definition of anti-esse„tialis
m simply
°y adding multiple
quantifiers and free variables:
-

9,

9

*

l

.

(2)

(3x)...(3x )cFx ...x^(x
)...(x ) D Fx ...x
n
1
1
n
1
n
Few models would be
anti-essentialist on such a
definition, as
the following schemata
show:
(3)

(3x)(3y)a x =y

(M

(3x){3y)o(Fxv~Fy)

.

Ox) (3y )~c x=y
.

Ox)

(

3y )~a ( Fxv~Fy )

Both (3) and (U) are true
in all worlds with domains
of more than
one element, yet they
contradict '(2).
+•
'
Obvious!
oDvxously,
v +y.«
the anti-essentialist
should not be committed to the
thesis
ebJ b rnat
that it
it is
id necessary
that
at most one thing exists.
-

Parsons

1

amends the definition (2) so that
(3) and (4) can

not be treated as counter-examples
to anti-essentialism.

that makes

(

3

)

One thing

and (4) troublesome is the fact
that (2) does not

allow an object to be essentially
related to itself in ways in which
no two distinct objects can be
essentially related. But as

(

3

)

and (4)

show, identity and complex logical
formulas (and perhaps even some

simple relational predicates such as

'is the same

height as') provide

examples of formulas necessarily satisfied
by ordered paris whose members are identical, but not necessarily
satisfied by other ordered pairs
There are also formulas satisfied necessarily
by distinct

objects but not satisfied necessarily by identical
objects.
the following also contradict (2):

Thus
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(3x) (3y)d x ^y

(5)

•

(

3x

)

(

3y )~a X jfy

and perhaps
(3x)(3y)aRxy

(6)

•

(

3x ) ( 3y )~aRxy

where 'Rxy' says of two objects
that they are never in the same
place at the same time.
In general

,

we can recognize that whether two
objects are

identical or not may hare a bearing on
whether they necessarily

satisfy a certain open formula.

But that admission should not,

by itself, force us to repudiate
anti-essentialism.
better schema for anti-essentialism than

We need a

(2) provides.

What we need to do is to mahe sure
that if one pair of
r

objects satisfies

mA

1

and another does not, then before we
will

say that that is evidence of essentialism
we will require that both

pairs satisfy the same identity conditions.

Thus we would have

the following two anti-essentialist schemas
in place of (2) (con-

sidering formulas ’Fxy' free in just two variables
for the moment):
(7

)

(

3x)

(

3y ) (x=y oFxy )m( x ) (y ) (x=y )=»Fxy
.

and
(8)

(3x) (3y) (x^y.nFxy)n>(x) (y) (x^y)=)aFxy)

((7) s^id (8) are, respectively, the denials of the essentialist

schemas
(9)

(3x) (3y) (x=y. nFxy)

•

(3x) (3y) (x^y.^-aFxy)

(10)

(3x) (3y) (x^y.aFxy)

•

(3x) (3y) (x£y.~aFxy )

and

.

To sum up all such anti-essentialist schemas, for any

“

arbltrary

°f free

to use a bit of notation

that Parsons has
introduced. 2

For

^

conjunction of formulas

My

^

or

^

formula A> let n

/^

a

>
each
x
occuring free in A such
that j>k, but not including
both
3
d
f° r
k
Parsons's characterization
of jtiessentialism can then be
stated in the following
way:
(12)
(3x )...( aXn )(n. x F .o F )c(
P
1
Xi )... (Xn)(niX =t]F)
must be true in every
possible world, for every
formula F with
free variables among x
^ 2 ls ^
the denial of essentialism,
l’***’ n*
the claim that

W

“

^

-

-*•

.

'

(^1 )---(3x

(13)

n

F
)(n x .oF).(3
i

Xi )...( 3Xn)(r7iX

F„_
aF)

Is true in some world,
for some formula F with
free variables among
X !’*
,x
^
n
*

*

m

*

But there is an inadequacy
in accepting the truth of
(12)

every world as the condition
an anti-essentialist model
must
meet.
Parsons's definition maPes no
requirement on possible but

non-actual objects.
sences.

It allows such objects to
have distinct es-

But the metaphysical principle
of anti-essentialism should

apply to all possible objects, not
merely to actual ones.

The

quantifiers of (12) force us to evaluate
the open matrices (i.e.,
(rhx .!')

and

(fhx mnF)

)

at each world with respect to the

objects that exist in that world

k
.

Since possible objects which

are non-existent do not come within
range of the quantifiers, they

6

are not relevant in
evaluating the truth of (is).

Because of this

we can construct models
which mabe (is) necessarily
true-models
which fulfill Parsons'S
anti-essentialist

condition-which are

not as thoroughly
anti-essentialist as we should
require.
There
can still he objects which
are possible with respect
to a world
which differ in essence from
other objects which are
possible with
respect to that world.
For example

,

we can construct a simple
model for a language

with the one-place predicate

’F'

as its only predicate
which gives

different essences to the objects
which are possible with respect
7
to each of its worlds.
2
Let K =\ G, Hj
R=K ,^= u v
ij/( G)={ u
j
}
^(H) =iv|
and u^v. Suppose cp('F', G) = cp('F»,
H) = jv]
Each
vorld has exactly one object existent
in it, so for any formula
with
r
no free variables except 'x,'
(3x)nA3( x )aA is true in both
worlds.
,

,

.

,

.

1

So the model is anti-essentialist
according to Parsons's original

condition.
'

o~Fx

'

But in either world, v satisfies

(and, of course,

'~oFx').

’Fx* but u satisfies

Thus these two possible objects

have different essential properties.

Being F is essential to v

but not to u, and not being F is essential
to u but not to v.
de can give a slightly stronger
characterization of anti-

essentialism which avoids this difficulty by forcing
consideration
of possible objects as well as actual ones at
each possible world.
In iacb there are two plausible ways of
extending Parsons's defini-

tion to all possible

objects.

*j
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Returning for a moment to the
simple case of one-place
open
lormulas (|n| which n. x A
formulas become irrelevant),
we can give
a simple formulation of
the sort of definition we
are looking for.
we want to say that if a
model is anti-essentialist
then if some-

thing satisfies

V

,

->

x

then everything does.

Anti-essentialism claims

that all essential properties
are essential to every
possible

object.

But we can take that to mean
either of two different things.

It might mean that in each
world, if one thing is essentially
F

then everything is, or it might
mean that if one thing is essentially
F in some world, then
everything in every world is essentially
F.

Slightly more rigorously, the first
of the statements of
an oi-essentialism vs are considering
is the following:
(Al)

For any world H, if

W

is true in H when some

1
possible object is assigned to x, then
'Fx' is true

in H when any possible object is
assigned to x.

We can characterize (Al) as making
anti-essentialism true at each

world.

The Ooher condition which suggests
itself is
(A2)

If there is some world H and some assignment
of a

possible object to x such that

dFx

is true in H

on that assignment, then for every world H' and
every

assignment of a possible object to x,
in H

1

r

oFj?

is true

on that assignment.

We can characterize (A2) as taking a more global look
at the model

structure

,

making anti-essentialism apply to the model taken as

a whole, not merely to each individual world separately.
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valent
-

But for at least one sort
of model (Al) and (A2)
are equiIf a model q> on a modal
structure <G, t, B ,?> is such

^

,

.her.

o sa isfies (Al) if and only if
it satisfies (A2).

So if we were to assume
that in every suitable model
for the

alethic modalities, every world
is possible with respect
to every
other, then it would not matter
which of (Al) or (A2) we employed
as our definition of
essentialism.
In order to show the equivalence
of (Al) and (A2) with re-

spect to models on model structures
such that R=K^

,

it is convenient

to work with a fully general
definition of anti-essentialism, one

which considers formulas with more
than one free variable.
so lnvolvss the use of n.x A formulas,
as Parsons has done.

Doing
In

addition, it is helpful to introduce
notation which makes the role
of the assignments to free variables
clearer, since our generaliza-

tions of (Al) and (A2) will explicitly
refer to such assignments.

Instead of employing the notation that Kripke
uses
cp(Ax^.

.

.x

,H)=T with respect to an assignment of
a ...a
1

X

l’“ Xn'“" WS Vl11

say

,

<P(A,H,I_ )=T'
l

,

where each I
±

n

to

is a function

which assigns some ux'Uto each variable of the
language 5 (and thus
to each free variable of A).

If A is a closed formula, the assign-

ment 1^ to free variables does not matter, so we may
write ’cp(A,H)=T*
It is now a relatively easy matter to extend
Parsons's defi-

nition of anti-essentialism to all possible objects (in
accord

with (Al) and (A2).)

We get the following two definitions:

.

(Bl)

45

is an anti-essentialist
model on a model structure

<G

’

K, R

if and only if for any
formula A and

,

r

any HEK, if

n x

cp(v

A

A

I, then
(

B2

^

(

n
A
n.x 3oA

w

’

tWt
I ^~ T

^

some assignment

H, l)=T for any assignment
I.

,

is an anti-essentialist
model on a model structure

<G, K,
tp(

r

1

DA*

i

R,'j/

n.x .OA

>
,

ment I, then

if and only if f or any
formula A, if
H, I )=T for some HeK
and some assigncp(

r

n x

A

i

any assignment

1

=)qA

,

H, l)=T for any HEK and

I.

Both characterizations (Bl) and
(B2) of anti-essentialism

require all sequences of possible
objects that satisfy the same

identity conditions (i.e., that satisfy
the same
to also satisfy the same modalized
formulas.

T7.x

A

formulas)

They differ in that

(Bl) requires, in each possible
world, that they satisfy the same

modal formulas, whereas (B2) makes a
global requirement that whatever modal formula is satisfied in one
world is satisfied in all
worldb.

Both are preierable to the characterization
based on (12)

because they take into account all possible
objects, making the

metaphysical principle fully general.

Indeed, all of the examples

of anti-essentialist models that Parsons suggests
conform to (Bl)
and (B2), not merely to (12).

Any maximal model

cp

(or any sub-model

constructed from it by considering only those possible
worlds of
the maximal model in which all members of a certain
consistent set
of closed, non-modal formulas are true) is anti-essentialist
/T

according to all three definitions.

The argument to show
(

14 )

If

IS a model on a model
structure

tp

such that R=K

2

it satisfies

(B2).

then

,

can now he given fairly
easily.

(Bl).

So suppose that

K,

R,f)

satisfies (Bl) if and only
if

cp

It is obvious that
if

essentialist according to (B2)
then
ing to (Bl).

^G,

is

cp

„

is anti-

anti-essentialist accord-

is anti-essentialist
according to

<p

I.e.,

Suppose that for any H'
r

n x

4>(

A
.QA’

i

tp(

r

A
n x 3QA
i

if some I is such that

,

,

HM)=T

,

H', I)=T.

then for any

s

Suppose also that there is an H
and an

such that

I

H, I )=T.

,

It follows that for any I,

So for any I,

I

if <p(n.x

Also, for any I, if

cp(

A

r
cp(

J7.

x^maA

1
,

H, I)=T, then

,

‘"oA^

H,

,

H, l)=T.
r uK‘

<p(

,

H, I)=T.

I)=T, then for any

H', ip(A, H', I )=T (since R=K2
).

But then for each I',

tp(

W

In addition, for any H

for any H'

H'

,

l)=T (since R=K 2 ).

tp(n.x

wiTT^,

,

,

H'

,

l)-T if and only if

l)=T.

So for any I and any H', if cp(n.x A
H’
*
i

then

r

cp(

dA

5

l)=T
*

,

H'

,

I)=T.

Hence, for any H' and I',

tp(

'

tLx^A

1
,

H'

5

l)=T.

,

this result is of some significance for us

results of chapters

^

I

,

because the

and 6 rely upon our taking (B2) as the appro
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priate definition of essentials.

If the appropriate
structures

for the notion of necessity
connected with alethic
modalities are
structures <G, K, R,Y> such
that
then it is a matter of
indifference which of (Bi and I'ncO ~
(B2) 13 employed.
No argument needs
tw given uhat (B2) rather
ramer tnan
than (Blj
m is +-u
the appropriate definiti on
of anti-essentialism.

M?,

)

‘

(

'I

-?

<-•

But as the situation now
stands, the results of chapters

and 6 hare their intended
significance only if we assume
either
that structures such that R=K2
are the only appropriate
structures
for the sorts of necessity we
are discussing or that (B2)
is a
5

better definition of anti-essentialism
than (Bl).

Fortunately,

almost all discussions of the
appropriate notions of necessity
argue for or assume that ReK2 so
our results hare their intended
,

significance for most QML theories.^
Traditionally it has been presumed that
the appropriate model
for metaphysical (or as Plantinga
calls it "broadly logical")

necessity is a model on a structure such
2
that R=K

.

The Leibnizian

definition of necessity is captured only in
such models— models

m

which necessity (at any world) amounts to
truth in every possible

world and possibility is just truth in some
possible world. ^

In

addition, contemporary discussions of the sort of
necessity relevant
2
to essenciaiism focus on model structures such
that R=K .^
u.ne

remarks of Hughes and Cresswell are typical. 10

the semantical models reflect in an obvious way
a
familiar philosophical idea which is often credited to
Leibniz, that a necessary proposition is one which is
•

.
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What Hughes aud Cresswell
say is slightly misleading.

argue for a model structure
2
ueture in vhioh
which n-v
R-K

,

4-

Ihey

as the appropriate structure

°r tte Lelbnlzlan notion of
necessity, and they conclude
that S5 model
structures are appropriate.
But not all S 5 structures
are such that
1

r=k2-s 5 guarantee3 Qnly that

R is

m

equiyalence relat on oa R> not
.

R is total on K.

But ve ordinarily think of S
5 only in terms of struc2
tures such that R-K
so it is not surprising to
,
find them stating their

conclusion as the claim that S5
expresses the Lelbnizlan idea directly. 11

Hintikka has also argued for the
conclusion that each
logically possible world is possible
with respect to every other
(although he also states, as his conclusion,
only that S5 is the

appropriate system for logical necessity.

)"^ 2

We
also see which system of modal logic
recommends
itself as the formalization of logical
possibility and
Cal necess ity.
It seems to me obvious that whatever
w^ 5 ^
is logically necessary here and now
must also be logically
necessary
all the logically possible states of
affairs*
that could have been realized instead of
the actual one ...
Conversely it also seems fairly clear that
no new logical
necessities can come about as a result of the
realization
of any logical possibility.
In short, it seems to me that
whatever is logically necessary in one logically
possible
world must also be logically necessary in others
The system. S5 then, seems to be the best
formalization
of our logic of logical necessity and logical
possibility.
•

.

_

m
,

,

Alvin Plantinga 13 has also argued that structures in
which

R=K

2

provide the approrpiate basis for models intended to capture

the notion of broadly logical necessity with which he
and we are

.

concerned.

He argues that since it
is evident that whatever
is

possible is necessarily possible,
"that is, possible with
respect
to every possible vorld"
it
z fniinuc
iollows +>^
that every possible vorld
is
possible with respect to every
other.
{Plantings actually makes
tr.e error of assuming
that every model structure
for S5 is such
1-

that E=K

2

although, as we mentioned, the
error is excusable since
ve ordinarily consider only
models such that R=K 2 when working
vith S5. )
,

None of these arguments are
terribly convincing as arguments
about the structure of metaphysical
possibility.

They amount to

appeals to authority (Leibniz) or
appeals to intuition, neither
of which could persuade those who
actually hold an opposing view
(if there are such persons).

But there are few arguments
that

in considering metaphysical
possibility we should examine any struc-

tures other than those such that R=K 2

.

We vill choose (B2) as our definition
because to do so

makes possible the proofs of the next few
chapters.

But this should

he kept in mind as an assumption that aids
in proving our results.
2
If R-K

,

as many assume or argue, this makes
no difference.

there is reason to suppose that R^K2
then our results do not apply.
(Bl) rather than

(332

)

,

If

for some special theory,

Whether they could be proved vith

*
is left as an open question. 1 1

It should be noted, hovever, that if ve had
an independent

argument for (B2) as the appropriate definition of
anti-essentialism,
then ve vould have further evidence that structures
such that
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ar„ the appropriate structures
for alethic modality.

Any model
satisfying (B2) is a model on a
structure such that the same modal
lormulas are satisfied in every
possible world.
Thus if ^p 1
r

(or

pp

and so

is true in some world H, it
is also true in every world,

)

0$P

(or

oqP

)
'

is axb
also
in u
° true
xrue ln

This is precisely the

condition that a restriction to models
on structures such that

R=K

2

imposes

iii

Our final definition of an anti-essentialist
model (B2)
is merely a generalization of
the characterization of essentialism

as the view that all possible objects
have the same essential pro-

perties.

We have implicitly assumed that an object
is essentially

F if and only if it satisfies

W

.

But Plantinga 15 has suggested

two other definitions of what it is for a
property to be essentially
F, and we shall consider those views.

Our definition is (for the simplest case):
(Dl)

An object is essentially F if and only if it satisfies

Fx in every possible world.
The other two suggestions are:
(D2)

An object is essentially F if and only if it satisfies

Fx in every world in which it exists.
(D3)

An object is essentially F if and only if it satisfies

Fx and there is no world in which it satisfies ~Fx.
(D3

)

differs from (Dl) only if we deviate from Kripke's

semantics by saying that objects satisfy formulas only in those

worlds in which they exist,
as Plantings does,

But then (D3)
does not allow us to say
that sene possible but
non-actual object
is

essentially F

-

Yet if Pegasus is such
a possible, non-actual

Object, we want to be able
to say (even if we do not
want to aver)
that he is essentially an
animal.
So (D3) as it stands
does not
suit our purposes.

Nevertheless, we might consider
a variant of (D 3
), based
upon the same deviant account
of satisfaction, which
does not
have the undesirable consequence
Just noted.
(Dlt)

An object is essentially F if
and only if it satisfies
Fx in some world

(

in which it exists) smd
there is

no world in which it satisfies
~Fx.

me

treatment of possible non-actual
objects is crucial

to the consideration of (Dl),

(D2) and (Dl) and to the
question of

whether or not to adopt the deviant
account of satisfaction suggested
by Plantings' s variation on Kripke's
semantics.
(Plantinga does
not say that objects fail to satisfy
formulas in worlds in which

they do not exist, but rather that if

'b

'

exist in H, then’FV has no truth-value
in

denotes u but u does not
H.

We are considering

only languages without constants, so (D3)
is an adaptation of

Plantinga 's idea to such languages.)

If we adopt Plantinga's se-

mantics, then only a necessarily existent object
can satisfy Fx
in every possible world.

So (Dl) is inappropriate for such a se-

mantics since we want it to be consistent to say
that an object
has a property essentially even when that object is
not one that is
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necessarily existent.

If we adopt Plantinga's
approach, then

(D2)

and (Dh) will he equivalent
characterizations of essential
properties
we are faced with a
choice.
We must adopt either
the sort
of semantics that Plantings
suggests, according to which
an object
satisfies an open formula
only in those worlds in which
it exists,
or the sort of semantics
Kripke gives, according to
which each
ob ject^satisfies each
open formula or its negation
in every possible
It would oe nice to stay
with the semantics Kripke
gives,

since that it is the basis for
our discussion so far, and
since
Parsons's work on essentialism and
quantified modal logic, upon
which much of the work of this
dissertation is based, has concerned
Kripke 's semantics. But there is
some appeal in the view that
objects have properties only in those
worlds in which they exist,
so that Plantinga's definition
of essentialism demands at least

some of our attention.
We shall stay with Kripke

's

semantics.

But we can con-

sider what we could do to make at least
a partial accomodation to
the issues Plantinga raises.

(Dl),

(D2) and (D4) are all equiva-

lent definitions with respect to Kripke

's

semantics if we add the

following restriction to Kripke style models:
(E)

If an object u satisfies Fx in every
world H such

that uE ^

(Pi)

,

then u satisfies Fx in every world.

Since that equivalence holds, we can employ
(Dl) as our definition

of essentialism, with the understanding that those
who favor (D2)
or

(Tih)

should view our results as restricted to those models of
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Whlch (E) is true

should not be too odious a
proviso.

-

Having adopted Kripke’s convention
of assigning even non-existent
objects to the extensions of
formulas in each possible world,
it
makes sense to assign objects
in such a way that if they
satisfy
a formula in every world in
which they exist, then they
satisfy
It in every world.

can be made.

A case for Plantinga's semantical
approach

But once we have decided to stay
with Kripke's ap-

proach, it seems reasonable to adopt
(E) as a partial accomodation
to Plantinga's ideal.

But it must be noted that there is
a difficulty with Plantinga’s

approach and with our accomodation to
it.

If ve adopt Plantinga's

semantics with (D2) or (D4), or if we
adopt Kripke's semantics

with (Dl) and (E), then if we take 'Fx'

(as in

(e)) to stand for

any one-place open formula, then everything
will be essentially
such that

(3y)(x=y)

.

But that amounts to the claim that every-

thing exists essentially, which seems
counter-intuitive.
What is needed is a restriction to atomic
formulas, (or
to formulas that "express real properties").

of essentialism is incomplete.

But then our account

In particular, we do not have an

account which is general enough to allow us to prove the
results
of the following chapters
In sum, the best course for us is to adhere to (Dl) as our

definition of what it is for something to have a property essentially,
(i.e.

u is essentially such that A (where A has one free variable)

if and only if u satisfies

r

aA

'

)

Doing so allows us to retain
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(

B2

as our definition of an li
essential ism, and it significantly

sirapl ifies the formal
-work of the chapters
that follow.

iv

By making use of some of the
technical apparatus intro-

duced, we can see more easily
and completely the difficulties
with
Quine's criterion of essentialism.
In chapter 3 we suggested
that
there are non-controversial
instances of the schema he gives,
so

that schema does not adequately
characterise an objectionable

essentialist doctrine.

The purpose of this section is
merely to note

the relationship between maximal
models (and the restrictions

upon them discussed in chapter

3)

and Quine’s schema, and the basis

for claiming that Quine's schema
is fulfilled even by theories
for

which models implementing no dubious
metaphysical views can be given.
If Quine’s schema

(
'

Ox) (Fx.Gx.~aGx)

'

)

were the appropriate

characterization of essentialism, then, as we
saw, all models

would be essentialist models.

'x=x' and

W-Fx"

1

must be true

of every object in every world, since
the ordinary laws of quantifi-

cation theory are true in every possible world.

Even maximal models

are essentialist according to his criterion.
But the truth conditions which are established
by maximal

models can be given in an entirely non-controversial
way.
give the conditions under which a formula '"A

among

x^...^

1

We can

with free variables

is satisfied in terms of the notion of logical

consequence in first order, non-modal quantification logic.
We can do this most easily if we introduce the notion of

8o

a VOrld ' the ° ry tMnscri

P««19

Of a QML formula.

We shall use the
quantifiers (Vx) and (Ex) to
range over all possible
objects and
all possible worlds
We shall use a different
style of variable
.

f° r the tV °

tUt

tMS

(

U 2’-"’ v

“l’

Sh ° Ula be

i>

V"

- ie -tood

employ the predicates

™a

as abbreviating longer
formulas which

and 'V

'O’

('is a possible object'
and

a possible world') and
which employ

x','y',...).

<

Wil1

Fu
U

n
U h
l‘'' n

transcribed

j

r

.

u.=u?

,

'(( 3 x)Fx)

).

transcription of 'OxjFx' relative
to H)
'

(

oFx

will be '(VH')FuH''
;

'

20

etn
etc

5

Fx^.^x

-p^
for atomic ni
r
(except that
.

5

'is

only one style of variable

Relative to a base world H,
the QML formula

will be transcribed

rXi=X

H’,..., respectively )_

*

H

'

(the world-theory

will be '(Eu)(u6
f( H).FuH)'.

y
We0 „caa imagine that this
is

made rigorous in such a way
that for each formula A of
QML, there
is just one formula A H
of first-order quantification
theory such

that A

is the world-theory
transcription of A relative to H.

Some examples may help to make
the notion of a world-theory

transcription clearer.
The following:
(

x)

(

FxvGx

d(3x)Fx
°( x)

(}

(

3y ) Rxy

hecome (relative to H)
(Vu)(u€

f (H)io(VH'

FuH vGuH

)

(

.FuH’

'

(VH*

)

(Eu) (u£ f(H’

)

VH

)

(Vu) (uG

)3(EH'

(

’

Y (H'

'

)

'

))

(Ev) (vG

Y (H-

t
'

)

.RuvH'

'

)

,

8i

follows we shall .assume
that the details have
been specified.
Haring introduced the
notion of a world theory
translation,
it as quite easy
to give the truth-condition
for formulas containing
modal operators in such
a way that they correspond
to those laid
down by maximal models;
and this can be done
without introducing
essentialism in the explication
of modal operators.
Let I.u£
136 a C ° njUnCti0n
° f fo ™ulas 'u.€
^ (H) or ’u.£f( H )' for all j
'

SU.Clfl

ln A

L>h S,"t

*

Z U
i

Wh p V'p

-

the numerically latest
variable free

-v"

•

n

nUSt include exactly one of
u.6

H

each such u.
1

.

If

r
cp(

n

I u^
i H

i

if and only if r (Vu.

)

.

1

.

.

"*

5

H’

(Vu )((n
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cp(
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H, l)=T,

I U
u^zoaV
0 a theorem
3A
ls
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'

quantification theory.
This can be extended to the
models

models

<p

in the following simple way.

’of quantification theory'
to

A21
«,

based on maximal

simply change the words

-of the quantificational
theory

which has the world theory
translations of the members of A,
with
respect to each world in id, as its
special axioms’.
(Such a model
is constructed from a maximal
model

cp

by restricting

(p

to those

worlds in which all members of a
certain set A of closed, non-modal
formulas are true

.

ihe fact that we can give truth
conditions in terms of

what follows from a certain set of
closed, non-modal formulas A

(m

the case of maximal models A is empty)

shows that we can give

trutn-conditions for quantifying in in terms of
analyticity (since
all analytic truths constitute an appropriate
set A).

Such models

should not be objectionable
to Quine (at least
in the context of
hls ar gument linking
QML and essentialism),
even though they are
essentialist according to
his criterion.
In singling out an
elite
class of closed formulas
(A) one undertakes
only the second grade
Of modal involvement.
But singling out sueh
a class is all that
13 needed to give
truth-conditions corresponding
to those established by the sorts of
models considered here
(models
where
).^
is maximal

A

we should briefly note,
however, that a complete
definition
of essentialism should
incorporate the distinction
suggested by
Quine's schema as well as
the distinction incorporated
into our
extension of Parsons’s definition.
If essentialism is to
be objectionable it must involve two
distinctions. The essentialist
distinguishes sutong objects with
respect to their essential
properties; at least some objects
differ in their essential
properties.
But he must also distinguish
among the properties of objects,
labelii

some 'essential' and others
'accidental'.

A view which purports

to make all properties essential
treats all properties on a par.
The labeling of a property as

'essential' to an object can
accomplisl

no purpose unless that label
distinguishes that property's connections to the object from the link
between at least some objects and

their properties.
fhus a complete definition should
append to (B2)
<p(B,

H,

I

)=T and

r
4>(

aB~',

H, l)=F

'and

for at least some B with free

variables

and.

so"* H nnrf
and

t
1

1

•

t
In

,

what f °llovs that will
be assumed,
,

has been a matt
py nf*
i ; + +
tier
of little
controversy that there are
a t least some properties
true of, but not necessarily
true of, at
so._ things. Naturally,
any consequence of (B2)
is also
a consequence of (B2)
extended by the above clause,
so our ignoring
of that clause will have
little effect other than
to simplify
^^

subsequent discussion.
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CHAPTER

5

EoSENTIALISM IN QUANTIFIED
MODAL LOGIC:
TH E ELIMINABILIT7 OF

DE_

RE MODALITIES IN

ANTI-ESSENTIALIST THEORIES
chapter ve shall formulate
two claims about QML

which might vindicate Quine's
contention that QML is committed
to
essentialism. We will indicate
how a proof of one of these
claims
can be constructed, and ve
shall argue that this theorem
vindicates Quine at least partially.
The other (stronger) claim
is
not proved, but an alleged
1
disproof is found to be faulty.

Quine's claim is that QML is
committed to essentialism.
But this, by itself, is quite
vague.

To see more clearly what

Quine is saying it helps to consider
the use to which Quine would
put a formal language
Quine is concerned with our theories
about the world,

and he develops formal languages
primarily as vehicles for stating

theories in a suitably clear way.

It is in this use of a formal

language as a canonical language for
scientific theories 2 (where
'scientific' is construed broadly to include
the metaphysical)
that we should expect to find its commitments.

It is not the

language, but rather the theories stated in it,
which may be com-

87

88

mi t ted to essentialism.

Quine has defended the
viev that first-order
quantification
theory is adequate as
a canonical language
for science and philosophy.
Thus his charge of
essentialism in QML can he
viewed as
the claim that if the
statement of a theory
requires the additional
strength of QML (with
quantifying in), then that
theory must be
an essentialist theory.
3
hon-essentialist theories can
he stated
Without any uses of quantifying
in-i.e., in first-order
quantification theory with at most
a way of designating
closed formulas
as necessary (with at
most de dicto modalities^
14

As Parsons has shown,
however, there are
anti-essentialist

models for QML theories.

It appears then that
there is no incon-

sistency between the use of
QML and the acceptance of
anti-essentialism.
A QML theory can have an
anti-essentialist interpretation.
But, as we noted in chapter
3, there is a certain degen-

eracy in the use of quantifying
in when anti-essentialism is
adopted.
If

tp

is an anti-essentialist
model on

(G, K, K

2

*0

^

,

A is a

formula with only one free variable
('x'), and ^(h) is non-empty,
tnen

cp v

(3x)nA

,

d)=cp(

(x)nA

two quantifiers breads down

,

H).

The distinction between the

at least for this simple case.

Whao is more important is that if K
contains no world H
such that ^(H) is empty, then
r
tp(

1

o(3x)A'

,

H)=cp(

r

cp(

r

(3x)oA'

1

,

1

a (x)A'

,

H), for any

H)=tp(
b

(x)oA

T
,

H) =

This suggests that

H<EK.

quantifying in is at least nearly eliminable

r

,

since with these

few restrictions we find that each such
simple formula with quanti-

fying in is true in all
the same worlds as
(i.e., is necessarily
equivalent to) a formula
lacking quantifying in.
For each such
simple formula there is
another necessarily
equivalent formula
that is expressible with
the resources of only
the second grade
of modal involvement.
This suggests a way in
which Quine might be
vindicated

after all.

He would be vindicated
if the assumption of
anti-

essentialism led to the
eliminability of quantifying
in, i.e.,
if whenever the resources
of the third grade of
modal involvement are used indispensably
that use of QML is essentialist.
That this would vindicate
Quine should be clear.

He does
not object to QML because
of an aesthetic displeasure
at seeing

quantifiers precede modal operators
on a line of print.

He ob-

jects because he sees a problem
(essentialism) in the intended

semantics for formulas in which
quantifying in occurs.

If the

third grade of modal involvement
is undertaken only in ways
such
that it is eliminable in favor
of the second (i.e., such that
the truth-conditions for a formula
with quantifying in can be

given in terms of the truth-conditions
of an equivalent formula

which lacks quantifying in), then
Quine will not object (at least
not because such a use of QML is
essentialist.)

Quine's charge

applies only to the ineliminable use of
the full expressive re-

sources of the third grade of modal
involvement.
Of course the fact that anti-essentialist
models exist

for QML languages, as Parsons has shown,
does indicate that

w<

can give a coherent
interpretation to quantifying
in even if „ e
reject essentialism.
To the extent that
Quine rejects QML be-

ccherence rests upon the
acceptability of essentialism,
Parsons has answered Quine.
But the answer amounts
to a very
«ah reconciliation of QML and
anti-essentialism if the only
anti-essentialist uses of QML turn
out to be reducible to
uses
of modal operators before
closed formulas only-i.e.,
if the
third grade of modal involvement
is reducible to the
second under
such conditions. To vindicate
Quine we must show that de
re
modalities are elimmable in
anti-essentialist modal systems.
This would reinstate the
connection between QML and
essentialism
that Quine has said exists.

What we have said in the previous
section has used vague
terms

.

We must try to formulate more
precisely the sort of result

that would show a connection between
essentialism and QML.

In

particular, we should try to determine
how to make the idea of
e liminability

of the third grade of modal
involvement (de re

modality) precise.
There are at least two sources that
seem to agree about
the sort of result that would show
that a certain assumption
(for example, anti-essentialism) would
lead to the dispensability

of quantifying in.

Ruth Marcus 7
(M)

Parsons attributes the following view to

:

A system oi quantified modal logic is non-essential

91
(in the sense in question)
if and only if (i)
eTery

sentence containing an
essential attribute is
provably
equivalent to a sentence
containing no essential
attribute, and (ii) the
corresponding sentence containing no essential attribute
is of a sort which
does not raise essentialist
objections-in parti-

cular, it is not like the
examples which Quine cites
as troublesome.

In discussing a thesis
held by von Wright (which we
shall examine

closely in chapter 7)

G.

E. Hughes and M.

de re would be eliminable
in favor of
(HC)

for everM wf f

ot ,

de_

J.

Cresswell say that

dicto if

which contains a modality de
re,

We should be able to construct
a wff ,ot'

which

contains no modality de re and
which is provably

equivalent to a, i.e., which is such
that /-(a=a'

8
)

Both (M) and (HC) employ the phrase
’provably equivalent’
to pick out the appropriate
standard of eliminability

can, however, be taken in at least
two ways.

.

This phrase

In connection with

the thesis that anti-essentialism
can be implemented in QML only
if quantifying in

(

de re modality) is eliminable,
one might say

either
(1)

For each A there is an A' such that A’
lacks quanti-

fying in and

A=A'

is provable from the axioms of

QML together with the anti-essentialist schema
taken
as an additional axiom schema.

(i.e.

,

h

(A=A

'

)

.
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or
(2)

For

an;-

anti-essentialist model

13 " Wff A

'

SUCh that A

*«*

’

ip

and wff A, there

quantifying in

A

and A' can be shown
to have the same
truth-value
every possible world
r
(i. e
A=A''
can be shown
to be necessarily
true.)

m

1

5

Hughes and Cresswell
make it clear that
(l) is the result
they have in mind. 9
Although Hughes and
Cresswell require (l),
they never directly
consider the question of
whether (2) alone
fight be adequate, so
they never argue for
requiring (l) rather
than (2).
(M), on the other
hand, is open to either
(l) or (2) as

an appropriate
interpretation.

own standards for wn.n
wh^n aa fnvmni
formula
We are assuming that
a

Ruth Marcus has laid out
her
"

.

contains an essential
attribute."
,

form^a says that things have
essential

properties if it employs
quantifying in, and that it is
viciously
essential
if the truth-conditions
for quantifying in can not
be given in some metaphysically
uncontroversial way.
Thus our version of (M),
retaining the ambiguity between
(1) and (2), would say that if
a system is anti-essentialist

then
,
every formula with quantifying
in is provably equivalent
to one
without. Whether this should
be taken as (1) or as (2)
depends
upon whether we mean to say that
for each wff A there is a replacement formula A' lacking quantifying
in such that r A wA
follows
from the axioms of the system
(l), or whether we mean to say
that
,_1

:

the interpreted
system is such that th.
there is a purely
de dicto
r
1
A' such that
4 =A
i *
H
is
necessarily true (2).
•

^

'

-

lii

“

We snail first
examine alternative
KeL
(2)>

WiU

“ CUrately

f

°“*

-

•

in +
h
in
this
section

2 >’

contrast it with another,
eyen
weaker result suggested
and rejected by
Cresswell, and indicate
how to y
prove it
Lj
in section iv we qhnii o
snail argue further
that
this provides a
partial but substantial
vindication of Quine’s
claim that QML is
committed to essentialism.
-

-

^

r,

,

<

.

The theorem that we
wish to prove (based
on (2)) ls the

following

Theorem A:

uctu e

If

q>

is an anti-essentialist
model on a model

<G, K, \~ 1
1

Cl 0 s_d wfi A

)

,

then for any closed wff
A there

such that (a) for any
formula B, if r oB'

1

occurs in A’, then B is
closed (i.e.. A’ lacks
quantifying
in) and (b) for all H6K,
cp(A’, H ) = cp(A, H)
(so that
4>(

(AsA

1

)’

,

H)=T, for all H£K).

Theorem A requires that A and
A’ be necessarily
equivalent.
It is weaker than (l)
only because A’ can be
relativized to <p.
Even though A and A’ are
necessarily equivalent with
respect to
there might be another
anti-essentialist model <p’ which
assigns
A and A' different truth-values
in some world (although
there
will be a formula A’ which will
be necessarily equivalent to
A
with respect to <p-). The
difference is precisely the difference
’

cp,

)

9^

bet W e en "For ever,
model
rr

as Theorem A Says
qp-u C

^

^

every fornula A
thers la

&

„ j n_
and
For every ^rmuia
formula A tho
there is a formula
such that for every
model...” as (i) S
Says
avs
if we reconstrue
it in terms of
model theory).
(i) and
{}
anti theorem A
differ in the
oraer of their initial
quantifiers.
(we snail
shall return
ret
to this in
section v.
{

'\

'

(

v

'

’

1

It is helpful to
contrast Theorem
ieurem A
a with a
B weaker
require,

ment suggested, and
reiectert
n
jectea. Utr
by Cresswell.
In "The Elimination
°F
Fe_ Modalities"
Cresaw^ii gives a
criterion of eliminability
which is basically the
same as Uj.
t> 11+
h
But
a footnote he says
the following:

m
•

)

in S
S
e ^native
definition viz
[i?e?! A
/-R(a)
jft
without some condition
of
effectiveness on R
1
a condition we <=°uld
let R(a) be a if a’is
de dict^M
k

«^M

If

nly Cr esswell is right
to reject such a
formulation

of the eliminability
requirement.

But the requirement
made by

Theorem A is much stronger
than this.

It does not eliminate
a non-

theorem in favor of just any
de dicto non-theorem; it
requires
that 01 be eliminated in
favor of a de dicto non-theorem
with which
it is necessarily
equivalent.

In addition, as we shall
see, there

is a routine procedure
for constructing a replacement
formula from

This procedure is not based
purely on the syntax of a, as
Cresswell seems to want to require.
But in Theorem A, and the
rea-

placement procedure we shall employ
in proving it, we have found
an alternative way of handling
eliminability-one that is only

.

)

)

slightly weaker than (i
_
(1), TrVln
which Cresswell
would require, but
vhlch
is considerably
stronger thqn
>e very weak
requirement he reflects
WS
UPM
A
-to account the semantic^
f0 ° Ur f0r "al
-

)

^

:

,

™ **

™ng o„ly~

actlca]

axiomatic aspect of
our formal systems.

- »«„
tialist model

<p,

..

a new formula A*.

_ nm

Jm><

We must the
v,
then show
that A and A 4

are necessarily
satisfied by
all
11 the esame assignments
.
in any world
,
of the structure on
which * is a mode l.
(Thi _ proof. is
unis
omitted
from this dissertation.
It is long
inner w
+
but reasonably
straightforward.
From this Theorem A
follows easily.

_

Suppose that A is a wff
of QML and

structure
'A

<p

.

is a model on a
model

<G, K,
45
'

is defined as follows:
(0)

If A is atomic, A 4 =
A.

(1)

If A is

r

If A is

r

If A is

r

(2)
(3)
(^)

*

If A is
(A)

~B'

1

B C

,

r

~(B 4 )"

1

then A 4 = rB 4 C 4

x b" then A 4 = r ( x ) B4
1

(

.

''.

'

7
.

r
DB"’

then

,

if 3 contains no free
variables, then

A4 is
(B)

then A 4 =

,

r

a(B 4 )\

if B contains free variables,
where x
z

is the numerically earliest
variable not

occunng

in B (either free or bound),
then

A<P

is

n xB B
i

( '

'

l

each sentence n.x

.v(n x .Bw )
w
B

)v.

-

.

B
is among

n .x

1
j

,

„ here

B
,...

n

and

^

B*

)

is

(x

r

B

z

n.x' .aB

4>(

(x =x

)

z

43

z

if

)

'
1

i

?

n ? -L;-i
l)-T fnv.
lor some I

and some H£K and
(ii)

B*

is

(3x
z

Lemaa:

structure

If

<p

~
th6n for
an ^

'

function I, ana any HOC,

connectives

,

z

otherwise.

)

A, any assignment

H, I) = lp(A> H> I}

cpCa^,

_

ny induction on the
number of truth-functional

quantifiers and modal operators
in A.

Theorem A:

If

tp

structure

Vff A

’

Wff 3

’

is an anti-essentialist
model on a model
<G, K, K2
then for
,

,^

any closed

there ls a olosed "ff A’
such that for any
lf

'

r

°B 1

for any H£K,

Proof:

(x^x

is an anti-essentialist
model on a model

<G. K"

Proof,

)

occurs in A

ip(A'

Let A' he A4*.

,

A

'

then B is closed, and

H) = <p(A, H).
43

is closed if

A is, since B 43

is free in the same
variables as B, for any wff B.

A

has no

quantifying in, since clause (hB)
of the definition of A 43
guarantees that o' never occurs
before an open wff. By the lemma,
^(A

43
,

H) = tp(A, H).

The proof of the lemma rests
upon the intuition that since

ant i-es sent ialism requires that
objects be indistinguishable with

respect to their essential properties,
quantifying in can not be

x

.

.
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distinguish which objects
there are in the
domain of a
Objects are indistinguishable
with respect to the
modal
formulas they satisfy.
So quantifying in can
be used only to say
which formulas are {or
are not) necessarily
satisfied by eyerything
and to say something
about how many objects
there are in the domaj

The construction of

from
m A
A refW+
reflectsc this; open
formulas

are replaced by wffs
which hare

-

r
r

aB

_
1

as their sole
predicate.

It
IS only the satisfaction
and non-satisfaction of
certain identity

clauses that matters

Because of this, the procedure
for constructing

from
not, at first glance, seem
to be a construction which

obviously retains meaning.

If B has free variables
then

IS a disjunction the
only predicate of which is

the seeming complexity of ralP*
is deceptive.

introduced by the fact that we
have defined

’

=

However,

The complexity
_’

r

oB

(p

for the general

case, in which B may have more
than one free variable.
If B has only one free variable
the complexity disappears.
r

'

°B

llP

iS elther

'*=x.(y)(y=y). or

1

x=x

.

(

3y ) ( y^y )

whether everything or nothing satisfies r
oB 1

'

,

depending upon

The translation

preserves the intuition that to say
that something satisfies
IS to say something that is
either necessarily the case

equivalent to saying that it satisfies
'x=x. (y ) (y=y )

-

)

1

i

*ob"

(and thus

or neces-

sarily not the case (and thus equivalent
to saying that it satisfies
f

-

x=x. (ay) (y#y)

'

)

6 C ° SPlSXlUeS
,

,

—ere

lntr0duced

“

fully general
definition

B may have more
than one

^

from the neatness
of the connection
between the satisfaction
of
^3
an d. the necessi'fv ** n
i
^
,
a closed
formula.
Consider the case in
r*

nas

t

wo

f

n

ree variables

(

x
'

’

and 'y')
J
'

"up

r
•

°B

.

is one of

.x^y .(,)(,„))

or

U

x.y y.x y.(z)( z

z

))v(x-x.y=y. x? «y.( 3 z

)( z? f z ))

or
(x=x.y=y. x=y.

(3z)(z^z)v(x=x.y=y. x^

y (z)(z=z)
.

)

or
(X X y y X
7
‘

*

’

(

3 z)(z^z))v(x=x.y=y.

x^y.( z)(z?z)).

Depending upon whether or
not u and v are identical,
their

E

13 either necessary
or impossible.

features of u and v are
relevant.

No internal

Only the semantical
features

of B (whether or not
it expresses an
essential relation) determine the applicability
of the modal operator.

Since it is only the
identity conditions that
matter, it
might be thought that if
satisfies n.x B , then

<u ,....u
1

n>

necessa. lly

satisfies r OB 1 if and only
if
..rue,

.

.

.

(xj (n.x Bo>Bf

so that a more "intuitive"
translation of

would be possible, viz
(t)

B

B

(n x .o(x
1

1

)

...(x )(nlX =,B)v...v(n x B .D(x
)...( Xn )(n x B=i
n
w
1
w

But such a translation is
not possible.

Kripke's formal
semantics does not, per se, lay
down any conditions on what
objects

,

.

can co-exist.

in particular, there
might be an n-tuple

^

SUCh

that <u

±

,

.

,u >

n

t(H), for every H€K.

satisfies

FT

X

B

and

<
<

u 1S
U

<u

It might a

J^

'

“

,u \
>

does not satisfy
n
Furthermore, there might
be no other n-tuple
satisfying n.x B
r
In that case,
n
a( x
Wrr B
1'
" '”n'
1
n^ n"ii x ^B) Wl11 be satisfied in every
possible world sinee in
every possible world every
n-tuple whose
members^ exist in that
world (there is no such
n-tuple, will satisfy
n
=B
So
,u > would satisfy
i*
< u1
( T )
eyen though it does
n
r
not satisfy nB'
i

-

•

•

B-

.

)

'

J

,

.

,

.

.

.

If we vere to add the
condition that

^(h)

H£K, then (T) could
serre as the translation
of

satisfying n.x B satisfied

niX

in every world.

But since

f\ H) =

='l(

,

for all

If some n _ tuple

then eyery n-tuple would
satisfy
That is guaranteed by
anti-essentialism.

for all H£K, it also
follows that every n-tuple

l(

Itn.xW

satisfies

if an d only if, in every
world, every n-tuple
r
1
in that world satisfies
n. x^B , i.e., if and
only if

° (x

p

)

.

.

.

(

x ^ ) (Ffx

1

ioB)"

is true.

Unfortunately, we have no proof of
the stronger result

based on (1).

The purpose of this brief section
is merely to

point out a defect in Creswell's
alleged proof 11 that a putative

theorem very close to (l) is false.
decision as to the acceptability of
a proof nor a disproof of it.

We are left, then, with no
{

1)

since we have neither

)

.

)

)

.

In "The Elimination
of De Re Modalities"
M. J.

Cresswell
attempts to prove that
in a certain modal
system LPC+S5+Pr (pre _
dicate calculus together with cm
r ,,lth S5 axioms
b
and the principle
r
(x)(DFx v o~Fx) v
(x)(0Fx.0~Fx)'
de re modalities
modaliti
are not eliminable ' _i e '’
th6re arS f ° rmulaS
-th quantifying in which are
not equivalent to any
formulas without quantifying
in.
LPC+S5+P r
18 Cl " Saly
related t0 an ^I~ ess entialism,
and the precise nature
of this relation will
be discussed in chapter
Pr and antl _
J.
essentialism are so similar
that if Cresswell ’s
proof were successful, we would expect
it to he readily revisahle
to show that
(l) is false.
)

——

'

But Cres swell.’
s proof does not succeed.

An important lemma

(Lemma 1 in Cresswell’s
paper) in the proof says
that if A is
provable in LPC +S5+ Pr then
C(A) is also provable,
where C(A) is

constructed from A by replacing
every part

r DBd

wnere Xp >••.,*, are all the
free variables in
is not true.
(a)
(b)
Tiie

by ro( X;L )

B.

.

.

.

(x

)b\

But that lemma

Consider
(

x ) ( 3y )
(

(

Fx v ~Fy

x ) ( 3y ) n ( x

(

y

(

Fx v ~Fy

first is provable in LPC+S5

•

)

The second is flase unless it

is impossible that there
be more than one object.

But the necessity oi a unit domain is certainly
not provable in LPC+S5+Pr, so

the pair of (a) and (b) constitue
a counter-example to Cresswell's

alleged proof of the falsity of this
putative theorem closely

related to (l ) 12

)
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Even though we have
no proof of (i),
lt should b0
note(J
that the translation
(T) introduced
at the end of the
preceding
section is a translation
of
which hoes not depend
upon cp.
Because of this, if we
consider only
anti-essentialist models
such that for any HGK,
f(H) -V , then the stronger
result based
0n (i h0ldS
FOT
-ere is a formula A^ lading

W

-

;

quantifying in (the
translation of A based on
(T)) such that for
an^
model cp on <G, K X2 V>
i-r cp
>r/
if
is anti-essentialist
and for
•

’

all HGK,

and

I.

]3

,

/'(h) =L(, then cp(A T
H'
,

I)1 =

A

H

r)
I)
for any H*
This proof is also done
by
J induction
uuucuon nn
on the complexity
,
5

y,(

»

»

,

^

of A.
In addition, there
is another result
slightly stronger

than Theorem A but weaker
than

the strong claim based
on (l)

which is readily provable,
based upon the way t? is
defined.
For
each formula A, there
is a finite set of
purely de dicto formulas
±

l\

""

and I,

A

~

21

’

such that for anji
anti-essentialist model
1

^p(

'a(A=A )v.

.

in )'1

.yn(A=A
\

)

,

H

ti,

upon the number of free variable
u naDles

l)-T
l)-T.

m
-in

(m,
+
(What

<p

and any H

m is depends

Aa andn the number of modal

operators in A.

Certainly if (1) were true Quine
would be vindicated.

If

we could show that for each
formula A there is another Asuch
that A' lacks quantifying in
'
and a (AeA'f is true in all
worlds
in all anti-essentialist
models, then we would be justified
in

saying that the third grade of
modal involvement carries a commit
m.nt to essentialism, since the
expressive resources of that

grade would always hp P i
^ eliminable when essentialisin
was denied.
Ine only further
requirement
tnot
- enent
tnat one mxght
reasonably make would
t0 rSqUlrS
A be eff -«rely
constructible from A, so
that
a tranSlatl0a
Pr0cedure for transforming
formulas of the stronger
language to formulas of
the weaker language
would be possible/
,

^

'

We haye no proof of
that strong result,
however. All we
lave is a proof of the
weaker claim that if we
are given a parti-

cular anti-essentialist
model

«p,

then there is, for any
closed

formula A, a form^a A*
lacking quantifying in
which is true in
clll

"fcll0

S cUI10

A
VOTI dsq oasq A,
T T
with respect to that
model.
r?

• _i_-i

In this

section we shall explore
the significance of
this result, attempting to determine the
extent to which even this
weaker result might
be adequate to vindicate
Quine.
We would like to know
whether
Theorem A is an adequate
basis for the claim that
an anti-essentialist can always accomplish
the goals he has in using
QML even
if he renounces the use
of quantifying
in.

As we have seen, Quine’s
principal goal in the use of
formal

languages is the development of
a language suitable for
stating
scientific theories
Now someone would think
that such a language
should be supplemented by modal
operators and given an intensional
interpretation if he felt that the
ordinary extensional interpretatic
did not reflect important
intensional features of language,
and if
he felt that such intensional
features should be incorporated
info iho language of science.

Consider, for the moment, models for
quantificational
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languages without
modal operators.

The model that
He are mQst

-uenesteu an as the model
which assigns to
each predicate
(n-p la ce

relation) of the
language the set of
objects
Jec ^ (n-tuples
(„ of objects)
°
sa tisfy that
predicate, under its int *
intended meaning.
The correct
moael for a theory
in which
F has the
h
^teniei meaning 'is blue'
one which assigns
all actual blue
tunings to the
things
extension of »f».
V,S might see
a model ip on <G,
K R vP>/
x
as a model which
that sort of
extensional model (for
i irst-order
first
non-modal languages ) at_ each_ world.
But, of course, «p
is much more.
It also
provides for assignments
of truth-values to
formulas containing
"0dttl 0Perat °rS> ““
interpretation in ever,
possible
world for formulas. In
providing an interpretation
in ever, possible
world it grves an
intensional interpretaion
to formulas.
But we are not concerned
with just any abstract
model <p.
we are concerned
with the model * which
assigns to each formula
ltS COTreCt
tSnSi0n i e -* the
^ich at each possible world
assigns to each predicate
(relation) the objects
(n-tuples) which
satisfy that predicate in
that possible world,
according to the
nded meaning of that
predicate. 15 The correct
intensional model
for a language with the
predicate 'r is 'is blue',
is the model
cp on yne model
structure
\ G K ’ r 40 —where G is the real
world,
K is the set of all possible
worlds, B-K 8 1(5 and
f assigns, to each
possible world, the set of
things that exist in that
world-such
that (p( 'F' , H) is the set
of things that are blue
in H, for each
possible world H.
That model provides the
correct intensional
,

_

,

'

'

v,

5

,

v

“

“

-

-

'

.

>

.

10 U

interpretation of the
formulas of the lan
g uages_i„ the
that a model which
assigned all

sajne

way
'

^

tfi
wQuid pro _
vide a correct
extensional interpretation
ation of
P
of th
c
the formulas
of the
17
language
'

.

The crucial matter
is that each thing
which is possibly
blue be blue in some
world, that each thing
that is possibly not
blue
blUe
S ° me W ° rld
^r both simple and complex predicates.
Once thi=: Q adone,
the model has been
constructed.
These considerations
lead us to the view
that if we can show
that each formula with
quantifying in is necessarily
equivalent
to one without
quantifying
in
thpn
*
then no
o m,
we can eliminate
quantifying

^

^

’

-?

.

M

without losing the ability
to express each
intension of the
language.
For each formula of the
stronger language, which
has
quantifying in, there is a
formula of a weaker langauge,
which has no
quantifying in, which is
intensionally equivalent to
it.
Iheorem
A shows that such an
equivalence holds for
anti-essentialist

-dels.

So if an interpreted theory
is an anti-essentialist
theory,
then for each formula A
with quantifying in there
is a formula

without quantifying in to
which A is necessarily, or
intensionally
equivalent..

If an interpreted QML
theory is anti-essentialist,
then
that interpreted theory can
be equivalently expressed in
a language
which seems weaker with respect
to its expressive resources,
but
in which we are actually
able to express everything that
is expres-

sible in the stronger language,
up to intensional equivalence.

.

105

An^i essentialism
nerafp^
"
J
tns additional sxDres^iiro
cAprebsive strength that
third grade of modal
involvement has wer the
nrst
least with respect
to the U se of those
.

^
^
.

-

___ ^

theories

,

"hat is just as
important is that we know
that the weaker
language can also be
interpreted without
recourse to the metaphysical

apparatus associated with
QML.

The necessity operator
can be

associated with a special
linguistic status for a
certain class
of closed sentences
true in all possible
attaches to formulae n/->+ +
°
16 connec tion
between objects and
their properties.
,

vi

If our theory of the
world is an (S 5

)

anti-essentialist

theory then we shall find
no need to employ quantifying
in in the
canonical language with which
we state it. Theorem
A guarantees
that we can equivalently
state our theory in a
formal language
which allows no quantifying
in.
Thus with respect to
Quine’s
primary goal in the use of
formal languages, quantifying
in and
essentialism are linked and it
is fair to say that any
ineliminable
use of quantifying in in a
canonical language for science
involves
essentialism.
But

Qume's goal of developing

a formal language for use

as the canonical language
for scientific theories is a
limited

use of formal language, and
what we have said leaves open the

question of whether there are other
uses to which one might put

QML which would not
inVQlve a comm tment
.

di “’ 1CU

“

^

.

eS3ent alls

^

t0 eValUate the

connection between
ssentialism and the uses
of QML without a
thorough evaluation of
thS USS " t0 WhlCh °
nS might PUt a f °
rmal language.
One virtue in
attempting to evaluate
QML with respect to
Quine's use of formal
langauge is that Quine
has given
n
comparatively good idea
of
the use to which he
would put a formal
language.

In what follows we
shall not clearly
delineate uses for

QML, but we will
suggest some general
categories of use to which
one might put a formal
language and discuss the
relationship of

essentialism to such uses
of the formal apparatus.
Of course there is at
least one use for QML
which involves
essentialism but which involves
its user in no commitment
to
essentialism.
is the philosophical
use of QML in analysing
others' metaphysical claims
If> for example
ls

Ms

,

_

to reconstruct Cartesian
arguments one might find
that a reconstruc-

tion that employs QML makes
better sense of his arguments
than any
other available means for
understanding them. If what we
have said
iS riSht> the
SSSi to use QML for this could be evidence of
Descarte
essentialism. While that may be
nothing new, a similar need to
employ the full resources of
QML in explicating, e.g.,
Locke's work,
would be an interesting discovery.
In any case, the Kripke
semantic,
for QML that we have been
discussing might provide a valuable
tool
for the analysis of historical
material.
The fact that it is associ-

ated with essentialism is, in this
case, a virtue.

Even the anti-
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essentialist might be
interests
^stea in +\
the exploration of
the metaphysical
YleWS ° f MS
predecessors-he commits
himself to
no dubious metaphysical
views when he employs
QML in this way
At
B0St he
&1Pke S
“*
as apparatus
explicative
of essentialism and
accepts, thereby, that
j
essential'
essentialism
is at least
moderately coherent.

m

'

«

There might also be
advantages in using a
formal language
which essentialism is
expressible when one does
the semantics
for English (or other
natural languages), it
might turn out that
the easiest way to do
such a semantics would
be to translate English
sentences into the sentences
of a formal language
and then give a
traditional sort of semantics
for those formulas. And
it might turn
out that the best formal
language for such a task
would employ a

-

necessity operator which would
be used and interpreted
in such a
way (i.e., which would be
used in connection with
non-trivial cases
of quantifying in) that the
formal representation of some
English
sentences was a non-trivially
essentialist claim, according
to the
standards we have set so far.
If this were the case,
that would show that the best
se-

mantles for English must treat
essentialism as a coherently
expressible
doctrine.
One would still have the
option, as Parsons points out,
of denying all of the non-trivial
essentialist claims.
The point
here is that our theorem has no
obvious relation to this program
of giving a semantics for Enlgish.
Parsons has shown that Kripke’s
semantics can uniformly represent both
essentialist and anti-essentialist

° Ur

ne0ram shows that an
anti-essentialist need not
Pt QML fo, himself, but
in the interest of
uniformity, he might
adopt a language strong
enough to represent his
own claims as veil
as those of others.
The coherence of
essentials, not its truth
as presupposed vher.
one uses a system vith
de re modalities in
order
to develop a semantics
for English.
"

Of course, the
anti-essentialist might argue
for linguistic

reform.

Since a simpler language
is adequate to
represent all our
true claims (if
anti-essentialism is true), and
since that simpler
language avoids the ontological
"excesses" of essences and
possible
worlds (and perhaps even
possible objects), the
anti-essentialist
can, it seems, argue
for a linguistic reform
vhich will avoid these
ontological indulgences. This,
of course, is no longer
merely a
matter of doing the semantics
for English.
It returns us to the
project of developing a canonical
language for our theories.
Still another use of QML would
be a natural deduction system
reflect ordinary modes of
inference.
Such a use of QML might
show that ordinary language
involved essentialism if it showed
(l)
that quantifying in was crucial
to representing some ordinary
inferences and (2) that the modal
operator used to reflect such inferences

represented necessity of a suitably
metaphysical sort.

Whether or

not (1) can be shown, it is
argued in chapter 8 that it is difficult
to show (2).

In any case, the person who
developed such a natural

deduction system would show at most
that ordinary language involves
essentialism.

Such a demonstration would not involve
him in a

«

•
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commitment to essential cm ? -p
i
-aiism
if vhe were wiliinp-

-

denary

„

language.

are ju*t a few of
the uses one might
have for QML
"* '*•*
»• •*“•*•
e

»

more clearly
comprehensibi
p
tle

-

t
In

the inteUigibility
of

essentialism in this way
one need not accept
P essentialism
essenti i
as true.
All of this focuses
again on a crucial
rue _ at difdlfierence between

3rgment

“*

^

*!».

-

stressed that QML

is unacceptable
because essentialis m
is an incoherent
doctrine.
Our approach, on
the other hand,
accepts
pT:s that,
’
that the
tv,
semantics for

m

has clarified
essentialism, at least
to some extent.

We hare

explored whether QML is
tied to the doctrine,
so clarified.
What
We haYS f
d 13
is to be used as
:“
a canonical
guage lor theories,
does involve a commitment
to essentialism,
as Quine has suggested.
Whether other usesb ccarrv
arry a commitment
+
to
essentialism can he evaluated
only
i n llgtlt
light of a
* in
„ clearer
i
delineation
of those uses.

^

“ *

™

-

But some might argue
that the notion of
eliminability (of

d£ re necessity) relies
upon too crude a notion
of equivalence.
It might be argued,
for example, that necessarily
equivalent formulas

need not express the same
proposition, so our demonstration
of
the existence of a necessarily
equivalent de dicto formula for
each
de re formula does not
show that de re modalities
are eliminate.
There is no doubt that we can
draw finer distinctions of
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waning, according
differentiated.

to which necessarily
equival
qui valent, formulas
v
,

Hecessar-mv
7 e4U1ValSnt f

°“

are

are not intersubstittutaole
t
,
salva veritate in
belief contexts,
for example,
exMple so someone
mie-ht
i
tereSted in addi
t0
for
a Kay of
f f erentiating
among formas with
respect to their
behavior in
°
belief contexts.
,

u

-

W

™ics

such a caoe,
differences between
en SI
dp re
r P formulas
f
and the
dicto equivalents
might be reflected
in a diffe
difference
their
semantical treatrr'on+
t
treatment.
I n order for this
x
s to be
detrimental to our

m

m

.

arguments linhing

«

theories and essentialism
this Inference in
semantical treatment
would have to be
important for the notion
of
equivalence of theories.
But the relation of
believers to theories
should not be a factor
in our evaluation
of the equivalence
of those
theories.
Vie want to
evaluate whether the
theories say the same
thing about the world,
not whether they are
believed to do so.
We can make this
point in the following
way.

formula

For each

let p(a> be the set of
worlds in which 0 is
true,
intuitively, p(„) is the
set of possible states
of affairs consistent
Wlth the trUth ° f “•
“
-ts on what can be by ruling
out
all of the members of
K-p(a).
a.

,

U

For any formula
0, if 0 is necessarily
equivalent to a, then
p(e) - p(a).
O and 0 place the
same limits on what is
possible.
They allow (rule out)
all of the same states
of affairs.
We could expand K to
include other, "impossible,”
worlds in
which a and 3 differ in
20
truth value.
ouch worlds could then re—

fleet a person's
beliefs, where a and
their behavior in
belief contexts.

^

B can
p

be
oe diff
+
differentiated
by
-

But such an expansion
o f the set o f
worlds is not important

Bon the consideration
o f whether or not
„ and 3 hare the
same theoimP ° rt
«>« -ter of whether
„ and
3 are heiiered to
hare the same theoreticai
lmpor t.
tt e identity
P<0)
d P(B) g
e
-o are e.uiradent in what they
say about what is
possible, and that is
what is important
in deter-

"

mine

-

“

“

"

-

^

whether they play the
same role within a
theory. 21

t

(

.
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from his objections
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tharR=K §
cance of our discussion.

1011611

re?™

Quine has objections
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models
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is defective.

*

Elimination of De Re

indUctlTC proofs since they
are

quite routine!

has

uctioajm,

iogo;

"
haS als0

Pr ° fesSOT Cressvell
his proof

Panted out that

”

CreSS “ eU ls also p alse.
lemma (Lmalln
3
LPOtSStPr then so is nctC.CtB)'1
!
Bufthe !o!Li!g P
a
x 3y o(Fx v ~Fy) 5 ( x x=x
)(
)
(x ( 3y )a (x)(y)(F x v ~Fy) 3
( x )
x=x )
constitute! a counter-example
constitutes
to that lemma.
'
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“
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such that fo^
pretations the stronger
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In general^'i^amomtf
the
truth.
1
6 " UP to" necessary
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'
‘
°” S more finel
purposes (of. section vii)
y
some
B
t
is adequate to
nslaeI ed here
serve as a basis for
the claimlh
ex aminable
6 f0rmula ls
favor of another, where
the roTe
1
° tn ° Se formulas ln
scientific theories is
what is in question
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n
a
° ne
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ie!
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6

CONSTANTS
In Kripke

philosophical discussions 1
of issues S urrounding
l0elC> thS n ° ti0n ° f
*
an important role
ri81d deSl8nat0r 13
a SingUl
*“» **<* refers to the same
thing in every
possible world. For exa
examnle
'n- v,
mple, 'Richard
Bixon' is rigid
but ’the President'
is
T
a'PUcit in his discussion
is an assumption that the semantics n-p
mantles of Semantical
Consideration on Modal
Logic"
is extended to
account for such terms,
what follows we will
giye
such an extension of
that semantics and
explore the extent to
which
anti-essentialism can be define -p™
defined for models which
make assignments
to rigid designators.
We shall find that
with a plausible
extension
of the definition of
anti-essentialism so that it
applies to such
models we can prove Theorem
A for models for
theories stated in
languages with rigid
designators.

"

7

'

s

^

^

-

.

>

•

m

g,

i

We can extend our
Kripke-style semantics for
QML to apply
to languages with
constants (rigid designators).
1

Let

'a',

te varlables °‘ the
meta-language ranging over
singular

terms (constants and variables)
of the formal language.

by letting <p(a)£W for each
constant

11

1
.

+

a.

(

'<p( a )

'

„e extend

is undefined
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if « IS a variable

As before, I(a)
£tv( ix
lf a
„ is a variable,
I(Q)
( “>

)

.

.

——
^

-

0

reylse ciause (i)
°f
"the
;

-

following way:
(i')

, .

1

.

.

,a

n

) ,

“

(of. APPenaix
1} ln

ill

,
h, I) = m if
and only if

< I (« 1 ),...,I(a )>
n

”

any assignment
function

For atomic A:
(a

I.

if

«...

€4>(P

n
H)>

,

V „„
“ «•

V

involving constants
which would be
ue essential
i
+
essentialist
according to the
definitions given so fm~
-p_
far.
For example, if
u£^(h), v£lt(H), (a =
P
)
U=1(X) 3113 <P(b)=v=I-(
x ), then »('oJ=a .,
,
H I)- T b It
<f( ax=a', H, I'
)=F.
Ihus
according to our
definition , any model
with a world with two
named objects would
be an essentialist
(

’

5

,

,

,

model.

«e can rule out such
trivial examples of
essentials. Pirst
lntr ° aUCe the
-i=h is defined analogously
A
t0
’•
13
or r
for eaoh
.
variable or constant oc
or a occuring lree
in A (a
r
g free ln
k
J
constant is said
to occur free if it occurs 0 +
Such that J -*' except
that not both
_
r
r
and
°yOk
are conjuncts of n.a A
(We are assuming an

“

^

^

V’.

^

^

.

enumeration of all the singular
terms of the language.)
Now we can redefine
essentialism as follows.

Let J, J',...

be functions such that
J(«)£l( for every constant
or variable a.
(J is not restricted
in the way that I is.
It may be that o is a
constant but J(a)*p<c)
But each I is also among
the J functions.)
.

a

:

1

We will say that
a model

any formula A, if
(nf

r

rr
n. a
1

An
rcA

H

,

’

’

r
r

cp(
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^

is a
anti
nti-esse n +

<p

n.<A oA
1

H

,

’

.

tialist if and only
if

^

j)- T l0r
f
SOme H

jA-m
,-T -p
for ere ry H and

J.

J, then

Thls
nls def1n
definition is just
.

.

the earlier
definition, extended
to treat constants
like free
variables.

A
n a
n
i
1

asQ

A

is defined as
before for cases3

(o)

-r,

^° r
i

)

replaces

17.

1

X

A

(or
r 17
x
‘Ax

B

(?)
*-"» except that
una

'

'

,

+h
throughout.

)
)

Case (4) is

-Pr\ 1 1

follows
(A)

If A is r aBn
(A)

if b contains no
free
ree wviom
vari ables or constants

A 45 is
(B)

then

,

r

n( B

tp

r.

lf B contains free
terms and x
z

f

is the
th„ first
+
variable

not occuring in B
(free or bound),
then Av is
r
1
(n
o
v„ v /n
)
p o where
„
B
1
each 17. a B is
v

oh

moa B
(i)

B

n

•

B

1

is

,...,n o
w
r

B

) ,

and

Vr

(x ){
=Y
) (x

\

z

i-p
lf

B

n.a .DB V

*Vr

<P(

(Ol
,

H, I)=T

for some I and some
HGK.

(n)

B 1 is

r

(3x )( x
z

yx z

)'

otherwise.

Theorem A is proved for
models for theories
stated with
constants in almost the
same way that it is
proved for models for
theories^ stated without
constants, except that n.a A
B
(n.a ) replaces
n x (n.x ) throughout.
i
This appraoch to the
definition of essentialism
formally
isolates so-called "referential"
essential properties, 3 like
being
italics! with a Ox=a') and 'Fx v ~Fa',
relying upon their

sZ^
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larity to trivial
essences like 'x=x'
or'Fx
x ^v ~v
- x
the objecc that 'a'
denotes is the only
object that

Even
though

.

•

satisfies such f ormulas

necessarily

these open formulas
can b e treated as on
a par with formulas
like x =x'
x wh-iVh
Which Qexpress negligible,
universal
-senses, because every
object denoted by some
constant has essential
properties which are
formally analogous to
such properties of the
thing that 'a' denotes.
.

’

There are purely formal
criteria which we can
use to single
out formulas which
express such essences
(as we have done in
this
definition of an anti-essentialist
model Just given), and
for each
formula there is an analogous
formula that is satisfied
by every
object.
(For examole
x=x'
on logous
n
X
P
X 13 ana
to x=a' and «Fx v
~Fx'
is analogous to ’Fx v
-Fa').
Biere is nothing
metaphysically important in the fact that the
object that 'a' denotes
necessarily
satisfies x-a ( i.e., that
it is essentially such
that it satisfies x=a
Therefore our definition,
which is intended to define
anti-essentialism in such a way
that to deny it (i.e., to
accept
essentialism) involves one in a
metaphysically suspect view, must
(as it does) treat such
essences as being identical with
a on a
par with being self-identical
'

-i

5

<=

f

'

,

.

What we find, then, is that
our definition of anti-essentialism
for models for languages without
constants, which treats universal

essences as trivial essences, extends
quite naturally to include

referential properties of objects.

This accords well with the
informal

intuition that such properties are
trivially essential.

That Socrates

.
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necessarily satisfies
13

^

11Ule intereSt

,

'

x =s’

(where 's' is *a
constant denoting Socrates)

^

We ne£d

more about him than

needed to know that he
necessarily satieties
° laln
he SatlSfleS
'

’

X=X

than

’

human

“

18

Uke

X=S

'

^

1S

thS = lal ”

ls

Certainly the

the claim that he
satisfies
for example

,

„ecessari ly

latter is an interesting
controversial claim about
essence,
the other two are true
for purely formal reasons
.

Thin is not to say
that one must accept the
view that such
essential properties are
trivial.
The important thi
thing +to notice is
that these so-called "rpfpypn+id
referential properties are
formally isolatable
from other essential
properties. While any model
for a language
11

With constants (of the
type we have considered)
will have essential
properties of this "referential
«,«>.+
eierential " sort,
+»,
the existence of such
essential
P perties in no way afiects the
question of whether there
should
he any non-referential
essential properties. Ihere
are models which
make only referential
properties essential, so the
choice between
models with or without other
essential properties remains.
11

Beinv

i

dentical with Socrates entails
all of Socrates's

other essential properties.

But nothing constrains us to
choose

a model in which any properties
other than referential (and
universal)

properties are essential to Socrates,
so the introduction of constants
does not affect the issue of whether
we should regard any of Socrates's

non-referential properties as essential
to him.
Thus our definition of 'anti-essentialism'
in this chapter

might be seen as a definition of
non-referential inessentialism.

.

It allows for
essential properties of
a certain limited,
formally

isolatable sort
Of course

,

it might be argued
that onoe

_

^

class Of essential
properties, we need not
be hesitant about
recog-

to this.

First , the fact that
some referential
properties must be
essential nan be seen as
a result of certain
features of the referential apparatus of the
language for which we
give models-rather
than a result of any
special features of the
object referred to.
Second, whether or not
we should be hesitant
about recognizing that
there may be non-referential
essential properties, we
certainly
should be hesitant about
recognizing any particular
candidate as an
essential property without
good reason. Nothing about
referential
properties giyes any obvious
support to the claim that
any other
particular property is essential
to a
thing.

11

At first glance it may
appear that a definition of
anti-

essentialism that treats

W

as a formula expressing
a

essence of ohe thing denoted by
a is inconsistent with our
remarks,
chapter 2, on Hintikka's appraoch
to QML.
There we argued that

m

Hmtikka

approach does not provide an
anti-essentialist semantics

for QML because of the central
role played by formulas

r
(

3x ) D ( x=a y

.

An examination of some examples
of such formulas led us to the
con-

clusion that the most natural
interpretation of them seems to involve

)
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essentialism.
The crucial distinction
to be made between
our remarks in
chapter 2 and our
discussion in this chapter
is that here we
hare
been concerned only with
the singular terms
that are ri e id detain Hintikka's system,
some singular terms
are rigid and

others are not, and the
formula
“

"

a Sln

^lar

ter“ Which iS a

^HxW
-Sid

serves

designator.

^

dlstlngulsh

It is in dis-

tinguishing among the
designators that Hintikka's
approach involves
essentialism.
The essentialist must
make two distinctions.

He must distinguish among things in
terms of their differing
essential properties, as Parsons has
emphasized.
But he must also
distinguish
among the properties of
things, as Quine has
emphasized.
I„ distinguishing among the designators
of an object, Hintikka
makes the
latter of these distinctions.
A consideration of the
examples he
gives suggests that he would
also make the former
distinction.
(Being the number nine is
essential to nine, but not seven,
for

example.
In allowing descriptions
to be treated on a par with
other

singular terms, Hintikka makes it
clear that he regards singular
terms as expressions which
characterize their denotata.

mere labels,
basis of whether

They are

been he then distinguishes between
terms on the

(3x)ax=a

is true for the appropriate
substitution

for a, he is distinguishing between
different characterizing expressions
on the basis of whether they necessarily
characterize a single object.

relieving Kripke ve
have treated singular
,
terms (constants)

as raere

-els.

oar

sendee

thlnS tD 3 Sln8Ular

“

retires

—

“-Id.

a model to assign
the same

Singular terms do not

characterize their denotata,
they merely label
them, so
tells us nothing about
the essential
characteristics o f
(3x)nx=a

is true for any
denoting constant

I(

3xW
denota-

whenever

r
(

3x )x=„

is true, simply
because of the sort of
n-p term
+
a is and the vay
our

semantics treats such
terms.

No essential
essentlal Mature
+
of

ex's

denotation

needs to be considered.
It may see, tempting
at first to argue
that Hintikka uses

the truth of r

(3*W

as an indication that
« is a mere desig-

nator, which does not
link its denotation to
any property.
rigidity Of a might be
seen as an indicator offs
lack of

!he

content.
Ihen his approach, like
ours would make
anti-essentialism possible.
But consideration of the
sorts of terms that are
rigid rules
that out.
'The least integer greater
than 8' might be a singular
term b in the normal
language.
On most essentialist
views
( 3x ) mx=b
would be true, since 9 would
be held to satisfy 'o x=b\
'

1

b

is no mere

label—

it is an expression that
characterizes

its denotation, singling
out a property (allegedly
essential) of
9.
It is clear that Hintikka
would include such examples
among the

singular terms a such that r
(3x)ax=a'7 is true.
The difference between the two
approaches is simply this.

Hintikka's Singular terms encompass
a broad category of terms,
at
least some of which relate their
denotations to certain properties.

.
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He distinguishes
among the tents of
this tread category
on the

tasrs of whether there
is something that
they necessarily
denote.
Typically, at least,
some term that necessarily
a- +
denotes
its denotation vill also be
associated with an essential
- ssen tial
property of that
object
Our approach begins
with a grammatical
category of terms
an Of Which rigidly designate.
Terms of this category
are mere
labels. A constant is
not associated with
any non-referential essential properties in the
way that one of Hintikka's
singular terms
might be.
One can probably consistently
adopt anti-essentialism
together with Hintikka's
semantical approach, if he
makes his models
such that
is true only lf a ls
a mere labei> or logicaiiy
associated with a mere label,
so that a connects its
denotation
with no substantive property.
Besides a constant, say
'b', a might
be 'The x such that Fx v
~Fb , etc.
But no term a except such
a
mere label (or logical constructs
of the sort just given)
could be
f
7
such that
(3x)ox=a was true.
'

However, whatever reasons
there are for adopting such
an
anti-essentialist approach are also
reasons for rejecting Hintikka's

method for dealing with singular
terms.

The attraction in Hintikka's

method is that it treats proper
names and definite descriptions
on a par.
's’,

'b',

In the formal language they are
both rendered as letters
'c', etc.

But once one has established a
semantical

basis for distinguishing them-as
would an anti-essentialist approach.

^

.
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treating proper

nar.es as a

separate grammatical
category-there is

no longer any reason
to treat them on a
par inferential^.

To sum up, we can define
an anti-essentialist
model for
languages with singular
terms, whether or not
all singular terms are
g d.

But to define
anti-essentialism, apparently
we must single
out a category of rigid
designators not associated
with any "cha-

racterizing" properties of
an ooject
obiect

.

tw
But

m
,•

,

.

making such a distinc-

tion we undermine the
reasons for accenting
+•
accepting na semantics
of the sort
that Hintikka favors
.

m
There is, of course, much
controversy about singular
terms
and how they should be
represented in formal systems.
It is not
our intention to attempt to
resolve those problems in this
chapter
(or this dissertation).
We have mentioned a few results
here, but
those results apply only to
a particular view of constants
and their
role in language.
The question of how
anti-essentialism can be precisely defined for models for
theories which are stated in
languages
With constants, where constants
receive some different semantical

treatment

,

is left open here.

It should be pointed out, however,
that if anti-essentialist

models can not even be given for languages
with constants, then of
course theories stated in such languages
must be essentialist
So other approaches to the semantics
for singular terms may vindicate

Quine even more clearly than the results
we discussed in section

i.

Other approaches which associate constants with
properties

or objects would
mahe the satisfaction
of
a significant
tatter, Ihe properties
to u but not Y in
this case.

W

12k

by » but not v

associate. „ ith a are
essential

n

wo
m express an essence of
would
u
such systems would
be essentialist
6
from the outset.
rt

.

If, on the other
hand, singular terms
are not associated

with properties, so
that the satisfaction
of
of the fundamental
semantics for the languag
e

x-a

reflects features

then anti-essentialism
can be defined for
models for such theories
(as we have done),
But then it can be
shown that quantifying
in is eliminable in
the way
it was for languages
without constants.
’
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CHAPTER

7

VON WRIGHT'S PRINCIPLE
AND

ANTI-ESSENTIALISM

m

In discussing the
strong eliminability
of quantifying ln
,
section ill of chapter
5, we mentioned
.

Cresswell's unsuccessful

attempt

to prove a related
result based on a system
he calls
S5thPCtPr.
tte principle of Pr
("the principle of

predication")
that he adds to QML to
produce this system
J wia IS
is based
Dased upon some remarks
made by Georg Henrik von
Wright in An Essay in Mod o1
2
Von Wright has argued
that adherence to that
metaphysical
principle (which he claims
is true) makes
quantifying in unnecessary.
He says that acceptance
of the "principle of
predication
would
make a combination of alethic
modalities de re and
quantification
uninteresting.
Although he says nothing
about essentialism, his
argument, like Quine's, is
an argument that the
acceptability of QML
depends upon the acceptability
of certain metaphysical views.
His
principle and the argument he
gives are related in many ways
to issues
discussed so far, and we will
find that by working out von
Wright's
suggestion, we can prove a theorem
which is slightly stronger than
.

Theorem

.

.

A.

i

Von Wright argues that if the
following principle of predi
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cation (PP)

i

s

t~,, 0
»

en quantifying in
is "uninteresting."

J

a Property can
be significantly ^
:
predlcated of the indivi duals of a certain
Universe of n Scourse
the n either the
property is necessarily
>
present
ana necessarily
311
indirt <^ls
absent i' the e
1S
the
possibly but not necessarily
P r °Perty
*
(i’ e
in some or all
tly) present
individuals and possibiv
(i-e., contingently)
nec
essarily
absent in the’ rest. ^
.

1

y

T ff

T

Uhe

the anti-essentialist
principle. PP implles
tlmt nothlng
be necessarily true
of one object but only
contingently true of
some other object.
We will explore what
other relations hold
between
these principles and
the arguments based
on them.

_

Von Wright's principle
divides properties 5
into just two
He says:

groups.

^

^

Said
to'underlie'the
S
or "logical" and "material"
,f0rmal,,
or"descript^e"
oriptive properties
which is sometimes made.
’

The anti-essentialist
principle, on the other hand,
divides
properties into three exclusive
groups: the necessary,
the contingent and the impossible,
i.e., those that are
necessarily true of
everything, those that are
possibly true and those that
are necessarily false of everything.
The decisive factor is
that anti-essen-

tlalism guarantess that if a
property is necessarily
(contingently,
not possibly) true of one
thing, then it is necessarily
(contingently,
not possibly) true of each
thing.
Von Wright does not explicitly
include properties which are

necessarily absent in all individuals
in either the formal or material
category.

In a discussion 6 of PP and
von Wright’s argument, A. N.

Prior attributes to von Wright the view
that such logically impos-

a

sible properties are
among the formal
properties 7
There is at least
one reason for
including them among
the
formal properties
(whether won Wright
intended to do so or
not)
The complements of
material P
operties are material
properties
*
properties
end the complements
of all formal
properties which are not
necessarily true of everything
are formal properties.
By including
impossible properties
among the formal
properties we make it true
that a property is
formal (material) if
and only if its
complement
IS formal (material).
.

•

Von Wright probably
intended to include
impossible property
among the formal ones 8
Whether he a-;
did or not, we will
assume that
a correct version of
PP would classify them
in this way 9
The question that now
arises is whether this
classification
corresponds to the classification
that the anti-essentialist
principle makes
Are contingent and material
properties the same and
do the categories of
necessary and impossible
properties exhaust
the category of formal
properties?
.

.

.

It is fairly easy to see
that the material properties
of

von Wright's classification
correspond to the contingent
properties
of the anti-essentialist
classification (properties expressed
by
open sentences wmch are
possibly true and possibly false
of everything).
Material properties are "possibly
but not necessarily (i.e.,
contingently) present in some or
all individuals and possibly
but
not necessarily (i.e., contingently)
absent in the rest." But this

explication is unnecessarily long.

To say that a property is possibly

’

out not necessarily

,

15

W«alent

e<

possibly our not
necessarily absent
sent.
if and only if it
satisfies

and

r

£~Fx

r

reduces to

r

~a~

So

^

to saying that it
is

An object satisfies r
n
£ Fx ~a Fx
is

x

’

a
Slnce Q
reduces to

n
material
properties are just those

which are possibly but
not necessarily
present in all objects
But these are precisely
the contingent
properties, so yon Wright's
category of material
nronerti
properties „corresponds
to the anti-essentialist
category of contingent
properties.

M

But von Wright

category
oi iformal
-n
6 ^ of
ormal properties
is not e X hausted by the
anti-essentialist 's categories
auguries ox
of necessary
ne
and
impossible properties. A
formal Property
property is 'V
necessarily present
in some or all
individuals but necessarily
absent in the rest.”
The anti -essentiali
st does not allow the
possibility that a property
is necessarily present
in some but not all
indiyiduals.
PP does
not appear to be the
same as anti-essentialism,
since it allows the
possibility that something
is necessarily F but
something else is
not necessarily F
'

s

.

But PP (as we haye reyised
it to include impossible
properties
among the formal properties)
is entailed by
anti-essentialism.
If

anti-essentialism is true then all
non-contingent properties must
be
formal.
Necessary properties are formal
properties, and impossible
properties are formal,
(They are present (absent) in
all indiyiduals.
a fo^uLoiu , they are present
(absent) in some or all indiyiduals
and absent in the rest.)
Whereas PP aserts that if F
corresponds
"
to a formal property then
everything satisfies rmFx y d~ Fx

1
,

anti-

essentialism lays down
the stronger condition
that 11
if tx
Fx corresponds
co
oo a iormal
property, then either
everyth! no- «satisfies
everything
+
r
'Fx1n or
everything satisfies
1
•

Wx

.

Although PP appears to be
weaker
weaxer than
anti-essentialism,
S £ntSlled
“*
•

S

“ Ce “;

*

“

*>»

that at least one for-

13 equlvalent to
anti-essentialism.

We will show
this by first showing
that if PP is formalised
as a thesis about
all open formulas,
then PP entails the
aeniai
denial of the
th
+
strong
form
Of essentialism mentioned
by Parsons in "Essentialism
and Quantified

Modal Logie."

strong essentialism is
the position that
there is
some formula A such
that something satisfies
in SO me world
and something (else)
satisfies
ln some world.
PP ( on oae
construal ) entails the denial
of this form of essentialism.
But it
can be shown that the
denial of this form of
essentialism is equivalent to anti -essentialism
as defined in chapter
h ( at least it is
if we accept the reasonable
assumption that there are some
contingent
properties).
So (on this construal)
PP entails anti-essentialism.

W

W

To show clearly that PP
entails the denial of strong
essen-

tialism, it may be convenient
to restate PP in an equivalent
form.
The version of PP that we
are considering 11 can be stated
in the

following way.
(X)

For any open sentence A, everything
satisfies roA v a~An
or everything satisfies r§A.fy~A

tn^t (X) entails the denial of strong
essentialism, we will

.

Show that (X) is
equivalent to
(Y)

F° r

OPM

Senten

“

A

«

>

then everything satisfies

something satisfies

^AxA

W

,

1

.

The proof that (X)
entails (Y) is
straightforward. We will
show that (Y) entails
(X) by assuming that
(Y) is true and
(X) is
false and deriving a
contradiction.
(1)

Suppose that (Y) holds.

(2)

Suppose that^A is an open
formula such that u
satisfies
-(A v n~A) and v satisfies P
~(0 A.<>~aT
.

(3)

v satisfies

r

o~A v aA

(h)

v satisfies

r

o~A" or v satisfies r o 1
A

(5)

Everything satisfies r

$~A^

/)AzW

(°)

u satisfies

(7)

u satisfies
u satisfies
r
(}~K'

(9)

r

and

1

and

or everything

.

msA

and

W

aA.

r
'^o~A~'

and r(}A

^ ~A

u satisfies r n~A

n ~aA

.

r

satisfies

(8)

1

and
(from

n

r

.

n
<>A

(

5

and

)

or u satisfies

and

7 ))

(

A' or u

satisfies

‘

aT'
.

^

r

The denial of strong essentialism
is:
(z)

For any open formula A, if
something satisfies 'A',

then everything satisfies rAmoJ
It is easy to see that

(Y)

entails (z).

.

Since (Y) is equivalent

to PP(X), PP entails the denial
of strong essentialism.
We can also show that if we view
PP and the denial of strong

)

(

,

.
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essentialism as restn'o+inne
° ns 0n models

™e

“

the

ay
."

employing

m0<lel “ SUCh that
R=k2

W

ft.x

="

eaeraliZed

° Ur

then they hold of
all

’

We "ill generalize
(Y) and (z)

'

“

deflnltl

o' anti-essentialism,

'

formulas and applying
the definition to
complete
models , not merely
individual worlds.
Sup pose that
^ ls a moael
on a model structure
2
< o. K, K ,/ >
aen (y) becomes
.

“

(Y ’)

tP(

r

V

A

^

QA

H, !)=T for some
H and I, then

A

n.x 3(AA3aA)
v
J

<P(

(Z)

T'l-rp *
H 1J-T
n,
for any H and I.

'

>

1

becomes
(z*)

If

r

cp(

TT.X

A

i
<p(

.aA^

no
rn
j)IJ-T
for
some H and I, then

H

>

r n.x A

3(A=QA)\

H, I)=T for any H
and I.

We will now show that
if

then if (Z*
(1)
(2)
(3)

(b)
(5)

(10)
( 6 )
(7)
(

8

)

is true of

Suppose that

1

is true of

)

A

r

n.x .oA\ H, I)=T.

iprn^tAzoA

By (3 )

cp(

Since R=K'_

n.x

H-,

,

A

r)=T

0 a\

.

for any H' and I'.

I")= T

H,

From (7)H.x

•

OA

So, for any

So (Z

1

)

1

H

,

r

7

(

r
<p(

for

n.x

soale x<

'

aA 1

,

,

I

'

f

)

.A'',

H'

=T

H, I'')=t

we can infer that for any I,
if

)

,

H,

I, cp(

I )=T,
r

then

A

n. x ^(

r
cp(

aA\

H, l)=T.

7

<>

AmaA )"

,

H, l)=T.

entails the conditional of
(2) and

which is (Y').

.

A

'

cp(

,

(for some K and I).

1
)

r
,p(

A

'

<G, K, K 2 ,^,

cp.

Then there is some H'€K
such that

<p(

(9)

4>(

Suppose that

is a model on

then (Y») is also.

cp

Suppose that (Z

then

V

(

9 ),

,

I")=T.

.
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-bus

,

i-P

P? is true of a
model

then
tnen cp
cn meets
pip +
a condition
bas ed on tho donipl nf c-+Str0ng eSSentlalIs
”
is precisely analogous to the definition
of an anti-essentialist
^bonnialist model, a
developed earliar (on the basis
of denying weak
cp

anti-essentialism)

But it can be shown
that the assumption
that there are

contingent properties
leads
eads to thp
the conclusion that
the denial of
strong essential! sm is
eguiyalent to our old
definition of antiessentialism.
If one could deny
that strong essentialism
is true
without denying that weak
essentialism is true, he
would have to
hold that there Might
be two objects such
that one has a certain
property essentially while
another does not hawe
that property essentially.
Thus he must hold that
for some open sentence
A and
some I and I', «('n.x\aA\
H, I)=T and
cpVn.A-oP H>

^

r)=T

,

let B correspond to some
contingent property such
that
but <p( OB , H, I )/T.
If B is independent
of A, then

<p(

_

B ,H, I')=T

'

^ V' D(A
*p(

(A V B)

T B)"
>

*

H, I

H ’ I)=T
)1T.

«P(

n

V-(A t B)

,

H, 1

1

^

)=T but

But this is inconsistent
with the denial

of -strong essentialism.
In other words, if A
is a formal property and
u is essen-

lly A but V is not, and B is
a material property such
that v
is B, then u is essentially
such that Ay B, v is such
that A v B,
but v is not essentially such
that A v B.
This argument shows that if we
assume that a model is not

anti-essentialist (as in (l)), and we
add only the additional assumption that something has a
contingent property, we can conclude

^^

that the model does
not conform
om to
+n the requirement
based upon the
denial o, . troog
essentials It is> then>
a
t
i0r =«y model q>, if
there is some one-pl
ace open formula
A such that 4>CoA\
H, I)*! hut <p(A, H
I)=T1 for some H
and I then
^ 13
antl ~ eSSentialist m
°del if and only if it
is a PP-model.
-

^

>

)

,

“

,

iii

But at first glance
von Wright's principle
seems to be much

weaker than anti-essentialism.

It seems to be
consistent with

doctrines that resemble some
traditional forms of
essentialism;
the distinction between
material and formal properties
may be acceptable to many who hold
essentialist views; and we
can construct
Is that appear to
fulfill the conditions laid
down by von Wright
even though they do not
have some of the seemingly
peculiar consequences of anti-essentialism.
For example

,

von Wright's principle PP
appears to be consis-

tent with the essentialist
view that to predicate of
an object
that it belongs to a particular
species or genus is to say
some-

thing necessarily true or
necessarily false.

Some have wanted to

say that each man is necessarily
a man and necessarily an
animal,
that each thing that is not
a man is necessarily not a man,
and
that ea-h ching that is not an
animal is necessarily not an
animal.
All of this seems quite consistent
with von Wright’s notion of formal properties,
which need not be universal,
essential properties.
PP seems weaker than anti-essentialism
in several important

135

vays.

PP allows that
things of different

™

pecies might have
different

It allows that
abstract objects might
be essentially

different from *aterial
objects.

(Men are necessarily
men hut lions

are necessarily not
men.

Three is necessarily
a number but each
material object is
necessarily not a number.)
Anti-essentialism,
other hand, forces us
to say that if three
is necessarily
a number then
everything, including the
hitchen sinh, is
necessarily
a number.

^

All Of this suggests
that our previous
version of PP, which
turned out to be eoui
vai pni j-_
equivalent
to anti-essentialism,
may have been
faulty.
We shall try to find
a plausible version
of PP whlch is
not equivalent to
anti-essentialism.
.

way

•

m

which we might try to
reconstruct PP so that it
vas not equivalent to
anti-essentialism would be to
formally construe the notion of a
property in terms of the
primitive predicates
of the language, rather
than in terns of the open
sentences of the
language.
Construed in this way, PP says
that for any primitive
n
Ere dicat e P , every n-tuple
1 ** r
P
satisfies
n.x p(oPx
,x v tHPx^.x ?
n
or every n-tuple satisfies
t
,
Pl
Px
x 0

r

V/l(e

.

.

Hie reconstrual of von
Wright's conjecture seems to
preserve

the intuitive difference
between PP and anti-essentialism.

If

being a man is symbolized by
a primitive predicate 'M\
it is now
permissible for one thing to satisfy
even though other things

W

do not satisfy 'Mx' at all.

This version of PP is entailed
by anti-essentialism (and

)

•
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hence by the earlier
version of PP).
PP')

^ ery
v,

is such that PP
is true at every
* world
1

68,son

"to

"think "cnat this~

ant i-es sent ialist

model

But there
th
is no apparent
•

•

nev version of PP
Pn
Q
0
entails
anti-essentialism.
4-

,--i

The interesting
question for us now is
whether this construal
of PP leads to the resnii
result that von Tr
Wright say s
Toes and whether
that result corresponds
to Theorem A (or its
corollary). Does PP,
a principle which
is apparently weaker
than anti-essentialism,
entail that quantifying
in is unnecessary?
Von Wright says that
acceptance of PP
.

.

^

&«

a

1C
and
quantification°uninteresting ^si^
from a combined use which
would not follow from
quant if ication alone in conbinp+^r,
?
f° OTal
Or material nature of
the
,

What von Wright says is
quite obscure.

But It strongly
suggests the thesis that PP
entails that each de re
formula is
equivalent to some de dicto
16
formula.
0 ne thing that is
suggested
is that Theorem A (or
its corollary) is true
for any model q, in which
PP holds in every possible
world. 17 If ve can prove
this to he true
we will have a stronger
result than
Theorem A, since PP apparently
applies to more models than
anti-essentialism does.

Let us now redefine a PP-model
as a model

structure <0. K,
n

cate P
or

r
ip(

t>

|,

cp(

n.x^aP^

'

.

.

.x
n

P
iD(

0 Pxi

.

constructible from

.

.

x

n

.

> •

(/~-p

•

on a model

such that for any primitive
„-place predi-

and any assignment I,

n.x

<p

•

x

7

Xl

n

)

•

•

•

x

n

)

,

v

x

?

H, I )=T (for any n.x P

We can then recast von Wright's

,

H,

l)=T

0lalm aS the thesis
that

—^
*

not merely ant i
-assent ialist models).

Theorem if?:

If

<P
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an

PP^

„ is thesls> then

is a PP-model on

_

(and

1#

<G, K, K2

,^

thsn
,
for any closed wff
? c
A therp
Q
n
t^ere is
a closed wff A'
such that
A' contains no
quantifying in and for
any HEK,
cp(A', H) =

cp(

A

H).

,

To prove Theorem APP
it is helnf^T
helpful +to show that
at least

one relationship between
PP and the aenia
denial
-l of strong
essentialism
holds
Xf (o j q o pp m ° del
then for “V Primitive
predicate
n
r
p
^f>(
.oPx ...x , H, I)=T
for some H and I,
’
1
n
then
•

-i

,

n

V(

V^r -n^r V

H.

D»T

for all „ and I.
Ey ery
PP-model implements the
denial of the strong
form of essentialism
vhere essentialism is
construed as a thesis about
the interpretation
of the primitive
predicates of the language
(rather than a thesis
about the interpretation
of all open formulas).
The proof is straightforward.
•

’

Next we can show that
any model on a structure
^G, K, K 2
,f)
which implements the denial
of strong anti-essentialist
with respect
to primitive predicates
is such that any formula
is necessarily
equivalent to a formula without
quantifying in. Since each
PP-model
fulfills this condition, proving
this demonstrates Theorem APP.

We must first define an
operation * which constructs,
for
each formula A, a formula A*
which lacks quantifying in.
A* is
construed from A by replacing every
wff
in A by Bt, where B +
r
B
1
is
((n x .B )v...v(n x B .BW )).B*\ where
i

W

I

)

.
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i)

B

is

H

(x) (x=y)
xI

m

-p

v

r

r

B _p
n
n.x aB
.

i

11

B

)

i

is

3 x) (x^x)

(

* replaces
each

as in chapter
5

>

H

^

r

~
T '1-m
IJ-i,
for some H and I,

otherwise.

formula

r

n

aB

(and the Appendix).

by

where

is defined

W

(Naturally if n0 wff

in A, A*=A.

Lemma
cate P

1:

If „ ls a model such
that for

^

prlmltive

occurs

pre(J ._

if

,

r
<P(

P

n.x ,QPx
...X
x
~"“1
i
1

_
’

'

n

r
X>(

-p
H
T'l-m for
H, Ij-T
some H and I, then

P

n.x =(P Xl
1
1

~

,

.

.

•X

n

=BPx

l
1

.

.

.xj', H, I)=T for
every H and I,
n'

for any wff A and any
H and 1.

Proof:

* A.,

h> i} .

^

H>

J}

By induction on the
number of truth-functional
con-

nectives, quantifiers and
modal operators in A.

Lemma 2:

If

(p

is a model such that

R=P

and <p satisfies
the conditions of Lemma
1, then for any closed wff
A there is a
closed wff A' lacking modal
operators such that cp(A- H) =
<p( A
H).
,

Proof:

,

Let A' he A*

A* is closed if A is, since
for any wff c, C* is free
in
the same variables as C.
A'

lacks modal operators

By Lemma 1, <p(A*, H) =

tp(A,

H).

Theorem APP follows from Lemma
2, since every PP-model
satisfies the conditions of Lemma
1 (and every formula without
modal
operators lacks quantifying in).
We can get a more intuitive
picture of the connection between

PP and quantifying in by
comparing simplified versions of PP to anti-

essentialism.

2
Thus, if we consider only models such
that R=K and

3

.
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C ° nSidSr ° Rly

rhj

~

can see more clearly

rcodalitifes are dispensable
if pp f s true.

The auoi-essentialist
holds that all objects
have the same
essential properties.
That u is necessarily
F can not distinguish
u from any other
object of -one
the universe.
univerqp
t
In
proving Theorem A we
^

s^ply constructed

W*

in such a way that it
is necessarily satisfied if and only if
something is necessarily B.
(For atomic oner
place predicate B, OB^
ls either '(x)(x=x)'
or ’( 3 x)(x*c)'.
1„
the former case it is
necessarily satisfied by
everything.
In the
latter it is necessarily
not satisfied.) That is
enough, because
n anti essentlalist
models, whatever is necessarily
satisfied is

necessarily satisfied by
everything.
But for models of which PP
is true we need more.

Even if
°B^ is satisfied, it may
be satisfied by some but
not all ob jects
What we do know is that if r ^
aB ls satisfied at all,
then it is
r

^

satisfied by u if and only if
u satisfies
to

B.

So by conjoining B

we get a formula which is
satisfied whenever

W

is satisfied.
(The definition of A* also
changes because PP is restricted
to pri-

mitive predicates, of course.)
Von Wright's thesis says, in
effect, that objects may have
different essences, but any property
that is an essence is an essence
Of everything that has it.

But Prior

1

and Cresswell 19 have objected to von
Wright’s

claim that de re modalities can
be eliminated in favor of formulas

^

)

.

lacking Quantifying in

T-n

+>n‘o

Sec lon

.

the °ue that follows
ve will examine the
arguments they
give to determine if
y glve
they apply
to von Wright s
claims and if they show
any
j inadequ-v
-naaequct.cy in our results
Prior interprets von
Wright to he saying
that if PP is true
then the distinction
between MsxJa’ and
"(3xW breaks down, for’
any wff A.
Prior says that von
Wright
311(1

•

-

'

m

-1

,

S

a

lated into' modai assert”onf
for example , is equivalent

daTT

0" 8

——

'

Can be tr anst(3x)

°^’

Prior ^produces a counter-example
to show that for some
A,
r
1
1
Ox)DA and ‘"3xA differ in
truth-value.
^

If we rule out empty
domains

a(3x)(~Bx v

(

3x ) ( By )

is true for any B,
since

r

(3x)(~Bx v (3y)(By)P is a
theorem of

quant if icational logic.

But if B expresses a
contingent property,

r

and

{>((3x)Bx.(3x)~Bx?

,

then

(3x)a(~Bx v(3y)By)
IS false.

Prior concludes that either
von Wright’s argument that
PP entails the eliminability
of de re modality is wrong
or PP is
false
But Prior's example does not
show that de re modalities

are not eliminable.
be replaced by

It merely shows that

r
(

1
3x )aA can not always

r

D ( 3 x)Al

But there might still be some
other formula
that is true whenever IbxJdA1 is
true but which lacks quantifying
in (de re modality }

formula.

.

'‘(BxJda"'

could then be "translated into" that

)

,

In the above
example A expresses
P esses „a „
property that is
not
necessarily true of
r
c
/
anything
ty thing.
n
3
^
so
(3 x)d(~Bx v
way/
(y)ByJ* is
is, tn
for example

w w
(3x)((x)(x=x.
(~Bx v
,

(assuming that

'B'

is

(

atomic).

y ) By

)

The cmantif

•

ln has been
elinlnatea
in
n tne
the * formula,
f
and thp * -p~
formula is true
whenever the original
_
ls
80nera1 ’
°“
6 *
-at is true whenever
the or-gmal xs,
as we have shown
in the preceding
section.
‘

—

"

Pnoir's objection fails
because-

“

translation.

rder ° f

V

t •a

are

flerS

bivalent.

^

-

k

it
t is an
objection to a

—

.

Sh ° WS that Ve can
nob simply reverse

—

-

still have formulas

But von Wright never
argued that any such

simple procedure for
constructing de dicto
formulas from de re
formulas would yield
an equivalent formula
uxmuia.
Alth
Although von Wright
6S n ° SP6CifiC
SUSS
*1. ^ard, we have seen that
Theorem APP can he
proved, and that theorem
seems to capture what
von Wright might have
been saying. The
construction of A* from
A
is not a simple
translation procedure based
on the switching of
quantifiers and modal
operators, but it does allow
us to prove the
result suggested by von
Wright's remarks.

—

"

But Prior's second
objection to von Wright's
argument is
-ch stronger. It leads us to
things that must be
considered in
evaluating the significance
of Theorems A and APP.

Prior argues

that von Wright can show
that if PP holds
then for each formula A,
there are formulas 21 A'
and A" such that
A' and A" both lack
de re modalities and
for any u, u satisfies A

,

„

))

.

1U2

if and onlv
-

if'
11
-

satisfies A'

ifc.^+it
satisfies
A
.

•

'

4.

•

p ri
Prior
says that if, for
anv „

only if lt
i +
satisfied

r

.

.

...
ov v.
op
a „satisiies
~ j
A i-p
lf a
nd only if

-

-

n

*

A' v A " 7

"

5

1

"n

,

ties

(

1

.

e

r
.

A’

,

SatlSfied A if and

'

^° n Wri ht
S

,

u

^ould have estab-

—

v A’ 0

This would show
that de re~ Modalities
‘UVUCU.X t Co
-

Li

are dispensable,
since a single
formula would be
Tceessarily e
necessarily
equivan
A no matter how
A was interpreted.
•

,

Prioir's remarks bear
some relationship
to the results
that
ve have established.
o ur construction *
does not
n
7 takS a Tormula
and cn
e
-a
construct another which
is true in all
the same worlds i,
SoiSioperates on a form^a
A and a model
an d what formiaa
1 -c constructs
as a replacement
nc for
lor A
a will
win depend
i
upon features of c
P
not just on the
structure °f
of A.
A
-Pn
i
Two formulas
with the same structure
ffllS “
diff6r nt rePlaC6mentS
In Edition, we
can not merely
;
and A*
for two models cp and q>*
and expect to have
one
single formula necessarily
equivalent to A in each
model.
T° 366 thlS C ° nSlder
’
the blowing example
Suppose that
F 1S a one-place
atomic predicate.

^

,

U"

-

,

.

'

'

(a)

(

3x ) aFx

will be replaced by
(a

r

)

(

3x )

( (

x ) ( x=x ) Fx
.

or by

(a")

(

3x ) ( 3x ) ( x^x ) Fx

depending upon whether

'F'

exureqq^Q aQ -p
expresses
formal or material property.

Neither (a') not (a") isb
true in nil
all of the same worlds
;

m

as

(a) in

„

-lOdv- 1

.

11

tp

is

™

a model such
that
at

'P'
F

,

je

property in w

m
(

all the worlds
of

or a . Qnn

4).

if tp,

* ” aterial

^

.

expresses

h° WS ° f
<**•<*), then
a > are true in
all of the same
worids of cp.
at PP
guarantees is that
,
these are the only
two sorts of
models.
We have the
sane problem that
we had with
w i
a a
A
a is

(a-)

ar d

f

*

.

neces-

.

...

eerily equivalent
to A in model
valent to A in every
model

cp

,
but
Ut A
4 <P 13
"ot necessarily
equi-

.

snown that if we
want to develop the
theory of a
Structure <0. K, K 2
,^>
and our model for
that theory
the
i S to make
pp rue, then
a language which
is weaker than QMr
QML provides, f or each
,

“—

^
-

-ntifyin,

in which is true

a translation which
is true in all of
the same worlds as
the

S rven formula no matter how
that given formula is
interpreted

vi

We have shown that
for any PP- mo del
a closed
<P(A ’’ H)

=

,

'"

(A ’ H)

'

1

omul a

A’

cp

and any olosed formula

such that A’ lacks
quantifying in and

?ri ° r re l u ires that
a stronger equivalence

hold

before we say that
quantifying in is eliminable.
Oresswell
follows Pr.or
making the stronger
requirement that r AsA 1 be
prorable
a f0rr“ al SySte ” that
has Yon Wright's principle
of predication as an axiom. Given
22
that there is such an
axiom , this is

m

'

“

•

equivalent to requiring
that for each
formula A there is
a formula
a
S 4uantlfy«8 in which
is true in aJa
all °f
of the
th same worlds
E2fel 2 which makes that
at axiom
necessarily
i

u

“

*

true.

Cresswell has attempted
to demonstrate
hat thi
that
thls res ult does
,
not ton
hold for
models which qntic-e
y that Somatic version
of the
principle of predication.
But
uo, as we
vp saw i n
chapter 5 , his alleged
„
demonstration of tms
this iisc unsuccessful.
°
As a
as
result we are left
without a proof or
u
disnroor f +this
stronger result.
o

«,

.

,

°
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in^h^'N
Wright s principle
relati
° n =hip of won
and
t*
n Particular,
erstonof the principleanti-essenti^i,™
one natural
of predication11 hat
of earlier chapters
follows
the
pattern
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natural version is
anti-essentialism, hut
not.
another

0

l

-

1

Prior, Formal Logic
(Oxford, 1955), 211-14
7

Jfrid

.

,

211.
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perties at all.

n
r
^erarrneve^iL?LtSed °\ t S ^ d

them

aS P ro ~

IS to include them
6 Slnplest course
among the formal
properties"

the p inciple as
stated might
T

need revision

HI

it

,

can he

said^

10
6

***^rlS^fS^fT....

°°
?" 1 + V (edited by Leonard Linsky),
Ac tual
85
".-i f
form of essentialism
0 " ° f the " tronger
as "we did^n cSpter'i
“ eaker form
so that it applies to
all possible objects
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by our ear Tier SfinUi™
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tion of formulas free in
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.

ll+6
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necelsaJ/tT^

'formal' is

1

^^^

"ed°for iuc^propertSs.* 0

Version Portly,
when it
UJlderstand »hy the
word

that one might"
151" S °“ e
Vegar!^'odd!
consequences
that if anything
is contingently
“W-^entialism
en
Lc
red
r
Xample
-^yin£g. of Chairman
copy of The
,?
then
everythin
s possibly
red and possibly
^^“three)
not red, sinc^ref^®
d is a material
ll+
property.
P
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is short for 'IT. Px
,x
*
i
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SECTION

III

ESSENTIALISM

.

CHAPTER

8

essentialism

suggested that users
of QML should be
careful to evaluate
the extent to which
their use of QML
Involves linguistic
resources
that are unnecessarily
controversial if essentials
is to be eschewed.
In particular, we
should expect a defense
of essentials
and an explanation
of the
Lne related notions
of metapnysical
metanh^soi necessity
and possibility from
those vho
no see QML
OMT as an
appropriate language
for the statement
of th^or-’Vq
p 11+ we
^es- But
have not directly
considered
the question of
whether or not essen+i.r
essentialism is an
acceptable doctrine
in this part we will
evaluate the ways in
which one might
defend the metaphysical
views that we have shown
are associated
With
In Parti
to see how some
traditional
metaphysical arguments bear
on the acceptability
of essentials
OW much the apparent
need to maAe the verbal
distinctions that
are made
QML, with its full
apparatus for quantifying
in, support
traditional metaphysical
views.
.

,

—

- **

m

we Will find that after
the essentialist doctrine
associated

With QML is distinguished
from other metaphysical
doctrines, scant
resources for its defense are
available.

1^8

•

•
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oret-d
p

b

J

—
4—
- — —^notions

As we emphasized
in chapter
3, we are concerned
with inter° rieS
ia
.

-

.

tation.

y and ne
Krinkp
Pke

'

c
S

lty

—

“

r,

set-theoretic semantics

’

„

of

y realistic interpre^

as in "q
Semantical

Conrpflo n +P ° nly
the
br0adest characteristics
'
of possiblllt
ility and necessity
j
so it tq adaptahie
to many related
notions.
„
our concern is
with a metaphysical
doctrine essential
essentialism, and
connection with the
semantics for QML
theories
ICf
_
( 0f
course,
1 anal ° gUeS t0
th ia metaphysical
doctrine
cinne may he
b
associated
ith other notions
of
necessity
u
+
'
leave that question
open
,
nere.) Our concern
is with the
necessity
SSSlty associated
with general
theories of reality—
with necessity
n.cessity as a modality
of truth. 1
But saying that we
are concerned with
necessity as it is
incorporated into theories
does not pinpoint a
particular sort of
necessity.
We can think of
appropriate notions of
necessity which
correspond to various
+
segments of aa continuum
of necessity concepts.
Considering only the uses
of the modal operator
before closed
formulas we can roughly
characterise the continuum
in the following
At °n- end i, „he
notion of bare unadorned
logical necessity
Only the theorems of
first-order logic plus S
5 are designated as
necessary.
Even "All bachelors
are unmarried" is not
necessary
in this bare sense
of the word 'necessary'.
,

.

siderations

"

,

.

^

™

,

™

,

We can enric.i our notion
of necessity by adding
to the stock

-
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necessary tvn+'he
ruths

,

,

n

thus addina "att
-

truths to th

^

“4

Bre Unmarriea "

° th

“

"«*

necessary truths,

t

a still
xJ_ OToadGi'
notion nf
necessity would be
what we might call
Cal1 sem antical
8
or 'linguistic'
c
necessity.
"All
+v
thln S s are colored"
might
hp a n example
gnt be
of a
c
n ence which
is linguistically
necessary but not
analytic 2
'

^

'

•

,

.

^

””

.

br ° ader n ° tIOn ° f

physical necessity.

"

““““r ****

be that of meta-

Goa exists" and
"Socrates is b

which might
oe held to
s t be
t
a
be
necessarily
analvti
c 11
alytically
or semantically
necessary.

"

th ° u «h th

^
^

Sentences
are not

A still broader
notion of necessity
is that of h
p y slcal
necessity (where all
of the previous
categories are understood
to
e sub-categories
of the physically
necessary). According
to some.
natural laws are
physically, but not
metaphysically, necessary.
Physically necessary that
bodies in proximity
exert a
onal attraction, even
though it is metaphysically
possible that
no such attraction
exist between proximate
bodies . 3

All or these are
legitimate concepts of
necessity and Kripke's
neral
8
set-theoretic semantics
seems to be adequate
to capture
the fundamental
structure of all of them.
In addition,
our theories
about the world miAht “ho
v,,
°“
"
° Ught t0 invoke any
of these notions of
necessity.
,

These five notions have
been presented here
as segments of
a continuum.
But it has been
traditional for philosophers
to pick
a point on this
continuum and treat all
things prior to that
point

.

as on a par
with resuect
P ' 0t -n
t0

nor example,
Alvin

•

necessitation

m anoinga
.

.

it were a

discusses necessitv
necessity as though

least vhat
we have describe
h
as metaphysical
necessity. * He
refers to th'
°ften as "broadly
logical"
•.
gieal necessity
np
and he calls 'o'
„ " semantical
a
operator." Yet he
•*
cites as necessary
truths many tradition
ali meta ~
Physical doctri nes
whl h
0
l0USly
Purely
semantical considerations.
1

^^

*"

"

•

Plantings -s support
for the necessity
of these
bese metaphysical
met
h
truths nests
„
ultimately on an
appeal to
+
S ° rtS ° f
“‘Pitions
about vhat
hat 15 Possible
and impossible
v
It. m
'
that Plant
“e a
x
c odjru.s th=
regards
these aDD°fli « j._
intuition as appeals
to our intuitions
a ° Ut what is
semantically
y acc^ntahT^
CCeptab le ^d
unacceptable.
If SOj
then he is assuming
that what we nave
have called
called the u"semantically’
necessary should he
.r?+v,
u
merged Twith
what
we have called
the "metaphysically” necessary.

^

.

“
•

.

.

1

^

18 thlS C ° nCePt
° f metaP h ysieal
-semantical

et Plantinga takes
as P
primary
imary.

necessity

'this
This

concept lies at the
base
of vhat he calls the
"depraved" semantics
for QML, vhere the
notion
possible vorld is taken
4 uite seriously as a model
of vhat is
£SaUy possible (i.e., of a
fully realized state
of affairs).
11113

° f C ° UrSe d0eS
n0t

pr0hlblt Plentinga from
recognizing

that more limited
notions of necessity,
such as bare logical
necessity
can be distinguished
from the concept he
considers.
It is Ju st that
he takes this
metaphysical necessity as
somehov characterizing
the
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notion of

7*0 R2.

r>p f>p Q Q
-

-]

-f-r

r

m
-he possible worlds
associated with that
-1

=or^ oj necessity are
the worlds he regards
8iras as ,.,11
really possible.
In contrast, quite
a different view is
associated with traditional positivism.
It can be characterized
as the view that
necessity
13 baSed ia langUage
taken to encompass lo
g ical
truths and analytic
truths-truths certifiable by
logical rules and
definitions alone.
It was found necessarv
necessary to supplement
these to
account for the apparent
necessity of "Red things
are colored" for
example
The notion of a meaning
postulate, a linguistic
rule which
is neither a logical
nor a definitional truth,
seemed to handle
these cases (which we earlier
subs^ed cuider the category of
seman-

™ «"t

.

tically necessary truths).
Wo special category of
metaphysically necessary truths
was
recognized.
In fact, an attempt was
made to rule metaphysical
claims
out of the language entirely.

a view.

(Physical laws might be regarded
as necessary or not on
such
The important thing is that
if they are regarded as
neces-

sary, their necessity must be
viewed as necessity of quite a dif-

ferent sort from that of purely
linguistic necessities.)
Quine

critique of necessity, particularly
of this linguistic

theory of necessity, has two parts.

First he criticizes the view

that there is a special category of
the linguistically necessary.
Ke argues that truths differ in the
degree to which they are central

to our conceptual scheme— thus seeming
to take a view of such truths

vhich places them on a continuum, and the
segment beginning at one
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end of that
continuum vould be the o +
C ° ntlnU
of truths described
a
few
ew Pages
„
ago.
He refiiboc
reuses +to apply the
word nece
necessary to the
truths
ve ha.™
nct.i. been
discussingo sinr>~
Q
*
smc. he does not
believ- Inat their
u
truth
SPeCial StatUS
determination to retain
r Sllef
"ae "-quantified modal logic
i s eschewed.
*s views on +>%?
are well known
and they are no(
concern of this
5
dissertation.
•

™

,

“-—
Vi

J

7.

“

tw

•

r,

.

What IS our concern
is Quine's further
attack on QML. He
argues that even if
ve adopt something
like the linguistic
linguist,'
conception
oi necessity favors
by the positivists
ve still will not
,
have an
adequate way to give
an interpretation
to formulas with
quantifying
unless we adopt a
metaphysical view,
essentials. But such
a course should
never appeal to
positivists, who abhor
such doctrines.
If we view Quine's
argument in this way,
we can see how
diSSertatl ° n ’ t08ether
WUh
»rk, lends support to
We have found that
anti-esse^^
interpretations negate
thS ° nt0l0 Cal
impaCt ° f *2.
*L -dalities by making de re
modalities
Sllminable
Vay
US
taiin S QML seriously
and taking
essentialism seriously
enough to deny
y it leads f
n a retreat from
to
import ant uses of the third
grade of modal involvement.

w

^
^

*

^

’

In addition, as
Parsons has shown, adding
analytic truths

to our stock of necessary
truths introduces no
essentialism, since
analytic truths are,
presumably, closed, non-modal
formulas. As
have seen, analytic truths
also introduce no explanation
of
dUClb1 'modalities , since a model A
<p
constructed from a

~

-^

,

maximal model

ip

by

male-inn-

.

,

all analytic
truths necessary
cessary truths intro
dunpq no
insliminable de re
modalities
‘

^

•

.

saw dn chapter

,ve

^^

1

VheD

;;r:
b_xng human

rT

(

°f S

T

freely allowed.

„i + ,

-d

essentialessentla lia- is
introduced in the

generalization is allotted
on

iike ,f,soessariiy
s
’

3

’

°— -

and beinong e-reate-r
greater +h
than ^7 must be
treated as
ateS
d 9 reSPeCt ely)
Wh
inferences are

“

"

“

But as Quine
recognized we must be
able
Me to llnk
it v
essentialism
n]VIT
QMt theories even
when such theories
do not have
constants

definite descriptions
in their primitive
apparatus, if Quine s
argument is to hare
any
force
y lorce.
h
t
In chapter
5 we shoved that
there
fact, a link between
essentialism and QML
theories.
What we are concerned
with in this section
is the nature
Of the necessity that
is connected with
essentialism.
We hare
referred to it before
as "metaphysical
necessity." tt e
metaphysical
essentialism says that some
things have different
essences
1 e”
th3t °“ e th “«
necessarily F even though
another is not necessarily
F, for some property
F.
,

'

^^

But there is no
apparent reason why this
metaphysical doctrine is not associated
with all of the notions
of necessity mentioned in connection with
the continuum described
earlier. 7 A

theory is essentialist if
it is a theory about
reality which associates some properties
more closely with objects
than others and if it
differentiates among objects
with respect to these
"closely associated"

.
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-me,

The important thing
is that essentialism
says that
tut not all, of an
object's propertles

_

being of some, but
not all, objects.

^^^

Consider the continue
sketched above. Any
one of those
necessity concepts, in
so far as it is e
mpl0 y ed at all ln
staWng
a theory, says
something about the real
status of the truths
to

aPPll6S

m

it marks a "nrivil

ged

their properties

~

“ “

Whe "

'

"

US6d

“

-nnection with quantifying

connection between objects
and some of

However, with the most
rudimentary notions of
necessity,
l0SiCal
d
alytlC —ssity, the
corresponding essentialist

“ “

s

aity, we^

not very plausible.

In general with bare
logical neces-

win

say that something
necessarily satisfies A
if and only
If (X)A is a necessary
truth.
Everything is essentially
P or not-F
everything is self -identical
etc.
,
Ho essences peculiar
to single
individuals are associated
with bare logical necessity.

Similarly, if it is a
consequence of logical truths
and
i ons that F*s ars
G's3 then
b
lh<=n xt
i
13 essential
to each thing
+-

'

that if it is an F, then
en it is aa r
G.
’

,

.

5

t+
It seems

.

implausible to associ-

ate essentialist distinctions
with analytic necessity.
It is only broader notions
of necessity which are
associated

with essentialism.

Thus interpreted theories
such that Socrates

(but not everything) is
necessarily human, or such that
9 (but not

everything) is necessarily greater
than 7 admit essentialism.
In what follows we shall
consider the extent to which the

’

,
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sentialism associated
vith such broader
"metaphysical" necessity
can be defended.
Contrary to common use,
physical necessity

lnclude(J

^ '“ed. ^

t

^

discussions of p h ysicai
ne.essitj one often finds
examples like the following 8
given as
a-Ueged examples of
physical necessity.
J
"It is physically
nhve-'
n
necessary
that whoever drinks
from that well gets
poisoned." Such examples
^e
imPlaUSlble
they ignore the facts
(among others)
that it is physically
possible for the well
not to have contained
poison, for someone to
take a very small,
non-lethal drink, for
someone to have taken an
antidote prior to drinking,
The conditional
linking poisoning with
drinking is not necessary
in any plausible
Such alleged cases of
"physical modality" are
better construed
as counter-f actuals of
some sort or other.
Counter-factuals allow
for the defeasibility
of the claimed connection
between antecedent
and consequent.

*»«

Ws,

on the other hand, shall
not construe physical

modality in any way that lends
itself most naturally to
such a counterfactual interpretation. The
sorts of examples of physical
modality
to keep in mind are more
of the sort "For any two
physical bodies,
It is necessary that there
exist a gravitational attraction
between

then” or "It is physically
necessary that the total amount
of energymatter in the universe remain
uniform." The necessity here is
absolute0°" a defeasible link like that
asserted in a counter-factual.
It seems most natural to
treat physical modality so understood

"

°“ a

*«

aletWC

r-Peet

to

nations

about
Are there any Pr °
Perties physically
necessary to an
oc.ject which are
not -iv-i.ebsary
necessarv to
0 all
Qn
objects’
,*«,
Thp+
0
inat ls
the question
OP whether "physical"
essentials holds md in
terms Qf
system, it is just the
question of whether or
not there are any i„eliminable cases of
quantifying Into physical
modalities. 9
+.

,

.

_

,

^

ii

We haVe COtlSldered
SOme 8tric «* formai
characterisations
of

essentialist models in proving
our results.

te

Careful considera-

of the formal apparatus
of QML was vhat was
needed to allow
OS to prove the results
of part IX of this
dissertation.
But the
formal definition of an
essentialist model gives us
little feel
for the substantive
metaphysical position of
essentialism.
In proving our formal
results it was useful to
generalize

some of the things we
considered.

Our definitions dealt
with the

satisfaction of open formulas
of the form

r

mA°

by n-tuples of ob-

jects, rather than considering
only essential properties
of single
objects.
But traditional essentialist
views have been concerned
only with essential properties
of things, not essential
relations of
n-tuples, and it will simplify
and clarify our considerations
of
these views if we consider only
one-place open formulas. 10
In defining essentialist models
we quickly passed by the

notion of an essential property,
and we have made little direct
use of this fundamental notion
in our formal proofs.

We should

remind ourselves that an essential
property of an object u is one

•
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that u could not
lack,

i. e

.

’

one th,+
at u v,
has in every
possible world.
-

1

-n open sentence
A with only one free
variable expresses
esses an essential
+
e
property of u if and only
if u sa t lsfies
11
•

^

As ve hare seen
Preriously, essentialism
is not merely the
position that there are
objects with essential
properties.
In order
to characterize a
controversial form of
essential
essentialism,
we must define
it as the view
that at least some
ome obiec+q
objects have non-trivial
essential
properties, i.e., properties
that are not essential
to ererythin
g
Remembering that a possible
world corresponds to
the intuitive notion of a
counter-factual
tual qitnn+i
situation or possible
set of circnmstances, we see that
a property is essential
to an object if that
object must hare it, no
matter what situation
that object is in.
.

^

m ° tiYatlng -taphysical
notion here is that there
are some properties of a thing which
are so much a part of
its being that that
thin*
could not possibly exist
without haring those
properties. No matter
vhat could possibly hare
happened, it would hare
had those properties.
Saul Kripke has discussed
the metaphysics associated
with
QML the ° rieS 12 He has
distinguished this necessity
from sereral
other traditional philosophical
notions with which it has
often been
merged.
In what follows we will
compare this notion of necessity
and essentialism to sereral
related notions. Based on
Kripke 's
arguments and some generally
held news about the metaphysics
associated with QML, we will show
how this metaphysics can be
distinguished
from many traditional philosophical
riews.
But we should then question whether this independence
has good or bad consequences
for the
'

.

.

BOdal l0SiCian

'

In P rtlC
'

—
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>

* -* *

hov one can support
a metaphysics which
is isolated in this
way from otber
phllosophical
considerations

.

Drawing on Kripke's work,
we

win

construct „ de _
terms of the semantics
of ordinary language.
But we shall
find good reasons to
be skeptical about
the efficacy of such
an
approach

111

of the first things we
must examine is a
traditional

way of separating
properties into essential
and accidental properties based upon the
changes
that objects can undergo.

tional metaphysical doctrine

c^ls

a property an

perty of an object if that
object can change
to that property.

(

This tradi-

accidental' pro-

in time) with respect

If an object can be F
and then non-F, non-F and

then F, then that object is
only accidentally F (or
non-F).
It is
essentially F only if it would
cease to exist if it were
to cease
to he F.

The doctrine that objects
hare such properties has at
least
as much right to be called
’essentialism' as the doctrine we
hare

associated with QML; and it seems
to haye even more right to be
called
13
'Aristotelean essentialism
But it must be carefully
distinguished
from the metaphysical view that we
hare been discussing.
'

The doctrine associated with QML
distinguishes among the

properties of an object on the basis of
what properties it could
and could not have.
have failed to be a

Socrates is essentially a man if he
could not

man— i.e.,

if he must be a man in emery possible

)

i6o
s i 1 113,13 i on

(

wopld

This doctrine has no
obvious connection with
the considerations of Change and
subsistence through change
that motivate the
other doctrine which is
aXso caiied ’essentialism’
One might hold
that nothing that is a
man can change into an
object that is not
a nan.
One need not, on those
grounds, hold that there
is no possible
circumstances
which something that is
actually a man could
have heen otherwise
("t-p
If mroi
evolution had been slower, we
would all
.

m

'

be chimpanzees."

(

"If he were a pig, he
wouldn’t eat any differently

than he does now.")

Holding that no man can become
a chimp does not

force one to deny that someone
(say Socrates) might have
been a chimp
rather than a man.
But if one adopts this
traditional view about the changes

a thing can undergo, one
would probably want to say that
there are
certain properties that Socrates
has necessarily.
One will probably
say that he necessarily has the
property of not changing from a
man
to a chimp (or from a chimp
to a man).
But this property will not

distinguish him from anything else.

from being a man to being a chimp.

On this view, nothing can change

This view may involve arguing that

a certain property is necessary
of everything, but it does not need

to involve arguing that some things
are distinguished from others

by the properties they can not possibly
lack.

As we have emphasized,

it is the doctrine that there are
non-trivial essential properties,
i‘ e,> P ro P er b'ies

controversial.

essential to some things but not others,
that is

Considerations of change lend no support to that

.

doctrine
'

hSn

’

a oellef that some
properties belong to

Objects throughout all
changes the, undergo
hoes not force one
to
conclude that the
metaphysical doctrine we
hare linked with QML
is true
and arguments based on
change can be expected
to give no support
to tne sore of essentialism
we have been concerned
with.
Another doctrine related
to change
lge nas
has similar
sir.ii
consequences
for the metaphysics of
Qffi, vis. none.
A variant of the doctrine
just discussed gives it
an epistemological
turn, arguing that each
thing has properties by
which we can identify it
as persistent
through change. Obviously
this variant entails the
doctrine discussed.
If there is a property
by which we can identify
. thing as persistent
through change, there must
be a property of that
thing that persists through all of its
changes (i.e., the one by
which we identify
it).

An argument similar to that
showing that considerations

of ohange do not support the
essentialism associated with
QML shows
that adherence to the
epistemological variant of this
doctrine does
adherence to the essentialism
associated with QML.

One

might hold (implausibly) that
a man retains certain memories
through
all cnangeo he can undergo,
i.e., that in every possible
world in

which he has those memories, he
never loses them, and that we can
identify him as the same man in
virtue of those memories. One need
not hold, on those grounds, that he
must have those memories in every

possible world.

Some quite different property (or
different set of

nes) might serve

to identify him in
another possible world. 15

Of course, someone
might hold that some
objects have certain
properties with respect
to which they can
not change, and they
are
Identifiable in every
possible world, throughout
their careers, by
SUCh pro P srtles
Such a doctrine conjoins
ns a11
J
all three
thr
essentialisms
discussed saying that:
l) a is p in every
possible world and not
everything is F in every
possible world; 2) a
can not cease to he
d
WS C
ideatlfy “ in
being F. But if the
considerations adduced above
are correct, then such
a doctrine can
not be defended solely
in terms of considerations
of change and
identity through change,
since a defense of(2)
and(3) is not sufficien
to establish (l).
A separate defense
nse ot
of fl)
ic needed
1
is
to substantiate
such a doctrine.
-

J

^ “ ^

u

i

u

^

“

[

)

There may be arguments
linking modal essentialism
with one
of these doctrines about
change.
But it should be clear
that an
argument would, have to be given
before we could conclude
anything
about the metaphysics of
QML from arguments in favor
of these other
theories
Showing that there is some
property that must stay with
a thing through all
changes it undergoes or that
there is some property by which we identify it
as the same object
persisting through
changes will not be adequate
to show that something has
an essential
.

,

property— at least not
relevant to QML.

a property which is essential
in the way

A modal logician must defend
essentialism with

arguments other than the traditional
arguments based on change.

1^
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There are many uses
of 'essentially.,
'necessarily', and related terms. As we have
seen, different
metaphysical doctrines
have been called
'essentialism'
Similarly, some common
non-metaphysical uses of the words
'necessarily' and 'possibly'
can lead to some
eonfusion about the metaphysics
of QML and the sorts
of arguments
ohat can be used to
support it.
.

Probably the most common
ordinary use of most modal
terms
is in connection with
what has sometimes been
called epistemic
possibility.
By 'It’s possible that
he went', 'He might have
gone',
'He didn't necessarily
do that', etc., we often
mean to say 'For
I know he did & 0
fin
fiv,c+ two
Un the flrst
°
cases) or ’For all I know
he didn't do that' (in
the third). 17
1

4.

\

This use oi modal terms has
no apparent connection with

the metaphysical notions of
possibility linked with QML theories.

A typical example of a property
that belongs necessarily to
each
chimpanzee according to most essentialists
is the property of being
a chimpanzee.
No one should be tempted to
conclude anything about
,

,

whether

I

know my hairy friend Ralph to be
a chimpanzee from the

(alleged) fact that he is, in the
metaphysical sense, necessarily
a chimpanzee.

It

is possible, for all I know,
that he is a gibbon,

even if it is metaphysically necessary
that he is a chimp.

A more standard example points out that
even though there

may oe, for all

I

know, an even number greater than two that
is

the sum or two primes, Goldbach

r

s

conjecture is necessarily true

l 61i

^

trUe

^

a11

State ° f

'

knOTl

^

iB quite independent
of the necessary truth
or falsehood of Goldbach's
conjecture.
Actually, distinguishing
these sects tririal.
If the seman _
tics for QML is to he
explicated in terms of
epistemic possibility
then we are using QML
in a branch of
epistemology, and the
metaphysical doctrines, e.s
nccpntoi'
,,
alism, ohat we have
considered
would be quite irrelevant.
Both Quine and Kripke
agree that the use
of Modal terms associated
with the sorts of theories
we are considering is Metaphysical
and entirely independent
of the state of anyone's
knowledge. Quine indicates
this when he says.
‘

’

Used as a logical modality,
’necessari ly
1 v
unconditionally and impersonallv *«=
truth; and
necessity,
the negation. 18

1

+.
im-n
lmputes

necessity

°f
'pjgsibly'XLT™ “ m
S’SS*
that sense, of

Despite the apparent clarity
of the distinction
between these
two uses of modal terms
the philosophical literature
,
contains instances of attributions of
metaphysical necessity apparently
based
upon considerations of the
extent of knowledge.
Such a confusion
seems to be
at the basis of some of
the essentialist attributions
that Descartes defends. 1 ^

Descartes's argument that he is not
identical with any body 20
can be very roughly sketched in
the following way.
01

In the context

Cartesian doubt, he says,
(1)

As far as I know, no corporeal
bodies exist.

(2)

But

I

(3)

a)

So far as

b)

I

know of myself that
I

know

I

I exist.

exist and

am possibly not a body.

I

am not a body.

I.e.,
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^

(k)

Hence

(5)

But if something is
a body, it is
essentially a body.
Hence I am not a body.

(o)

(5)

1

not essentially a body.

seems to be a metaphysical
premise.

(indeed, if we
suppose that the concern
is epistemic possibility
in (5), it would
* e ParaPhraSable If
*
* *><* then I hno. that
x is a body'.)
But then if (6) is to
folio., (U) must also be
a metaphysical claim
(l.e., 'essentially' must
not be used differently
in (It) and (5)),
and if (It) is to folio,
from (3b), (3b) must be
metaphysical as
veil.
Obviously , though, if (3b) is
a metaphysical claim it
is quite
independent of (3a) and not a
mere restatement of it, so
(l) and
(2) .ill provide it no
support.
Thus the equivocation in
(3b)
'

between a restatement of (3a)
and the metaphysical claim
needed
to complete the argument
seems to be at the heart of
Descartes's
contention that he is not a body.

v

Similarly, metaphysical possibility
must be distinguished

from conceivability.

Once again ve find Descartes
inferring metaphysi-

cal necessity from a non -metaphysi
cal notion.
(1)

I

(2)

So

can not feign that I am not a thinking
being.
i

am not such that it is possible that

I

am not

a thinking being.
(3)

Hence

I

am a thinking being and being a thinking
being

is essential to me.

Here we

und

that Descartes has again made a metaphysical conclusion
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irom non -metaphysical
the faCt

'

premisses, apparently
illicitly exploiting

P ° SSible

'

haS

-«*

Of which have no connec-

tion with metaphysical
concepts.
(1) seems to say "I can
not conceive

not a thinking being."

(imagine) that I am

But there is no reason
to think that Descartes's

Inability to conceive of his
own thoughtlessness
entails the impossibility of such thoughtlessness.
What humans can and can
not
conceive ought to be carefully
distinguished from what is
possible
and impossible.
Ihe latter concepts are
metaphysical, not psychological or epistemological.”^
But in discussing conceivability
and possibility we discuss
two notions that have been
explicitly linked by many
philosophers
of divergent backgrounds.
In the case of concluding
that something
was metaphysically possible
from the fact that it was
epistemologically
possible we could contend that the
inference was based upon confusion.
Mo one had clearly distinguished
the two notions and then argued
that they were linked in some way.

Descartes's argument simply

proceeded as though they were linked,
without any argument that
epistemic possibility guarantees
metaphysical possibility.
But the connection of possibility
with conceivability has

been explicitly made by many philosophers.

Descartes, Hume, Kant,

Popper and Kripke have all employed
arguments connecting the two
or argued that the two notions should
be linked.

Hume, for example, specifically endorses both
inferences

from conceivability to possibility and from
inconceivability to

—

.
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impossibility.

For example,

iS!sSd!SeSlf

“

cs

^lo lutely impossible We canT/^T?
mountain, and from thence
conclude that
may actually exist.
We can form no
out a valley, and
therefore regard
gara it

Ua!
as

To form a clear idea
of anything, i
ment for its possibility,
and is ai ,
pretended demonstration
against it/

fin

£

*T>i?Ly
««

all
Si

/eas

^
°

whatever

° Z a golden
a mountain

*

impossible.

^

With

‘

undeniable argua refutation of any

eS 3 are ade<J ua te
representations of objects
°f
id *“
'

appHcablftfibe'objec^s

/st“e

oui a^y

te

^

•

""

^

TO mparlIon fffge
contradictory , with-

Hune-S support for the
inference from inconceivability
to
impossibility is not totally
unqualified.
In the first quote he
does not specifically state
the principle that what is
inconceivable
impossible , although he does give
an example employing it.
In
the third quote above, he
confines the principle within
the very

limited sphere of a discussion
of extension and division.

But his

support for the inference from
conceivability to possibility is
clear and unqualified. The second
of the passages just quoted is
a portion of Hume's famous
argument that laws of nature are not

necessary because their contraries
are conceivable (and hence possible)
The inference seems to be important
to some of Hune's most widely

known views
W.

C.

Kneale

has criticized Hume for making an
unwarranted

conclusion in much the same way that we
previously criticized the

argument from epistemic possibility to metaphysical
possibility,
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arguing that Goldbach’s
conjecture is conceivably
false even if
it is necessarily
true.

Kan

Popper

joinder amounts

26

has made a rejoinder
to Kneale.

But his re-

lo a

total conflation of
conceivability and possibility.
Thus he says, "We may,
roughly, describe as
logically necessary what would hold
in any conceivable
world," 2 ? and "Logically
possible or 'conceivable'
is everything that
does not lead to an
2
obvious contradiction." ®
It may be that Hume
simply equated conceivability
and pos-

sibility.

But if he did then there
is no

is metaphysically possible.

argent

here that something

His claim that no natural
law is neces-

sary is merely a restatement
of
1 the
Lne claira
claim that the contraries
of
all such laws are conceivable.
In any case, one of the
two following situations
holds.

Conceivability and possibility may
be two distinct notions
that
Hume was linking together.
If so, he gives no argument
to so link
them.

Otherwise, conceivability and
possibility were merely variant

idioms for a single notion 29
.

If so, then what Hume says
lends

no support to any metaphysical
conclusions one might draw on the
of

..on

metaphysical claims,

and what he says does not consti-

tube an argument at all.
One might, interpret Kant as arguing
that vhat is possible
is crucially dependent upon our
conceptual abilities.

Thus, for

example, it is the fact that space is a
"condition of the possibility
of experience of objects" that places
limits upon what is geometrically

.

,
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possible

But we shall not
consider Kant's

argents for two
To do so would take
us far afield, into
complex and illunderstood territory. Also,
the inferences
lerences irom
from conceivability
to
possibility
and inconceivability to
impossibility that are ordinarily made are not defended
by an appeal to Kantian
arguments.
USe ° f SUCh inferences
ordinarily quite independent
of Kantian
reasons.

.

considerations
concei /able

is thought to carry an

appropriate success

presupposition, then the fact
that something is inconceivable
will
entail that it is impossible.
For example, to say that
p is conceivable might be to say that no
a priori considerations
rule out its
possibility, i.e. that nothing
that can be known a priori
to be
metaphysically necessary is
inconsistent with p. On this
reading,
if P is inconceivable, then
something that can be known a
priori
to be necessary is inconsistent
with p.

world that is a priori possible.

Thus p is false in every

But the metaphysically possible

worlds are a subset of these,
because what is ruled out can be
known
a Eriori to be impossible.

But if a situation can be known
to be

impossible, it is impossible.
If
irrijyOoSxble

r

,

p is inconceivable' is given the reading 'p is a
priori
then what is inconceivable is impossible.

But then

the argument that p is impossible
because it is inconceivable is

unlikely to be persuasuve

,

since the premise will lack the self-

revealing status that it had on the prior
reading of
ceivable’.

'p is

incon-

One would have to be able to determine
that ~p is
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knowaole a ££iori (i.e.

that ~p is a jjrlorl
necessary) to know

,

that p was inconceivable
(a Priori impossible).
SZ'0

S."bl 0

Most philosophers

to 8,P
a ° 7'60 that
q large
“a” a
number °f cases
,

e.g. mathematical
,
and logical truths, can
be known a priory to
be necessary. And most
agree that these truths
are metaphysically
necessary truths (at least

in so far as it is
agreed that the notion of
metaphysical necessity

has any application at
all

controversial

-?

~

5

in this case, inconceivable

that

Rn+

1

respect to the interesting,

„4
at
least as likely to doubt
that p is,
.

,

(i.e., that it can be
known a priori

is necessary) as one is
to doubt that p is metaphysically

impossible,

the success presupposition
built into the notion of

knowability a £riori validates the
inference from "It can be known
a priori that ~p is necessary'
to 'p is metaphysically
impossible';
but this success presupposition
makes it difficult to see how
one
could determine that the premise
is true without presupposing
the

truth of the conclusion.
In sum, then, we have found
no argument to support the

inference from conceivability to
possibility, and the inference from
inconceivao j.lit,y to impossibility is
supportable only if conceiv-

ability is thought to carry a success
presupposition— but then we
can expect to have no insight into
any of the controversial cases

m

WhiGh the Possibility or impossibility
of something is in question.

vi
We have just noted a connection between
'It can be known

—

P r l° ri
..

.

p is necessary’ and 'p is necessary'.

But that is

t
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a -very triviar sort
of connection.

If someth
in
methmg
can be known
,

ja priori
then it is true simply
because it is true
urue if
n it can be known at all.
With su.itcibj_0 doctorinooc.orxng n,-p
of use-mention problems,
we could have simply
dropped the words 'a nrinm'
and necessary' from
__ priori
the above; the
inference would still be
valid.

u

,

'

.

r

But a more significant
connection between the a
priori and
the necessary has often
been affirmed. It has
often been claimed
that p can be known a
priori if an d only if
p ls necessary.
with that claim, one often
finds it alleged that
p can be known
a p riori if and only
if p i s analytic.

^

Kripke has been puite
explicit in divorcing necessity
from
both of these notions, a
B ri°ricity and analyticity 32 He has argued
that some necessary truths
are known only a posteriori
fe.v.
"This
.

table is composed of vood")-although,
it may be that any necessary
Con b- an own a

known a pr ion

(

priori — and

that some contingent truths
might

This stickfthe standard meter)
is one meter long").

He also recognizes necessary
truths that are not analytic
("Cicero =

Tully" and "Aristotle is a man").

(A major portion of this
disserta-

tion has argued that in recognizing
non-trivial instances of de re

attributions of necessity Kripke must
divorce necessity from analyticity, so it is no surprise that he
does so.)

Equating analyticity and the a priori was
part of a major

program in twentieth century empiricism.

It was

thought that if it

could be shown that all a priori, knowledge
was knowledge of analytic
truths

,

then the thesis that all important knowledge
was based on
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experience could be
supported.

A priori knowledge
was to be ex-

^

Plained away as knowledge
of contentless

established merely by the
way we use language.

Empiricists in this tradition,
of which the logical
positivists
are the primary example,
also eschewed metaphysics,
regarding it as
an attempt to reach
beyond experience.
'Necessaryaccessary and related,
terms
were to have a legitimate
use only in so far as
they could be equated
with the epistemological
term -a priori and terms
related to it.
Thus metaphysical truths
and a priori knowledge
were both to be
g ounded
language,
so far as such metaphysical
truths were to
te recognized as meaningful
at

w

m

m

all.

^us

we find A. J. Ayer affirming
33
that
"The certainty of
a priori propositions
depends upon the fact that
they are
analytic" and that 3 ^ "The validity nf a
aity of a priori propositions
depends
upon certain facts about verbal
usage." He claims that it is
the
.

•

possibility of going to a dictionary
whenever a statement is not
empirical that legitimizes science-in
contrast with metaphysics,
where neither experience nor
dictionaries can help us 35
.

Quine's arguments can be seen as
attempts to show that one who

adheres to such a program will
have difficulty in giving a
semantics
for QML.
Necessity must be explicated in an explicitly
metaphyscial
way; it can not be explained solely
in terms of analyticity if
quanti-

fying

m

is allowed.

We have supported the general
thrust of Quine's

argument, if not the full force of his
conclusion.

If someone is

to make us of QML to state his
theories about the world, and his
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uses of quantifying in
are not to be eliminable,
then he must explicate at least some uses
of
i„ terms of a notion
other than analyticity.
Thus Kripke has done what
the modal logician must
do when
divorces necessity iron the
linguistic conception supported
by
the positivists. Necessity
and analyticity must be
distinguished
if quantifying in is not
to be eliminable.

But once we have distinguished
metaphysical possibility from
epistemological, conceptual and
epistemic notions, and isolated
the related metaphysical
notions from considerations of
change and
from a solely linguistic conception
of necessity, we should pause
to attempt to determine what
is substantive in the
metaphysical

concepts that remain.

We must see whether we have not
made it im-

possible to argue that these metaphysical
concepts have application
and impossible to defend the
essentialism that is associated with
QML.
The burden of proof seems to be on
the essentialist

;

he must

defend a distinction among properties,
those which are and those

which are not essences, and he must explain
why certain properties
are essential to some things but not
others.

That this load is

actually burdensome becomes even more evident
when we take into consideration the reflections that have so far taken
up this chapter.
The essentialist must convince us that certain
properties and things

are necessarily associated, and it happens

that in doing so he

can not effectively appeal to the non-modal things that
we know
or

can conceive.

Similarly, the interesting claims of necessity

17 ^

aSS ° Ciated

SSSentiali

^

ticity. nor upon the
a priori

and QML can not be
based upon analy.

But the essentialist
is not at a loss for
a basis for his
essentialism, even after the
metaphysics of QML has been
cut off
from these traditional
philosphical doctrines. He
can argue that in
ordinary English ve often
say truly vhat properties
a thing might
or might not have had.
In doing so ve assume
essentialism; i.e.,
the semantics for such
locutions is the semantics
for QML, vhich
"e have Seen t0 be
related «th essentialism. Essentialism

underlies our claims that a
certain thing could not have
had (or
can not have) a certain
property.
Or, when ve say that
something
could have had a certain
property, ve implicitly contrast
that property with others that it lacks
essentially.
This accomplishes little, since
we might just always be wrong

when we make metaphysical claims
to the effect that some object
could
have been F
or at least we might be wrong
whenever being F
is not essential to everything.

We have already seen that modal

terms have many non-metaphysical
uses, which might be confused with

their employment in connection with
absolute, metaphysical necessity.
But the argument lor essentialism
based on considerations

of ordinary language may succeed in
doing one thing.

If such claims

are ordinary assumptions of some
meaningful discourse then essen-

tialism is at least presumptively significant;
and if that discourse
has the ring of truth, then essentialism is
perhaps even presump-

tively true.

What we say may at least shift the burden of
proof

.

from the essentialist to
the anti-essentialist
But closer examination
reveals that what we
ordinarily

say is of little help to
the essentialist.
essenti al <?+

As we have already seen,

-i

'necessary'

,

'possible'

,
,

i\

'essential'
essential and their cognates
are used in
•

many ways in ordinary
discourse.

The question we must
ask is whether

the metaphysics associated
with QML theories ever
underlies ordinary
claims employing modal terms.
In particular are there
non-trivial
attributions of de re necessity
which are both true and
appropriately
,

metaphysical?
Because of the multiple uses of
modal terms, the existence
of obviously true claims
employing them validates no
metaphysical
view, unless their employment
can be certified to be a
metaphysical
use of the terms.
As we have seen, some Cartesian
arguments, for
example, fail because such certification
can not be made.
In fact,

m

addition to the traditional philosophical,

but non-metaphysical, notions with
which modal terms are connected,

there are other uses of modal terms which
can not be appealed to in
the attempt to defend the view that
the metaphysical notions associ-

ated with QML have application.

We make a distinction in ordinary

language between

re uses of necessity in the follow-

ing sentences

de_

dicto and

de_

:

(1)

It is necessary that some horse will win.

(2)

There is some horse such that it is necessary
that he

will win.
Here we find a de re- de dicto distinction, but it is
obvious that

.
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involved here is a claim
about what is determined
by the rules
° f hOTSeraClng
iS
various metaphysically
posslble
worlds is irrelevant.
Such a use of modal
terms merely indicates
the relationship of
certain facts to some
background assumptions
taken as fixed termporarily 36
-

^

It is also worth noting
that the de re assertion
of neces-

ty,

for*

(2), is false.
r

Q(3x)F

f

Usually, when two ordinary
assertions of the

U)QFx

a

it is the apparently
essentialist

^
,

^

de re assertion that is
false.

But when the two do not
differ in truth-value, then
the claim that
their use involves a distinction
which logic must reflect is
dubious.
Of course there are instances
in which essentialists
claim
that the de re but not the
de dicto is true.
For example, it is thought
that there is something (e.g.
, Aristotle)
that is essentially a man,
even though it is not necessary
that there are men.
But acceptance
Of such examples relies upon
a prior acceptance of
essentialism.
and the anti-essentialist will
certainly not be convinced by them.

Such considerations as these do
not show that the possible

worlds framework is not useful in
analyzing such claims as (l) and
(2).

We can imagine the range of
possible situations in which the

horseo race.

In all such situations one horse
wins.

no horse that wins in every such
situation.

But there is

Thus the truth of (l)

and the falsity of (2) can be easily
mirrored in a structure based

upon the notion of possible worlds.
But what we imagine in such a case is
the range of situations

,

,
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:°" sistent witb the ruies ° f hors

™- - -**

the raoe is run
tSllS US that lf a
race iS rUn accor
“*>« to the rules, one
horse
(2> tSllS
<falSely) that «»
-les determine which
Heither
Snythlng about - b at
is metaphysically
possible nor is any
claim about vhat is
metaphysically possible
presupposed by (l) or
(2).
.

“

,

we hare argued,
then, that 'necessary.

,

.possibly.
etc. are associated
with conceptual, epistemic,
epistemolo g ical

tempera! and linguistic
conceptions.

“

COnneCtl ° n Wlth attemPtS
t0 say

background information.

-rely stylistic variants

Furthermore, they are
used

*at

is consistent with
certain

(We might add that
they are occasionally

of quantifiers.)

We have found no
reason
so far to think that
their unimpeachable uses
are associated with

metaphysical possibility.
The essentialist can
still respond that even
though ’necessary'
and 'possible, are often
used in connection with
an assumption of
certain background information,
there are certain things
that we
hold constant no matter
what our background
assumptions are. Thus,
we do not say that Socrates
could have been a rock, that
if he were
a rock, then such-and-such,
or that if so-and-so, then
Socrates
would has- been a rock. An
absolute assumption is that
Socrates
must at least be animate.
Such assumptions are incorporated
in the
semantics of modal discourse.
Such a semantics reflects the
fact
that Socrates is essentially
animate.

The usual semantics for counter-f
actuals gives some plausi-

)
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biUt.y to this line.

If a is not possibly F,
then "If a were F,

then p" and "If a were F,
then not-p" haye the

saiue

truth-yalue.

Counter-f actuals related in this
way are odd, and that oddity
is
due to the impossibility of
the antecedent's truth.
(When the

antecedent is possible, "If
q were

,

then p would be" entails the

denial of "If q were, then
p would not be."

When the antecedent

is impossible, both are
true.

But the oddity of a counter-factual
(or its failure to in-

terest us) may be due to things
quite other than the metaphysical

impossibility of its antecedent.

A supposition is odd when we are

not concerned about its consequences—
not merely when it is impossible.
Our intuitions about the oddness of
counter-factuals may rise from

sources other than the impossibility of
the antecedent.
Even if one supposes that we never do
consider the counter-

factual possibility that Socrates is an inanimate
object, one might

question whether that is because such an assumption
is semantically
or metaphysically incoherent, or rather merely
because it is point37
less.
The fact that something is odd to say does not
guarantee
its incoherence.

Since the essentialist is relying on our intuitions

about what is acceptable English, he has a problem
here.

We can

have intuitions that a sentence is peculiar without knowing
just

why it is peculiar.

Our lack of interest in what would happen to

Socrates were he inanimate is sufficient to account for the peculiarity
of che supposition that ne could be inanimate.
or semantical incoherence needs to be posited.

Wo metaphysical
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appeal to counter-factuals
can also be based upon
predications made in the consequent
of such a conditional.
For example,
"If
then a would be an F." If
there is no consistent
replacement for
•' that makes
the subjunctive true,
then that is used
as evidence that a could
not be an F (i.e., that
being non-F is
essential to a). Similarly, the
existence of a coherent, true
instance is evidence that a is
possibly F.
-An

•

•

Unfortunately for the essentialist

,

if we are to consider

such evidence at all, we seem
forced to conclude that it
counts against
most of the common essentialist
claims.
For example, each of the

following seems to be true (or at
least not obviously implausible):
If evolution had been slower,
we would all be chimpanzees.
If we were all numbers, then
Kripke would be a number.
If everything is purely material,
then Kripke does not

have an immaterial soul.
-ne truuh of these statements can
not be accounted for merely

by alleging that their antecedents are
impossible, since the counterfactuals formed by taking each antecedent
together with the denial
of the consequent seem false.
An essentialist might disagree with the
claim made here

about these sentences— arguing either that their
truth is the result
of the impossibility of their antecedents or
that the conditionals
are incoherent or deviant because of the
vacuousness of their ante-

cedents.

But to do so he must appeal to essentialism to
support

his claims about the antecedents.

But then an appeal to his findings

j

A

•
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to support essentialism
would be blatantly circular

viii

Knpke employs

the stratagem of appealing
to ordinary locu-

tions in an attempt to
capitalize on the essentialism
that allegedly
underlies them. We have
mentioned the efficacy of this
procedure.
What is needed is a direct
argument for the appropriate
sort of
essentialism.
But there is one passage
in which Kripke does
give an argument
that if a table is made
from a certain piece of
wood, then it could
not have been made from
any other. 38
Let 'A' be a name (rigid
designator) of a table, let 'B'
name the m
eoo rs-c
piece
of wood it actually came
from
Let 1 name
another piece of wood. Then
suppose A were made from
n the actual world, but
also another table D were simul'
B ^ D; henoe > even if D vere
°
mSe°by
b Itsel?
4 n
tabBe
were
made from A, D would not
°..
be B
rsicl*
f
lc
[Apparently
there
is
an error in the text
The^lastf two’B's should be’A's
and the last ’A' shoSd be
m.r

™

'

—

,•

a.

V

_

5

,

'

-*

This argument begs the question.

It assumes that whatever

table is made from C will be table D
and not table A.

assumes that A is essentially not
made from

C.

That is, it

But that is what

is at issue.

What we want to suppose is that A is
made from C rather

than from B.

There is no apparent reason to think
that such a suppo

sition can not coherently be made.
Indeed, facts about the way a thing originates
seem at least

——

as facts about what it originates from.

Thus, being

made at a certain point in the history of an
assembly line might
be regarded as crucial to A's identity.

If C had been fed to the

.

assembly line at a
certain time instead
of B, then A would
have
been made from C, not
B.
But our goal Is not
to argue that some
other property Is
essential to the table,
The purpose of the
last example is to
mustrate that we could hold
different facts about the
table con-

counter-factual suppositions.

Neither being made of
B nor
having been made at a
certain point in the
assembly line's history
13 abS ° 1Ute1
^
metaphysically essential to
table A. Different
properties can count as
important in different
contexts; nothing
need be regarded as
essential.
As Kripke has pointed
out, ve stipulate that
an object is
the same object in a
counter-factual situation. We
do not need
any properties by which
it must be qualitatively
recognised as being
the same object (or, as
Lewis would have it, a
counterpart of the
Object).
The essentialist recognises
certain constraints on what

”

—

SUPUlate

-

U1

he has a right to do,
appealing to ordinary

language, is to recognise
that certain stipulations
are odd.
But
their oddness need not be
accounted for by their metaphysical
inadmissability.
It might rather be associated
with the pointlessness
of certain counter-factual
suppositions

’

.

NOTES

Quine puts it this way in
Word and Obiert.

195.

,

2

0

Something like thi s seems to
be what Lewis had in
mind.
chapter 1, f n 5.

Cf

.

J JpJ f T ^

”

" hlch
gome
dlSSerta '
tion, "On Physical Modalities,"
Dube UniyersitY^loSU
196h
J’
haYe =°nsidered defeasible
.
.
water - soi
«*>jects diss olve when
+’
c£ i
exa“P les
of physically necessary
statements.’

tionally

S

Ja

?

"Be Re et Be'

”

Dijf
'

’

'

'

^

>

Z beJ

° f Kecesait
Xa

"World and Essence" and

.

6'g

’

" TrUth

Empiricism.

by Conventloa "

™d

"Two Bogmas of

Note that in the anti-essentialist
models discussed in
chapter 6c such claims would be false.

m

,

.

In fact other notions structurally
similar to modal
notions might have structural
analogues of essentialism associated
with them.

^

11
13
t0 thS examP le used
Dagfinn F^llesdal
!in
n "Ounnfirf
Quantification
into Causal Contexts,” Boston Studies
i n the
0
v
ei Cohea ana Wartofsky (New York,
?^ 71
M
^’ £d L Llnsky
(

iJr
Jo J

-

-

1970,

^m

-

-

9

I
ShOUld be remembered that the results of
part II assume
w-v2
R-K
Thus an argument that a certain notion
of necessity does
not fit such model structures would
exempt it from our discussion,
tor example, if physical necessity were
construed in such a way
that HRH' if and only if H' has all of the
physical laws of H/then
R would (prooably not be construed
as a symmetric relation.
Such
a notion would be outside the scope
of our results.

+w
that

.

l

)

Actually there are plausible candidates for the status
of essential relations.
One might argue that each father and son
are essentially related by the relation 'x is
father of y'.
But
as we saw, TL^ sentences become relevant when these
relations are

182

" 51

^

183
1 *5

SimP lifi ^tion in
considering

o^esseniia?

p^rtL^

in every world

in^hic^it^xists^th^

5* 1

™ 3 H"*

^~

lf U satisfles

/ r *—

'

Fx

hout
to assume that the
appropriate model for
12
’Identity and Necessity" and
"Naming and Necessity."
13
A -stotle's Essentialism,'
Review

^

of

14

*

th *

associated
Change WOUld
in^rpSi^he^l
considerations of whether
’
W S 0uld consider essential
between uujecxs
relations
obiects as well as essential
f. ?
I
+
properties
mho

with QML entails^th^d^t

^^/1 "

l ^^-^r
l
TT

US
times are entities

1

,

«

11

’

—

“ s»r»

15

nf qmt

Th

*

SaSy t0 Sh ° W that acce Ptance
of the metaphysics

,

r\

ke having a. Socrates-soul or
being the son of the parents*?*
ocrates.
Neither of these "non-qualitative"
properties can serve
as a basis for identifying
Socrates through change.
WS haV left the notion of
identification through change
v „_ n
06 f preclse character is of no
consequence to our
arguments^
l6

K r.LPke has recognized this
distinction.
and Necessity/’ 351, fn. 57.
.

17
18

Cp.

—

Quine, Word

a.nd

Object

,

Cf.

"Naming
S

195.

d
Cf K ripke, e.g., "Naming and Necessity,"
261.
But what I am concerned with here is a
notion which is not a notion
of epistemology but of metaphysics
[A question of possibility]
n ° thlng t0 d ° With an one s knowledge
M
of anything."
Al s
n?-d
307
,

,

~

-

^

r

3.9

Cf

....

'

Michael Hooker, "The Non-identity of Descartes
and
(A
^972).
version
of
this
paper
{’
was
read
Y
f
]+ rf
at
the American Philosophical
Association meetings in Atlanta
December, 1973.)
3

J

°d

-

npul3li hed

’

'

.

20
of, Descartes., translated

oso P hical Work
G. R. T. Ross
Ve
a rough aPP™xiargUment ;
*= no

b^Elifaba+h" s' ‘Xi
aldan e and
j-

'

(Cambridge, 1931) v t o 1Q
i?
matlon to what I take to be Desert
mere paraphrase of a singlj
passage
,

he probably actually
gives

1

Cf

Sn v

f

U

“

.everal^^"^^^^*

“d

C
V
lnga
necessity -P is
conceivable oft™ mean^p
case the di.cji“
*ich
Here We consid er it in
the sense of 'P is imasinahi^' 0
Wd
~f 1S not conce Ptually
false’,
We will discuss still onn+h
f.
n ° tl0n ° f ^eivability
later in
this section
’

.

“

’

•

^

^j^eatise of Human Nature, Book
23
2k
25

,

Part III, section VI.

Ibid

.

,

Part I, section II.

^

1968 ), 1426-3

28

.

Probability an d Induction (Oxford,
191+9), 78-80.

26

27

Ibid

I, Part I, section II

'

L° £lC ° f Sclentlflc Discovery
(London, 1959, i960.

Ibid

.

,

1+28.

Ibid

.

,

1+29

suotle variant

of this would be to use these
claims
!
as oart of „ v r ° ader
? lan t0 def end the thesis that there is no indel me +ta.physical
^
possibility— i.e
that

**

all possibility depends
conceptual.
It may be that Hume was doing
something like
If S °’
remarks are quite inimical to attempts
to support
ma
etaphysical claims by psychological
considerations.
In undermining
me apnysics he undermines the
metaphysical interpretation of QML that
we have been considering.

JnSn

.

1

,

e

*

,

R. S. Woolhouse has recently discussed
this in "From
Conceivability to Possibility," Ratio ( 1972
UI+), 1
Ultimately
5 I+.
he reads Hume to be arguing that since the
contingency of natural
lavs has revealed itself to me and is clear
and visible," natural
laws are contingent.
He never explains what grounds there are to
tnxnk thao anyone has ever had such a revelation,
nor why we should
believe that Hume thought that there were experiences
revelatory
of the metaphysical status of natural laws.
More significantly, Arthur Pap has discussed Hume’s view in
Semantics and Necessary Truth (New Haven, 1958), 69 - 86
He suggests
.

?K

(.o™.^

ght have mersod

31

T4it would really be more
appropriate
example based on the application
of the categories

+~

^“

32
f

33
34
35

36

•

^•o

•

5

L anguage, Truth and
Logic

?T

3

260— 76

(New York, 19U6)

16
’

Ibid.

Ibid
Cf.

.

,

13-iU.

Quine, Word and Object
er

anti-essentialism?^
38

Naming and Necessity

„

^

POint

.

195.

“

Ms

Naming and Necessity," 350-51,

n.

un P ubllshed paper on

56.

APPENDIXES

.

:

APPENDIX

I

In this appendix there is
a formal exposition of the
Kripke-

style semantics discussed in
Part II of the dissertation,
together
with the most important material
used to prove Theorem A, the

principal result of chapter

5

Our semantics follows that given
by Kripke in "Semantical

Considerations on Modal Logic" except
that instead of the notation
used by Kripke— 'cp(Ax ...x
H)=T with respect to an assignment
1
of
n
,

a

i

’

’

‘

a

n

to x r*-V-~we will say

’

is a function which assigns some

cp(A,

H, I )=T* where each I
1

UjE^to

(and thus to each free variable of A).

write

1

<p(

A

,

H)=T’

i

each variable of the language

If A is closed, we may

.

Following Kripke, we define a quantif icational
model structure
as an ordered quadruple

reflexive relation on
We let t(=U

H£K f

tp

letter and H£K, then

I

,

tp

K,

R,Y>

G£K and

K.

.

K is a set and R is a

^(h) is a set, for each H£K.

(H).

The model

every KEK.

<G,

is defined so that if P n is a n-adic predicate
n
cp(P

,

H)c^n

.

cp(

= , H) =

£

<^u,u)

J

ueU j,

for

gi es a truth-value to each formula relative to some
<

as follows

187

)

.

"
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(i)

Tor atomic A;
(pn

(Xi,... x ), H, I )=T if and only if
n

<P

s

<Kx 1 ),...,i(x
(iii

^
^

)

A *-

tp(

5

1

)

)> £cp(p

n
,

H).

=t is and only if

cp(A,

H, l)^T.

H, I )=T if and only if

5

H, I )=T and cp(B, H, l)=T.

tPvA,

(iv)

H

»

n

(3x)A

,

H, I)=T if and only if
there is some I'

such that I' is like I in
what it assigns to the free

variables of r (3x) A

\

(v)

tp(

nA

4>(A,

H,

,

H

'

,

I

I'(x)ef( H ), aud

cp(A,

H, I')=T.

)=T if and only if

I )=T

for every H' such that HRH

If A is a closed formula we
may write

.

'

H)=T’.

'cp(A,

In order to prove the results
cited we need several special

definitions
n.x

A

is a conjunction of wffs of the

formx^x"

k

j

for every j, k such that

including

both^'

x^.

and

and'Xj^,

x^.

occur free in A and j<k, but not

for any j, k.

(if x

n

is the numeri-

<C-,

^

K, R/f y

for some I
±

any

H£n

°

~ -- ^ L

is adapted from Parsons's definition
of
-~Ii

^t model is a model

such that for any formula A, if

and some H£K, then

cp(

^x^A*

,

H,

cp

fl

x

n n

.

.

on a model structure
r

cp(

n. x

I^T

A
.

a"'

,

for any

H, l)=T
I.

and

(ihis definition applies to models for languages without

.

constants

'

2

We assume an enumeration of such sentences
throughout.)

The definition oi PLx

^

k’

j

cally latest variable in A, then there will
be at most 2
such sentences.

42

or x

:
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Suppose that A is a wff of
QML and

structure

is a model on a model

cp

<G, K, R,V'>
f

is defined as follows
(0)

If A is atomic, A^ = A.

(1)

If

(2)

'V^henA^V)

1

Ais
A is

It

B.C

If A is

(^)

(A)

then

(x)B~'

then

A^*

=

*

r

If A is

(3)

,

r

oB

.

r

=

(

x )B

(pi
.

then

,

if B contains no free variables,
then A^
r

n(B

is
(B)

(f>

)"'.

if b contains free variables,
and x
z

is the

numerically earliest variable not
occuring
ln B (either free or bound),
then A^ is
(

n x -B )v...v(n^xB .BW )
i

tence n.x

B

where each sen-

,

is among n x B ,...,T7 x B and
±
"W

(i)

B

1

r

is

U z )U

for some
(ii)

is

B*

z

ture

<G,

If

.

(3x )(x

2

K, K ,V/

>

z

)

otherwise.

model on a model struc—

K, K

then for any wff A, any I function, and any
H, I).

cp(A,

Theorem A:
,

B
n.x .DB<P \ H,

1

H£K, cpU^, H, I) =

structure

z

is an anti— essentialist

>p

r

4>(

and H£K and

I

Z

Lemma

=xJ‘ if

If

cp

is an

2
,

anti-essentialist model on a model

then for any closed wff A, there is a

closed wff A' such that for any wff B, if
is closed, and for any H£K, cp(A'

,

r

1

nB~

H) = cp(A, H).

occurs in A' then B

IM

)

.

appendix

II

In chapters 6 and 7 the
results of chapter 5 are extended

in two ways.

In chapter 6, the definition
of

'

anti-essentialist

model' is generalized in such a way
that it applies to models for

languages with constants; and Theorem A
is still true.
PP-models are defined.

In chapter 7

The set of anti-essentialist models
is a

subset of the set of PP-models; yet
Theorem APP, the extension of

Theorem A to this class of models can
be proved.
The formal material of these two
chapters is summarized

below.
Let

'a',

'3',... range over singular terms
(vairables and

constants) of the formal language,
a way that cp(a)€

ij

a is a variable.)
a constant.

cp

for each constant

,

l(c<)€ LI if a is a

and

I

a.

('cp(a)’

are redefined in such
is undefined if

variable; l(a)=<p(a) if a is

Clause (i) of the truth-definition (cf. Appendix i)

is altered:
(i

For atomic A:

’

(a_^

<-P(P

, .

.

.

,o<

n

)

<l(a ),...,i(a
1

,

H, l)=T if and only if

n )>

£cp(p

n

,H)

To redefine anti-essentialism we introduce

A|
’

a

If

i

conjunction of
and

°j
r

=a

a
J

^

“k

or

a^a^

occurin S free in A
r

'

r

and a.^cc
J

'

K

>

,

’

the

for each variable or constant

such that j<k, except that not both

are conjuncts of FT.a
1

190

A
.

(A constant is said to

x

x

191

occur free in A if it
occurs in A.)

I„ addition, let
J

j

,

Q
be functions such that
J.(a)ell, for every
constant or variable a
reStri = ted ’
<Jl 13
^0 functions K such
that KtcO^a).)

—
-An

“ h

^

anti-essentialist model is a
model

such that for any formula
A, if cpfn.oAoA1

and some H€K, then

<p(V

A
ni.aa =xtA'
znA

n
H

,
1

i

r

on

<p

K>

^

J )- T for
f„ some

>

,

J.

H
T \_-p
H,
J.)_
T for any J.

and any H£K.
To prove Theorem A,
a slightly revised
definition of 'A*'
Is required.
Case (0)-( 3 ) are the
same as in the definition
of
Appendix I. Case
is
as follows;
(M
If A is

(^)

(A)

r

,

1

db"

then

,

if B contains no free
variables or constants, then
r
is
n(B^)
'

.

(B)

if B contains free terms
and x
2

is the first

variable not occuring in B
(free or bound), then
A IS
(n.0 B )v. .r(n a B .B V
E
) , Where each n.a
v
.

.

is among n a B ,.

.

.

,n a

(i)

fil

B

and

v

-f-

n

is

(x
z

)(x =x
'

z

if

)

z

B

r
4)(
'

n.a .DB
i

tp

\

H, I )=t

for some I and some H£K
(3x )(x
^

z

z

otherwise.

)

The proof of theorem A is precisely
analogous to the proof
"based on the definitions of Appendix
I.

In chapter 7 a stronger theorem,
Theorem APP, is proved.

First, a PP-model is defined as a
model
for any n-place predicate P n
r
<p(

P

n.x o( aP Xl

.

.

.

n

v

~Px 1

.

on

<G, K,

any H£K, and any assignment I,

,

.

cp

.

n

)\

H

,

I )= T or

such that

yn

19

or

r
<p(

n x

P
=>(

Q px

x

structible from x

.

1

’
.

n

A ~Px'1

v
)
;

.

Y

u

f*

n

5

’

’

1
I/-T (for any n.x p
con^

‘

‘

A* is then defined
as the formula which
results frQm
each formula f o B ln
A by
B*t (If there is no formula
in A, A* is A.
'

W

)

E
n

ry PP -“ del

7Thx p

.

’

•

ap x ...x
1
n

*«° "**
.

P

H.

<p(V -(^r-.Xn ^Pxr ..xn )\

I )=T

that for any primitive
predicate
for some H and I, then

H, I)=T for every H
and I.

Given

this it is easy to prove

Theorem APP:

If

<p

is a PP-model on

<G, K, K2
,

,

then

for any closed wff A
there is a closed wff A'
such that
A' contains no quantifying
in (i.e. , every wff
i„ A

'W

IS closed) and for any
HOC, cp(A'

,

'

H) = <p(A, H).

A* is such a wff.

Every anti-essentialist model
is a PP-model
is stronger than Theorem
A.

,

so Theorem APP
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